Trust and political orientations

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Abstract:
This paper discuss the rebirth of trust studies in recent years, especially in the field of political attitudes and opinions. The case study presented try to explore the relationship between electoral behaviour and political orientations, regarding the people’s views about the role of state, market and ‘third sector’ and application of law or social self-regulation. We found prevailing statists and liberal orientations, but also a ‘concealed’ group of Portuguese voters.

Keywords:
Trust
Political orientations
Electoral abstension
‘Concealed’ people
Portugal
Trust and political orientations

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Rafael Marques**

1. Introduction: The Rebirth of the Trust Studies

For decades the trust concept was a silent partner of the sociological endeavor. Forgotten by Encyclopaedias, seldom discussed directly by prominent authors, “trust” remained merely a way of approaching the hobbesian problem and elaborate on the causes of solidarity, cooperation and social order. Beginning in the eighties, however, the concept has been revamped by a plethora of new approaches concerned with the role of trust in cultural and social capital (Pendenza, 2000; Coleman, 1988); social networking (Granovetter, 1985); political action (Dunn, 1988); dynamics of organizations (Kramer and Tyler, 1996; Lazaric and Lorenz, 1998; Dasgupta, 1988); relations between patrons and clients (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984); or even criminal organizations (Gambetta, 1992). Some go as far as claiming that trust is the most important asset when it comes to explain the reasons behind the development success of some countries and the ongoing failures of others (Fukuyama, 1995). Trust can also be seen as a proto moral element capable of economizing on transaction and authority costs and contracts, thus leading to organizational solutions close to what is generally known as quasi markets or quasi organizations (Landa, 1994).

At the same time, political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists and economists alike multiplied their efforts and tried to build-up a general theory of trust. Despite some important contributions, the concept remains fuzzy and it is not difficult to find it applied in completely different senses. Bernoux and Servet (1997), Gambetta

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* This paper results from the research project “Trust Society: the Social Construction of Trust in Portugal”, led by José Maria Carvalho Ferreira (of Socius/ISEG-UTL, with Science and Technology Foundation funding under reference no. 47666/2002). This study includes various lines of research, including this political approach.

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(1988), Hardin (2004), M.A.U.S.S (1994); and Thuderoz et al. (1999) offer a collection of papers that present the wide spectrum of perspectives currently in use to define trust, mistrust and distrust. Barber (1983), Eisenstadt (1995), Giddens (1990), Lewis and Weigert (1985), Luhman (1979), Misztal (1996), Seligman (1997), Sztompka (1999) or Williamson (1993) can be considered the major contributors to the theoretical advances of trust theory today. Despite their theoretical differences, if we search for a common denominator among these contributions, we’ll be able to find some important elements: the relational dimension of the concept and the intrinsic vulnerability of the truster; the risk situation permeating the social encounter; the salience of the expert systems in the build up of confidence environments; the power dynamics and the costs created by the absence of trust.

2. Three Approaches to Trust and a Sensitizing Concept

Despite the huge number of trust definitions currently in use in Political Science, Sociology and Economics, we can limit them to three basic types: rational choice models, normative frameworks and relational and interactive constructions. The former is very close to the theorizing of the economical mainstream, claiming that both the truster and the trusted will act, in such a way as to maximise their utilities and self interest (cf. Brennan, 1998). They will decide to trust or not to trust after a very careful and thorough calculation of the probable outcome of each option. Information and the evaluation of the probabilities are central to their endeavour. Normative approaches tend to centre their reasoning on socialization and the generalization of sets of moral rules, leading to the build-up of a clear-cut system of expectations. Internalization of rules and pro social dispositions are central to this approach. Finally, the relational models are based on the idea that trust is a contingent construction embedded in webs of mutable social relations. Trust is socially (re)constructed in an interactive context.

