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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/2630

Title: Random Matching in the College Admissions Problem
Authors: Pais, Joana
Keywords: Matching
College Admissions Problem
Stability
Random Mechanism
Issue Date: 2006
Publisher: ISEG – Departamento de Economia
Citation: Pais, Joana. 2006. "Random Matching in the College Admissions Problem". Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão - DE Working papers nº 13-2006/DE/UECE
Series/Report no.: DE Working papers;nº 13-2006/DE/UECE
Abstract: In the college admissions problem, we consider the incentives confronting agents who face the prospect of being matched by a random stable mechanism. We provide a fairly complete characterization of ordinal equilbria. Namely, every ordinal equilib¬rium yields a degenerate probability distribution. Furthermore, individual rationality is a necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium outcome, while stability is guaranteed in ordinal equilibrium where firms act straightforwardly. Finally, we re¬late equilibrium behavior in random and in deterministic mechanisms.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/2630
ISSN: 0874-4548
Appears in Collections:UECE - Documentos de Trabalho / UECE - Working Papers
DE - Documentos de trabalho / Working Papers

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