As it happens often with rational choice models, Hardin (1993, 1996, 1998, 1999) has been able to advance a very elegant and simple definition of trust, making it an invaluable resource for the conduction of empirical research. Hardin argues that we should view trust as nothing more than ‘encapsulated self interest’. Trusting others is not a bet or a blind leap of faith, but a deliberative consequence of believing that they have a strong interest in taking my own interests into consideration. The encapsulation
comes from the fact that the fulfilment of someone’s objectives is strictly dependent on the articulation with others. Trust results from the evaluation of the available information that we deem to be reliable and consistent and is the product of a cognitive calculation of some sort of subjective probability that we attribute to different outcomes. The truster knows that he needs the others if he wants to attain his objectives, but he also calculates whether the trusted have some sort of interest in aligning themselves with him. Trusting becomes a cognitive choice framed by risk. The more information I have on a particular individual, the lower the risk associated with trusting.

In deep contrast with this definition we have some authors (Uslaner, 2002) that argue that trust is much more a generalised attitude towards others than the product of rational calculation by self-interested individuals. Uslaner advances a moral conception of trust, defined not by interactions (repeated or not) or reputation, but rather by a dispositional or attitudinal type of action guide. Trust is ‘a moral value that reflects an optimistic world view and helps explain why people reach out to others in their communities who may be different from (and less fortunate than) themselves’ (Uslaner 2002: 16). The ‘optimism’ in Uslaner’s definition can easily be presented by a rational-choice author as nothing more than a leap of faith or as a mere expression of the risky nature of all trust relations. Anyway, the presentation of this moral side of trust helps to explain that trust may well act as a substitute for honor, or friendship in cosmopolitan societies, which live beyond the direct and straightforward control of traditional communities. At this level, trust works not only as a lubricant of social systems or as a ‘Pagani mechanism’, but also as an ‘as if’ protocol, meaning that in the presence of risky situations, trust creates semi certainties and semi assurances that facilitate everyday life. Acting out of a sense of trust can induce reciprocation by the others, thus generalizing this disposition inside a particular society. The *quid pro quo* of reciprocity would lead to a virtuous circle of trust.

It is very interesting to find out that, during the last two decades, a new group of economists have been using laboratory experiments, namely dictator, ultimatum and trust games to question the universal validity of the self interested approach to the economic realm (Fahr and Irlenbusch, 2000; Berg *et al.*, 1995; Kirchler *et al.*, 1996; Bolle, 1998; Burnham *et al.*, 2000). Using data collected in laboratorial settings, they’ve been able to present a more nuanced view of economic agents. In fact, these experiments proved the importance of warm glow, trust, reciprocity and amiable behaviour and challenged the universal determinism of the *homo oeconomicus*.
possibility of exchanging good for good and retaliating after being hurt, even when retaliation involves forfeiting a gain, only proves the importance of trust in everyday life. At the same time, it demonstrates the validity of a *homo reciprocans* approach to the social and economic worlds. The revamping of the trust concept in sociology was also facilitated by Granovetter’s seminal paper (1985) that has been a cornerstone of the New Economic Sociology. In this paper, Granovetter reintroduces trust as a decisive dimension of economic action, objecting to its reduction to a simple reputational device. Trust is part of his weaponry against both the under and over socialized conceptions of human action.

Accepting this interactive dimension, we were able to establish a work in progress definition of trust; a sensitizing concept we used to shed some light to the various dimensions of the phenomenon.

1. Trust is a social relation established between two independent social agents that can exchange roles, pursuing different goals, but that submit each other to an interdependence frame that anchors the result of one to the actions of the second. The canonical form of trust can be represented as X trusts Y to do Z in the context K, under the conditions F1, F2, …, Fn.

2. Trust is not a leap in the dark or a blind jump of faith. Trust defines limited responsibilities and mitigated actions, either by tacit agreements or by formal contracts.

3. Trust works like an “as if” social mechanism, simplifying the complex, reducing the uncertain, and mitigating risky situations.

4. There are no societies without trust. However trust can be converted in confidence or faith. Dissipation and conversion mechanisms are crucial to the understanding of the peculiar types of trust in every society across time and space.

5. Distrust is not the denial of trust but a civilizational mechanism central to the modernization process. Distrust has fostered the constitution of decontextualized social relations and enabled the build-up of guarantees that are central to the creation of cosmopolitan endeavors.
3. Political Trust

The concept of trust has been central to the study of political attitudes and opinions at least since the works of Almond and Verba (1963), Easton (1965) and Gamson (1968). Trust in political institutions and the political system are part of many polls and surveys around the world. The standard questions on trust replicated in the World Value Survey have even enabled the materialization of many comparative studies. Political trust can be defined as an evaluation of government action and effectiveness based upon citizens’ normative expectations of how governments should act. The concept of political trust encompasses: the relations between citizens and the polity; attitudes toward the political regime; relations with government institutions and agencies, parliaments, and the law.

This extended definition of trust includes the political system, the political regime and the political institutions, but at the cost of violating the interpersonal dimension of a general definition of trust. So, it would probably make more sense to talk of political confidence when we refer to institutions and governments and limit the use of trust to the direct contact between citizens and politicians or civil servants. If we accept the idea that trust is mainly an interpersonal relationship than we should focus our attention not on the political system or the political institutions but the political incumbents in the parliament or in governments. However it remains to be seen if this trust in incumbents can be an active cause of electoral trust in countries, like Portugal, where the personal vote is not paramount. Anyway, this definition of trust based on the assessment of how good the government is acting compared with how good people assess its action (Orren, 1997) can contribute to an interesting approach to the study of political trust. Instead of seeing it as a one dimensional variable – the direct estimation of the quality of the government – trust would be defined as the gap between expectations and perceived action (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2001).

In recent years political trust has been declining on almost all advanced industrial societies (Nye et al. 1997; Norris 1999). This has been attributed by many (Inglehart, 1977, 1990, 1997; Abramson and Inglehart, 1995; Dalton, 2002) to a value shift from materialist to postmaterialist values, a shift responsible for the creation of a new type of political actors prone to challenge authority figures, including the government. These authors consider that the economic development and affluence of the ‘glorious’ 30 years that followed World War II have given rise to a new generation of political actors hardly identifiable with the orientations of the older generations.
These new actors do not follow the traditional political agendas and are more interested in new issues like ecology or minorities rights. Others (Putnam, 1996, 2000) consider that the downward trend in political trust is a direct consequence of the crisis in civil society. Faithful to a Tocquevillean credo, Putnam considers that the health of the political system depends deeply on the energies of the associations and social networks. Even if a plethora of studies has disproved the Putnamian isomorphism between social and political trust, revealing weak statistical relations between voluntary associational involvement and political participation (Kaase, 1999; Newton, 1999, 2001), the impact of his ideas has launched a strong debate on the reasons behind the decline of political trust and whether this decline constitutes a threat to democracy.

Democracy and political trust have been following divergent paths in the last 30 years. The second and third waves of political democratization have been paradoxically accompanied by a consistent decline in political trust. Using data from the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey, Catterberg and Moreno (2006) emphasize that political trust depends partially on government performance, being positively related to well-being, social capital, democratic attitudes, political interest, and external efficacy, suggesting that trust responds to government performance. But, at the same time, political trust is threatened by corruption, political radicalism and postmaterialism.

Many authors (Hetherington, 1998) consider that the erosion of trust, especially in democratic societies, contributes to a general climate of ‘political malaise’. If we add to that the fact that most citizens live in an environment of growing and unmet political expectations, it is easy to understand why it becomes more and more difficult for politicians to govern, meet public demands and generate trust. However, it is far from being proved that this general downward slope of trust in advanced societies is something new. A careful look at these trends only demonstrates that we are experiencing a mirror image situation of what Durkheim at the end of the XIXth century defined as anomie – growing and unmet expectations and aspirations contributed to a general state of frustration.

It is easy to claim that the decline in political trust is strongly correlated with increasing levels of electoral abstention, but that is also far from being proved. In fact, growing dissatisfaction with democratic government may well lead to a decline in electoral turnout (especially in those elections deemed to be less important by citizens) and political participation, but it may also assist the rise of voicing and extreme anti-
government parties (Gamson 1968). Trust is certainly linked with political involvement but the particular type of liaison remains, at least, blurry. A close look at the political trust literature even suggests a hypothesis of convergence at the extremes, meaning that cynicism and sometimes distrust can lead to apathy and withdrawal or more political involvement even with abstentionism.

While distrust may affect electoral participation, leading people to abstention, decreasing trust is more associated to the support of third-party alternatives. Some authors (Peterson and Wrighton, 1998) go as far as claiming that third parties can act as channels of distrust. In a Downsian world of political convergence of the major parties at the centre of the political spectrum, third parties can rise as a vehicle of voice for all distrustful citizens left without a viable political option and unwilling to travel to the ‘big centre’. Third parties’ vote would help to explain part of the ups and downs in political trust. In many ways, and contrary to expectations, distrust is not a source of apathy or reduced participation, but exactly the opposite. Political mistrust is more associated with voice than exit (Citrin and Luks, 2001).

Trusting someone today may well give us a hint on how a particular subject will react tomorrow when facing a similar situation, but her evaluation of the context and her expectations will be paramount, making it difficult to easily predict her response. If trust was simply a by-product of a general personality trait we would expect high stability in the attitudes of people when confronted with the same question across time. But a close look at the social barometers and trust inquiries produced all over the world clearly show huge variations in very short periods. Even those questions that seemingly reflect deeply ingrained feelings cause deep variations, according to the economic situation or the political climate. People are simply not immune to the social context. Trusting immigrants may elicit very favourable answers in a community which has no direct contact with foreigners and very negative answers when their presence becomes salient and the contacts problematic or exactly the opposite reaction if the actual contacts prove non problematic. Trust is not an absolute proclamation but a contextualized relationship. It does not make sense to ask someone if he trusts another – it makes sense to ask him if you trust someone – when, how, how much, to do what and so on.
4. The Case Study

Situated in the subject area of the political representations and behaviours of populations, this study takes a sociological approach. Its starting point is the empirical perception that there are signs of an increasing removal, alienation and distrust with respect to the political system, one that is to be observed both in present-day Portugal and various other countries.

From the point of view of political sociology, an attempt was made, more particularly, to study an abstaining population that exhibited similar electoral voting behaviour to that of the national spectrum but had differences in its socio-urban positioning. Research into the electoral results of very recent years led to the identification of two cases – two “parishes”1 (one urban, in the municipality of Lisbon, and the other rural, in the municipality of Alenquer) – with persistently and repeatedly high voting abstention levels. In the preliminary survey of the data it was ascertained that there were similar characteristics regarding age and low educational levels, fewer similar characteristics concerning socio-economic occupations, and not so many for professional activities. Two pieces of data (from an administrative source) characterising these populations are given below:
- Registered voters: 1,043 in the urban parish – 1,056 in the rural;
- Rate of abstention in the elections (2005 General Election): 37 per cent in the urban parish – 44 per cent in the rural.

This sample was later augmented by another, sociographically contrastive, population of young people, a population of students from a university institute in Lisbon.2 They were also abstainers (though naturally “without a past”) and, apparently, removed, alienated and distrustful with regard to the actual dimensions and functions of the political system. This attitude can be perceived in their “resistance” to adding their names to the electoral roll.

It is now clear that scepticism (escorted by healthy levels of mistrust) is an important part of the dynamics of democratic systems (Listhaug and Wiberg, 1995). This scepticism reinforces citizenship obligations to exert strict control of the works of political institutions. However, studies focused on the links between political trust and attitudes in democratic settings reveal that citizens present more than a healthy

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1 The smallest unit in the portuguese civil and electoral systems.
2 See Abravanel and Busch (1975) for a pioneering study of political trust among university students.
scepticism towards the political system. In fact, there is an undeniable trend leading to huge levels of citizen cynicism towards the political world. Value change plays an important role on political cynicism leading to a spread of distrust of politicians and political institutions. It is also common to claim that young, highly educated citizens and libertarians tend to be both more involved and active in political protests and be more cynical about political institutions (Lee, 2003). So, the comparison between two population sets, clearly different both in terms of average age and in terms of education degree, should correspond to a test of a value shift between traditionalism and reliance on authority to more libertarian values and self determination. This would also represent a deeper social transformation corresponding to the rise of post materialistic values in a society that has gone through a fast process of social change over the last 30 years.

According to some of the relevant academic literature, this distrust tends to have overall and mutual repercussions: in effect, it may extend to agents (leading party figures and militants, those responsible for public affairs, whether elected or nominated, and even journalists and commentators), processes (particularly electoral, though also legislative, business, supervisory, judicial and other processes) and political institutions (parliament, the government, the public administration, local government, the courts, the security and armed forces, etc.).

The survey on the ground took place in 2005, with the application of a questionnaire based on in-person interviews, and involved 198 validated interviews in the rural parish, 128 in the urban parish and 376 among the students. An initial sociographic analysis of the results revealed a similar gender distribution in the three populations; an inevitably extreme polarisation among the students with regard to age (low), studies (more advanced) and occupation (academic); an urban parish population notably older than the rural one; marked inactivity in the urban parish; and a significant minority of self-employed workers in the rural parish.

The results of the survey with regard to electoral choices showed considerable voting stability for the two territories in a comparison of the 2002 and 2005 general elections, with a dominant PSD (Popular/Social Democratic Party), a weak PS (Socialist Party), though with a better result in the rural parish than the urban, and some importance in the city parish for the other parties (outside of the alternating government system). For the students, the panorama of electoral choices was a little different from those observed in the ‘territories’. There was a balance between the majority PSD and PS parties, a certain disturbance in the ‘don't know/non-response’ (DK/NR) replies in
2002 and a rise in the ‘other parties’ in 2005. Finally, the levels of abstentions and spoiled/blank ballots for these three segments of the population remained stable throughout this period. On account of the structural similarities already indicated and the responses obtained in the survey (more homogeneous than expected), from this point we shall present the results of the two territorial populations together, under the label of ‘the parishes’.

5. Political orientations

There is an old tradition in scientific research that consists of analysing not only people's electoral behaviour (objectively expressed through the ballot box) but, especially, the political attitudes implicit in certain choices or opinions manifested by individuals when asked to complete appropriate sociological questionnaires. This has been shown in the pioneering studies on political orientations and families by Lavau (1952), Duverger (1958), Meynaud (1958) and Lancelot-Meynaud (1962). Normally, these attitudes are organised in the form of scales or typologies. The study that inspired the present research was carried out in the United States of America and operationalised the idea of sounding out the citizens' opinions on a greater or lesser state (government) presence in, respectively, economic life and the social behaviour sphere (Pinkerton, 1996).

In our study, the concept of (political) orientation sought to describe the individuals' consistent attitudes towards the role of the government in economic and social life, with the corresponding operationalisation being carried out on the basis of two distinct dimensions. The first was reflected in a question on the best way to guarantee the performance of the economic system. The possible alternative responses offered included regulation dictated by the state, by market mechanisms or by way of the expansion of non-profit institutions (such as cooperatives, associations etc., which make up the ‘third sector’). The second dimension was reflected in a question on ways of disciplining and reconciling the interests (and inherent conflictuality) that exist in living together in society: the respondent could choose between an orientation recommending stricter application of the law (‘law & order’) or, on the contrary, greater spontaneous self-regulation with regard to social relationships.
Though the notion of political orientation is still rather imprecise and equivocal, it seems difficult to find a better one. It has a rationalising content, when ‘general ideas’ or ‘policies’, with a certain internal coherence or sufficient distinction among themselves, are referred to. Its use seems appropriate whenever it involves people who possess a certain level of information (particularly about the economy and legal/state mechanisms) and objective thinking. But it also contains an ideological component, in that the words or linguistic construction used release automatic mechanisms of preconceived categorisation, with precise, highly loaded meanings (e.g. when the term ‘market’ means ‘capitalism’ or ‘exploitation’ and ipso facto is seen as something bad or negative or when ‘law’ suggests something imposed from above, something external to humanity, and not just a social norm, in legal form, to be applied in a certain human context).

In all cases, the information that we have to deal with in analysing the survey results should not be overvalued. What we are attempting to reconstruct and understand consists of mere perceptions, captured by means of ill-aimed questions and simple obligatory and alternative responses. In other words, it consists of ‘idealised’ mental representations (referring to ideal types) that can be captured by ordinary people in their daily exchanges, in a way that is simplified and only roughly approximate to more complete and rigorous definition. This is, however, a technical and communication problem that affects all surveys carried out for scientific purposes. But we must recognise that it also derives from our methodological inadequacies and the fact that we are exploring a conceptual field that is still quite new. In brief: the terms and formulations used are still largely exploratory and need to be improved.

The questions and response alternatives were formulated as follows:

Q46 – With regard to the regulation of the economy, how could the best results be obtained?

1 – With more intervention by the state and public services.
2 – With more liberalisation and private enterprise.
3 – With more intervention by non-profit agencies.

Q47 – With regard to issues of conscience and behaviour, how can the quality of life in our society be improved?

1 – With more intervention and greater strictness on the part of the law and legal system.
2 – Less legislation and more liberty/responsibility for individuals themselves.

Considered in isolation, the responses to these two questions immediately showed clear differences between the ‘parish populations’ and the ‘students’ regarding
the economy. The first group inclined towards a greater role for the state and the second towards further strengthening of the market, with very weak scores being registered for the third sector (even so, they were higher in the parishes). With regard to the regulation of life in society, the two samples recorded similar preferences. The DK/NR responses were within the expected limits (between 12 per cent and 20 per cent of the total).

By combining the matrices of those two questions, a typological index was constructed using the terms contained in Table 1.

Table 1 – Typology of political orientations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of orientation:</th>
<th>Combinations of opinions:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statist</td>
<td>More state in the economy and social relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utopian</td>
<td>More state in the economy and less in society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>More market in the economy and more state in society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualist</td>
<td>More market in the economy and less state in society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societarian</td>
<td>More third sector in the economy and more state in society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libertarian</td>
<td>More third sector in the economy and less state in society</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 indicates the distribution frequencies obtained for the index of political orientation types.

Table 2 – Political orientation frequencies by population (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of orientation:</th>
<th>Parishes:</th>
<th>Students:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statist</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utopian</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualist</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societarian</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libertarian</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK/NR (‘Concealed’)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As can be observed, the respondents' preferences differ greatly. In the parish populations, the statists predominate, followed by the liberals, whereas the liberals dominate among the students, followed by the individualists and, only at this point, the statists. The other types are clear minorities or even very limited in extent.

For the following analyses, we decided to give significance to those who could not, did not want to or did not know how to choose any one of the response alternatives presented to them, the DK/NR group, which we referred to as ‘concealed’ – because they ‘shielded’ themselves from our questions or because, given their complexity, our questions ‘concealed’ them from themselves. They reached frequencies of over 20 per cent, as Table 2 illustrates.

6. Some analyses

We present below the results of certain descriptive statistical analyses relating to this “political orientation” typology and the two populations selected. There are four types of bivariate analyses retained here.

In the first place, let us consider the general direction resulting from the cross-tabulations with sociographical base variables.

In the parish populations, we see that the men tend to be more liberal, individualist and libertarian, whereas the women appear as more societarian, utopian and ‘concealed’. This difference is interesting since only the statist type appears to be gender-neutral, as it accompanies the general pattern of the sample. Furthermore, as far as age is concerned, there are no significant variations according to the different age groups considered, with a few small exceptions: there are a few more of the utopians among the young, the societarians among the middle-aged and the “concealed” among the elderly.

With regard to the influence of the variable education – always for the same population of the parishes – we can see an increase in the individualists among respondents with a middle or higher education, a rise in the liberal, societarian and libertarian types among those with the minimum schooling, and a higher number of the ‘concealed’ among those with no education.

Let us now move on to the student population. Here, everything is identical in the comparisons between individuals of the two sexes, except for the fact that (though
on a very limited scale) there are a few more liberals among the men and a few more of
the ‘concealed’ among the women.

We can see, then, that political orientations tend to be more fragmented by the
condition of birth and the difference in initial socialisation in the “territorialised”
populations. Among the students they tend to be more homogeneous.

In the second place, let us consider the party sympathies shown by the
respondents.

Table 3 – Party sympathies by population and political orientation (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>PSD</th>
<th>PS</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parishes:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statist</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utopian</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualist</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societarian</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libertarian</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Concealed’</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Students:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statist</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Utopian</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualist</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societarian</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libertarian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Concealed’</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As we read in Table 3, about half of the parish respondents say they do not
identify themselves with any party, which also happens with the majority among the
students, though at a slightly lower level. By type of political orientation, the majority
among the statists in the territorialised populations prefer the PS; and, for the students,
the majority among the liberals see themselves in the PSD, as (almost) happens with the
societarians.
In the third place, we analyse the cross-tabulations of those same variables, this time, however, not with the sympathies reported but with the respondents’ declared vote in the 2005 elections for the Assembly of the Republic (which returned the PS with an absolute majority). The numbers can be seen in Table 4. We used the term ‘removed’ (from the party or political sphere) for all those who stated that they had not voted (by a decision taken at the time or because they had not put their names on the electoral roll), had cast a spoiled or blank vote or had responded DK/NR.

Table 4 – Voting in the 2005 General Election, by population and political orientation (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>PSD</th>
<th>PS</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>‘Removed’</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parishes:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statist</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utopian</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualist</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societarian</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libertarian</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Concealed’</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Students:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statist</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utopian</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualist</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societarian</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libertarian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Concealed’</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the parish populations, the vote for the PS was overwhelming and all types of political orientation gave it a majority, with the exception of the libertarians, who preferred other parties (removed from the field of the alternating government system).

With regard to the students, the commentaries can be more highly developed. First of all, the votes exhibited a greater spread. Following that, the liberal majority supported the PSD; the statists opted above all for the PS, though a fair number of them
also took shelter in non-participation; the individualists and societarians were mainly divided between the PS and other parties; the highest percentages of utopians and libertarians supported “other parties”; and, as could be expected, the majority of the ‘concealed’ were for non-participation, though those who voted were divided down the middle between the PS and PSD.

It may be stated, then, that institutional pressure and the utility of participation in elections operates, in reality, far beyond party sympathies. In addition, this time the PS almost completely dominated the vote of these two populations in the territories, whereas among the students there was a much greater division: the majority among the liberals (dominant in this population) opted for the PSD, but the PS attracted significant shares of the preferences among the statists, the individualists and even the ‘concealed’.

In the fourth and final place, we also provide brief bivariate analyses, crossing the various types of political orientation in both the populations with two successive key questions on opinions. The questions relate to their conception of citizenship and the trust they place in the prevailing political system.

Table 5 presents the results associated with the question:

Q.34 - Express your disagreement or agreement with the following statements:
[...] ‘Democracy should be the active involvement of citizens in the main political decisions’ – Response ‘I totally agree’ […]

Table 5 – Political orientation by ‘Total agreement […] with the involvement of citizens in decisions’, by population

(reading the line percentages, in relation to other response alternatives)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of orientation:</th>
<th>Parishes:</th>
<th>Students:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statist</td>
<td>51 %</td>
<td>65 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utopian</td>
<td>48 %</td>
<td>67 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>64 %</td>
<td>59 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualist</td>
<td>59 %</td>
<td>63 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societarian</td>
<td>54 %</td>
<td>55 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libertar</td>
<td>35 %</td>
<td>40 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Concealed”</td>
<td>61 %</td>
<td>56 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>56 %</td>
<td>60 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The different political orientations reflect fairly limited variations in this committed conception of citizenship (whereby citizens should participate in the main political decisions), in the one population and the other. Thus, there seems to be a certain consensus around a demanding idea of democracy, which is more strongly affirmed than the idea that democracy consists ‘of electing leaders who then make decisions’ (which, for example, attracted 50 per cent of the total declarations of agreement among the students) or the idea that democracy serves to ‘protect the citizens from political decisions’ (which obtained 45 per cent of the agreements, under the same conditions).

It is also worth mentioning that, if we include the fraction of those who ‘partly agree’ with the statement mentioned (of democracy as the participation of citizens in decision-making), then we obtain levels of overall agreement that rise to 87 per cent among the ‘territorialised populations’ and 95 per cent among the student population.

These are clearly values that would appear exaggerated and incongruous if they were seen in the light of certain problems relating to the practicability of such a principle. But they show the prevalence of a certain idealistic, perhaps mystical, conception of democracy as ‘government by the people’.

Curiously, only the libertarians diverge from this consensus, displaying a distinctly lower expectation of what democracy should be, in both populations, possibly on account of realistic opinions, lack of faith in the state or a fixation on another possible archetype of social life.

The other key question selected for these cross-tabulations with the different types of political orientation was formulated as follows:

Q.31 – What degree of trust do you place in the state for a solution to the following problems?

[...] ‘Corruption and patronage’ [...] – Response ‘Little trust’

The results obtained are shown in Table 6
Table 6 – Political orientations by ‘Little [...] trust in the state's ability to combat corruption and patronage’, according to population

(reading the line percentages, in relation to the other response alternatives)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of orientation:</th>
<th>Parishes:</th>
<th>Students:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statist</td>
<td>42 %</td>
<td>53 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utopian</td>
<td>46 %</td>
<td>50 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>46 %</td>
<td>43 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualist</td>
<td>23 %</td>
<td>49 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societarian</td>
<td>32 %</td>
<td>43 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libertarian</td>
<td>61 %</td>
<td>67 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Concealed”</td>
<td>53 %</td>
<td>54 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>44 %</strong></td>
<td><strong>49 %</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here, general distrust holds the field. The libertarians are clearly more suspicious of the state's ability to conquer corruption and patronage than most of the others, both in the parish populations and among the students. It can be seen, however, that in the ‘territorialised’ populations of the parishes surveyed, the societarians and especially the individualists are a little less doubtful with respect to that possibility.

As above, it can be seen that, if we combine the fraction of those who show ‘no trust’ with those who expressed the ‘little trust’ that we analysed, we attain overall levels of distrust of the state's capacity to combat corruption/patronage that reach 77 per cent among the parish populations and 89 per cent among students.

Finally, it is to be noted that this greater lack of faith on the part of the students, as compared to the ‘territorialised’ populations, is reflected in practically all the different types of political orientation.

7. Concluding notes

- In recent years, the distrust, non-participation and alienation of Portuguese citizens with regard to the prevailing political system has manifested itself, in particular, in electoral abstention and the failure of new voters to add their names to the electoral roll.
- The different ideas held by the population with respect to the state's role in economic and social life may form rationalised models of reference to the political
system, through the construction of a typology of political orientations; this reflects the electoral universe when it is crossed with variables of a sociographical, attitudinal and behavioural nature for these populations.

- An analysis of the responses obtained in a sociological survey of two populations with high rates of abstentionism shows that the statist and liberal orientation types appear to prevail over the others. However, there remains a significant segment – which cannot be ignored – of the ‘concealed’, who cannot or do not wish to reveal their choices and options to researchers.

- An analysis of the respondents' sociography, of party sympathies and votes, and of the comparison with certain questions on opinions about the political system seems to corroborate the conceptual consistency of the types of political orientation mentioned above.

- The research confirms the role of the PS and PSD as polarisers of the supply of choice among parties, the alternative function performed by the other parties with regard to demand, and the existence of an important element of voters who do not find a satisfactory response in the existing range on offer.

- The interpretation may be drawn that the latter voters, when added to the ‘concealed’ mentioned above, represent an operational measurement of the degree to which citizens distrust the prevailing political system.

- The empirical base of the population surveys was very limited, though perhaps important to and sufficient for this purpose of testing new analytical instruments. New empirical research opportunities with a broader investigation base and the use of more detailed statistical analysis techniques may confirm and improve these methodological mechanisms.
Bibliographical references:


