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The Dutch disease of the Euro Area
peripheral member states

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Abstract

This paper analyzes explanations identified in the literature for the subpar economic performance of the so-called peripheral member states of the Euro Area since the mid-1990s. It argues that a key factor was a Dutch disease-like transmission mechanism, as the adoption of the euro led to a capital inflow shock. This resulted in a structural shift in the productive structure of the peripheral economies away from technologically advanced manufactured goods, which are characterized by higher productivity growth. As a consequence, the peripheral member states specialized in non-tradable sectors, and in low-technology and labor-intensive tradable goods sectors, which largely explains the peripherals’ low economic growth, low productivity growth, and growing macroeconomic imbalances.

Keywords: Financial Dutch disease; peripheral member states of the Euro Area; non-price competitiveness; Euro Area architecture

JEL Classification: O11, O14, O20, O41, O52, E12, and F15

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1. INTRODUCTION

The single currency was presented as an important instrument to increase economic growth and private investment in the Euro Area and to promote real economic convergence among member states (European Commission 1990).

However, a growing number of authors (e.g., Eichengreen 2010; Hafele and Gräbner 2020; Gräbner et al. 2020; Simonazzi, Ginzburg and Nocella 2013) instead argue that the euro has failed to achieve that aim, resulting in growing economic divergence. According to this alternative view, the euro likely explains or at least contributed to the worst economic performance in decades of, for example, Italy, Portugal, and Greece. This paper contributes to this debate by seeking to understand what explains the economic underperformance of the so-called peripheral member states of the Euro Area.¹

Euro Area economies initially grew considerably in the years before and immediately after the launch of the single currency and of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), with real average yearly growth of 2.3% between 1995 and 2007. However, the euro crisis of 2010-2012 suggests that the growth spurt of the first decade of the euro may have been unsustainable, a byproduct of a private-sector debt bubble in the peripheral member states and of the mercantilist strategy of wage suppression in core member states, particularly in Germany (Storm and Naastepad 2016; Flassbeck and Lapabitsas 2013).

Between 2012 and 2016, the slowdown of the Euro Area affected more intensely the peripheral member states, which experienced a short recession between 2011 and 2013 and economic stagnation between 2007 and 2018, with real GDP only surpassing the 2007 peak in 2017 (see Figure 1). Finally, the economic asymmetry among peripheral member states has widened. In particular, Italy and Greece have had a very poor economic performance.

¹ Hereinafter, peripheral Euro Area member states refer to Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal following the literature (Gräbner and Hafele 2020), and additionally France. We include France in the group of peripheral member states given the decline of its industrial sector, the reduction in its non-price competitiveness, and the progressive deterioration of its external accounts (Celi et al. 2018). Core member states refer to Germany, Belgium, Finland and Austria, again following the literature (Gräbner and Hafele 2020). In an online Appendix, we present evidence that the exclusion of France from the peripheral member states does not materially affect the peripheral member states divergence path of the economic variables considered in the analysis.
Between 1995 and 2010, the peripheral economies had persistent current account deficits, thus accumulating net external debt and experiencing a deteriorating Net International Investment Position.\(^2\)

Several hypotheses that may explain the poor performance of the peripheral member states in this period are identified and analyzed in this paper. These include the deterioration of the external price-competitiveness of these economies (Shambaugh 2012), the technological gap faced by these economies (Botta 2014), or the lack of macroeconomic policy instruments to respond to (temporary) asymmetric shocks to these economies (e.g., de Grauwe and Ji 2018; Barba and de Vivo 2013; Beneito and Cháfer 2020).

The main argument of the paper is that, in addition to the explanations identified in the literature and above, the leading cause for the long-term underperformance of the peripheral member states was a Dutch disease-like effect that arose from the adoption of the euro, at an overvalued exchange rate, given the productive structure of the peripheral member states, which led to an adverse structural shift in their productive structure, contributing to a markedly lower productivity

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\(^2\) The literature questions (Febrero, Uxó and Bermejo 2018) whether the euro crisis was a balance of payments crisis (Cesaratto 2013; Cabral 2013; Giavazzi and Spaventa 2010) or a monetary sovereignty crisis (Lavoie 2015; de Grauwe 2013a; Wray 2012). In this paper, we adopt the former thesis.
growth path (Batavia and Nandakumar 2016).
This paper argues that the Dutch disease syndrome resulted, not from the gains of trade arising from a specific commodity export, but from foreign capital inflows that occurred since the mid-1990s (Batavia and Nandakumar 2016). These inflows of external financial capital may have led to two important effects. First, an increase in the price of non-tradable goods, resulting in an appreciation of the real exchange rate of these economies ("expenditure effect"). Second, growing economic incentives for a reallocation of production factors to non-tradable sectors ("resource movement effect").
Thus, the contribution of this paper is to show that the adoption of the euro by economies with different productive structures, by triggering a Dutch disease-like transmission mechanism, led to asymmetric impacts on the specialization profile of the different economies, contributing to economic divergence and poor economic performance of the peripheral member states.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 characterizes the problem, presenting data that shows the underperformance of the Euro Area peripheral member states since the mid-1990s vis-à-vis the Euro Area more internationally competitive member states – the core member states. Section 3 presents several explanations existing in the literature to explain the underperformance of these economies. Section 4 presents a theoretical explanation of the economic underperformance of the peripheral member states. Section 5 presents the main conclusions of the paper.

1. UNDERPERFORMANCE OF THE PERIPHERAL MEMBER STATES

The gap between Euro Area peripheral and core member states predates the introduction of the single currency as evidenced by various social-economic indicators, namely the real GDP per capita, the 10-year average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita and the Economic Complexity Index. However, more importantly, the introduction of the euro resulted in divergence in the trajectory of these indicators, which support the hypothesis of macroeconomic underperformance of the Euro Area peripheral member states relative to core member states.

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3 Earlier literature argues that the Dutch disease can be caused by capital inflows (e.g., Palma 2019), namely, those resulting from Foreign Direct Investment but also from emigrant remittances, as well as from the discovery or from large increases in the price of a commodity.
4 The economic complexity index (ECI) was developed by Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009). ECI data is maintained and updated by the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC). The ECI seeks to measure the technological sophistication and diversity of the tradable goods produced in a country. The ECI is widely used in the literature (Romero and Gramkow 2021; Hidalgo 2021) as a proxy for "non-price competitiveness" of the tradable sector and it is a way of measuring the distance of the economy’s productive sector to a given technological frontier. The closer an economy is to the “technological frontier,” the less dependent its competitiveness will be on the price factor, and the more it will depend on non-price factors such as quality.
For example, focusing on real GDP per capita, there remains a relevant gap between the core and peripheral member states (see Figure 2). Moreover, the former outgrew the latter between 2007 – the year of outbreak of the Great Recession – and 2019.

**Figure 2: Euro Area peripheral member states real GDP per capita**

*Germany=100*

![Figure 2: Euro Area peripheral member states real GDP per capita](image)

Source: Ameco, GDP per capita in Euros; authors’ calculations.

Although the peripheral member states converged with Germany between the 1960s and 1970s, from the 1980s onwards the peripheral’s GDP per capita ceased to converge to that of Germany's. Moreover, the economic convergence observed in the 2000s was ephemeral, and it was dependent on the existence of asset price bubbles (Buendía 2020; Holinski, Kool and Muysken 2012). The peripheral member states seem to have been the most affected by the combination of the Great Recession (2007-2009) and the euro crisis (2010-2012), as their real GDP per capita growth rate dropped more significantly (and below) than that of the core member states (see Figure 3).

**Figure 3: 10-year average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita, peripheral and core member states (%)**
Starting in the mid-1990s, the Euro Area peripheral member states began to report recurrent and large current account deficits. As this occurred, the surpluses of the core member states tended to increase (see Figure 4). The current account balance performance of the peripheral economies was driven by a marked deterioration of the goods balance, which was only partially ameliorated by a growing surplus of the services balance, explained by larger tourism sector exports.

The current account balance of the core member states improved markedly following the launch of the euro, whereas it deteriorated significantly in the peripheral economies up to 2008 raising the question of the extent, if any, the single currency contributed to this outcome (Pérez-Caldentey and Vernengo 2012). In 2007-2009 the Great Recession and in 2010-2012 the euro crisis led euro authorities to adopt fiscal austerity programmes in the peripheral economies that resulted in a stark improvement of these economies current account balances.
The large recurrent current account deficits of the peripheral member states, and the growing external surpluses for the core member states had distinct impacts on the evolution of the Net International Investment Position – Figure 5.\(^5\)

Even though correlation is not causation, Figure 5 provides stark illustration of the fact that the Euro Area became, likely by virtue of the single currency, a creditor-debtor monetary union, with core member states moving from debtors (negative NIIP) to creditors and peripheral member states moving from a nearly balanced position to highly indebted position. Thus, not only the peripheral member states experienced economic underperformance, but this economic underperformance was accompanied by growing external debt and liabilities, whereas core member states became net creditors.

\(^5\) Italy managed to reverse the decline in its NIIP, which at its trough represented -20% of GDP in 2010, to practically balance its NIIP by 2019. In contrast, France has seen its NIIP gradually deteriorate.
Finally, the share of the manufacturing sector declined significantly more in the peripheral member states than in the core member states (see Figure 6), even though the former grew somewhat less than the core member states in this period.

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6 Data for most economies are only available from 1999 onwards. In the case of Belgium, the data are only available from 2005, and in the case of Greece the data are only available from 2002.

7 The negative NIIP value for the Finnish economy was an outlier attributable to revaluation effects, mainly a result of Nokia's share price increase in the 1990s, as 90% of Nokia's shares were held by international investors (Hilpinen 2007).
Figure 6: Core and peripheral member states industrial output (% of Gross Value Added, GVA)

![Graph showing industrial output](image.png)

Source: World Bank; authors’ own calculations.

Figure 7 illustrate the fact that the launch of the euro was accompanied by a relative and an absolute deterioration unit labor costs of the peripheral member states vis-à-vis the core member states, with the weighted average ULC of core member states falling to 88% of its 1995 value by 2019, while growing to 104% of its 1995 value in the peripheral member states, a large 17 percentage point differential, relative to 1995, in the evolution of ULC in core vs peripheral member states, notwithstanding the austerity programmes adopted in the latter from 2010 onwards.
Figure 7: Core and peripheral member states real unit labor costs (1995=100)

The Economic Complexity Index shows that the peripheral member states produce goods with a much lower technological complexity than the core member states (see Figure 8). It further suggests that peripheral member states have seen the technological complexity of its manufacturing goods steadily deteriorate.

Source: AMECO; authors’ own calculations.
Figure 8: Core and peripheral member states Economic Complexity Index

![Figure 8: Core and peripheral member states Economic Complexity Index](image)

Source: Atlas of Economic Complexity (Observatory of Economic Complexity); authors' own calculations.

Figure 9 suggests there has been a change in the trend of the gross value added of financial services in the two group of countries. In the peripheral member states, this economic activity has slightly increased its relevance and in the case of the core member states there has been a marked reduction in its weight.
Private sector debt of the peripheral and core member states have similarly diverged (see Figure 10).

In the case of the core member states, the private debt to GDP ratio remained relatively stable, showing a similar pattern as the evolution of the gross value added in financial services. In the case of the peripheral member states, the rising trend of private debt to GDP was very relevant (especially until Great Recession), with private sector debt to GDP almost tripling in the case of Greece.

Thus, the economic underperformance of the peripheral economies between 1995 and 2020 was accompanied by more rapid growth of the ratio of private and public debt to GDP and a marked deterioration in NIIP to approximately -41.7% of GDP. The core member states average NIIP improved to approximately +52.4% of GDP and the ratio of private and public debt to GDP remained approximately stable. One of the contributing factors results from current account flows and the balance of payments accounting identity within the Euro Area. The net borrowing requirements of peripheral member states, arising from public plus private sector borrowing,
contribute to the net lending capacity of core member states, which in turn contribute to lower public plus private borrowing requirements in core member states, *ceteris paribus*. The accumulation of flows thus explains both growing private and public debt to GDP ratios and growing level of net external liabilities (more negative NIIP) in the peripheral member states – see Figures 4, 5, 10, and 11 –. The mirror image of this effect is lower private and public debt and the growth of net external assets (NIIP) of the core member states.

**Figure 10: Core and peripheral member states private non-financial sector debt**

(\% of GDP)

Source: AMECO; authors' own calculations.
Figure 11: Core and peripheral member states public debt (% of GDP)

In sum, we argue that different economic indicators presented in this section are consistent with the perspective of economic divergence between core and peripheral member states and, more importantly, support the thesis of significant economic underperformance of the peripheral member states. The research question that the remainder of this paper seeks to address then becomes what explains the peripheral member states relative (and absolute) economic underperformance.

3. LITERATURE REVIEW

A not insignificant body of literature, which predates the single currency, augured poor perspectives for the Euro Area (Feldstein 1997; MacDougall 1977; MacDougall 1992). More importantly, following the launch of the euro, the increasing economic divergence between member states inspired and motivated a growing body of literature that seeks to understand and explain its causes.

The economic underperformance of Euro Area peripheral member states relative to the
performance of core member states is likely driven by multiple factors. This paper identifies and summarizes five main explanatory theses and strands of literature.

The first strand of literature argues that the divergence is explained by differences in unit labor costs (ULC) growth rates. According to some authors, (e.g., Shambaugh 2012), the structural divergence of the peripheral member states was driven by the deterioration of their external price-competitiveness, with unit labor costs of peripheral member states growing far more rapidly than unit labor costs of core member states, particularly before the onset of the euro crisis in 2010.

For Felipe and Kumar (2014), the divergence in this indicator does not necessarily imply that robust wage increases have occurred in the peripheral member states, as the labor share of GDP remained approximately stable of even declined between 1980 and 2007. Piton (2017a) argues that the ULC increase in peripheral member states is explained by the expansion of non-tradable sectors in these countries. As these sectors are shielded from international competition, firms have greater market power to influence prices, which has contributed to a more intense increase in ULC in these sectors (Felipe and Kumar 2014; Piton 2017a; Gaulier and Vicard 2012). Since the mid-1990s, the consumer price index rose more rapidly in the peripheral member states than in the core member states. One of the possible explanations for this is the Balassa-Samuelson effect (Balassa 1964; Belke, Schnabl and Zemanek 2009; Van der Schaar 2019), which states that countries with higher productivity levels and higher productivity growth rates tend to experience higher domestic price levels and higher inflation rates. High productivity growth in the tradable goods sectors results in higher wage growth in the tradable goods sector. Since there is mobility of labor between sectors, the movement of labor from the tradable to the non-tradable sector also affects the wage growth rate in the non-tradable sector. As there is less scope for productivity growth in the non-tradable sector, the wage growth rate in the non-tradable sector tend to provoke a rise in domestic prices. According to Mamede (2020), some peripheral member states (especially Greece and Portugal) experienced a period of faster productivity growth than the core member states in the 1990s, which contributed to a positive differential in domestic inflation.

A subset of this first strand of literature focuses on the role of divergence of ULCs on the growing real exchange rate misalignment of these economies. Bresser-Pereira and Rossi (2015) consider that the misalignment of domestic exchange rates, driven by the divergence in the evolution of ULCs within the Euro Area, was the main determinant for the negative performance of the peripheral member states.

Although there was a macroeconomic consensus that the level of the exchange rate might be irrelevant in explaining long-run economic growth, this position has recently changed due to empirical literature showing that exchange rate overvaluation has negative long-run effects on growth.
In fact, Rodrik (2008) argues that a competitive exchange rate helps to overcome the market and institutional failures that hinder the expansion of the tradable sector, constituting an example of second-best economic policy, necessary to promote structural change. This effect is more relevant for countries with a lower degree of development.

One of the pioneering contributions in this area was developed by Baldwin (1988), which concluded that a temporarily overvalued exchange rate can have hysteresis effects, producing a permanent negative effect on exports. A competitive real exchange rate has direct effects, notably by providing greater diversification in the production of goods, as it allows a wider variety of goods to become more profitable to produce domestically (preventing the increase in imports).

Another (indirect) effect of exchange rate overvaluation is the negative impact on the profit rate and in the level of productive investment (Barbosa Filho et al. 2011). Additionally, it will also have detrimental impacts on the level of capacity utilization of firms, through the decrease of exports and the increase in imports that substitute domestic production. The profit squeeze affects negatively the level of capital accumulation, since retained earnings influence self-financing, and additionally enables firms to gain access to external financing - a necessary condition to support capital accumulation (Lima, 2010; Missio and Jayme 2012).

Oreiro (2016) argues that the benefits of a competitive real exchange rate exceed the positive effects on net exports that occur in the short run. Increased exports, by enabling returns to scale, generate dynamic externalities that spill over to the rest of the economy. These learning-by-doing practices, with positive economic and technological externalities to the economy, take time to develop and spread. Therefore, the overvaluation of the real exchange rate will limit these positive impacts, influencing the productive specialization of the economy and thus the influence long term growth path.

Finally, Guzman, Ocampo and Stiglitz (2018) argue that a real exchange rate at a competitive level create a more favorable environment for business to operate, allowing greater margin of error for businesses to respond to uncertainty and to earn income to support fixed costs. Such framework, the authors claim, is thus beneficial to the development of new tradable goods sectors and for sectors where learning-by-doing is important of the literature above largely argued for the importance of a real exchange rate at competitive levels.

Thus, the misalignment of domestic exchange rates in the Euro Area, by contributing to an increase in imports and a reduction in exports (compared to a situation of a 'competitive' domestic exchange rates) led to the emergence of current account deficits and to excessive private and public sector debt in the peripheral member states. Another symptom of the

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8 Fixed costs can be interpreted as the amount of time and experience required to build the endogenous capacity necessary to compete in international markets.
misalignment of domestic exchange rates was the increased productive asymmetries between Euro Area member states. While in the core member states, productive specialization in manufacturing with a higher technological level and higher value added was reinforced, the peripheral member states specialized its productive capacity in the non-tradable sectors. Jeong, Mazier and Saadaoui (2010) estimated the domestic exchange rate that would preserve internal and external balances, concluding that, in 2008, the euro was overvalued for most of the peripheral member states (Portugal, Spain, Greece, France, Italy) and undervalued for the core member states (Belgium, Austria, and Germany).

A second strand of literature focuses on institutional and architectural failings of the Euro Area, which have asymmetric effects on the economies of member states. Whyte (2010), Simonazzi, Ginzburg and Nocella (2013) considered that the Euro Area had certain dysfunctionalities, namely the absence of mechanisms to correct the external imbalances that affected member state economies since the first decade of the 2000s. The authors consider that the considerable German external surpluses were not the result of a particularly strong external competitiveness. The German labor market reforms9 resulted in lower wage growth, contributing to a lower aggregate demand growth in Germany and negatively impacted the economic and social performance of Germany’s Euro Area trading partners10 (Stockhammer and Sotiropoulos 2014). In particular, Germany began to register recurrent and very large current account surpluses of between 6% and 9% of GDP. External surpluses of this magnitude are a historical anomaly, even for Germany (Behringer, van Treeck, and Truger 2020; Gräbner et al. 2020).

Since the first decade of the 2000s, the Euro Area maintained a balanced current account balance, whereby the external deficits of the peripheral member states were approximately symmetric to the external surpluses of the core member states. According to de Grauwe (2013b) between 2000-2012, Germany’s current account surplus (€192.2 billion) was approximately identical to the combined current account deficit of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Tabellini (2016) argues that the Eurozone should be reformed, namely by increasing the weight of the federal budget, by establishing counter-cyclical fiscal transfers to allow member states fiscal policy to respond to systemic financial crisis, and by stricter fiscal rules in order to ensure fiscal discipline of member states. These policies would help reduce economic instability and promote convergence across economies (e.g., de Grauwe and Ji 2018; Barba and de Vivo 2013; Beneito and Cháfer 2020). Those economists have argued that a central problem of EMU is the

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9 Promoted through the implementation of a social pact between unions and labor confederations with the stated aim of making the labor market more flexible, the so-called Agenda 2010 of the Schröder Government in the early 2000s (Streeck and Trampusch 2005).

10 These problems were amplified by the strict application of the Maastricht criteria, which meant that Germany’s trading partners in the Euro Area could not use fiscal policy to counteract the macroeconomic imbalances that resulted from Germany’s domestic labor market policies.
lack of instruments to deal with (temporary) asymmetric shocks across countries. This leads to divergent developments, namely external imbalances (i.e., external deficits for one set of countries and external surpluses for the remaining countries). Due to the absence of such instruments, deficit countries had to impose internal devaluation policies with negative impacts on growth and unemployment (to correct these external imbalances). These asymmetric shocks had a stronger negative impact on the peripheral member states.

Barba and de Vivo (2013) argue that a currency zone is only viable if it allows a given region to have persistent current account imbalances (i.e., if there are no balance of payments constraints). The authors point out that an important difference between the Euro Area and the United States (US) concerns the weight of the federal budget. In the case of the US, both total federal expenditures and revenues were about 20% of Gross National Income (GNI). In the case of the European Union, both total federal revenues and expenditures were only 1% of GNI.

Thus, in the case of the US, the existence of a relevant amount of taxes and expenditures at the federal level allows that, in the presence of a relevant external disequilibrium, there is a redistribution of funds among states and, in conclusion, the level of (external) debt of an individual US state does not have an unsustainable exponential debt trajectory. In contrast, in the Euro Area, since the tax revenues are collected by individual states, the redistribution between states is minimal and not significant.

Since the Euro Area does not have fiscal integration, i.e., a federal component that provides large amounts of funds to spend at the regional or local level to deal with asymmetric shocks, it should not be perceived as an optimal monetary zone (Kenen 1969; Mundell 1961).

Lastly, de Grauwe (2013b) warns of a second problem of the EMU, in this case of a financial nature. The member countries of EMU issue public debt in a currency over which they have no control. Therefore, they have no guarantee that they will be able to rollover their public debt, thus being more vulnerable to speculative crises. de Grauwe and other authors point out that due to this constraint, during the 2010–2012-euro crisis, Euro Area governments were forced to implement pro-cyclical fiscal austerity policies and labor and product market reforms in order to decrease borrowing needs, in the misguided expectation of regaining the confidence of financial markets (Flassbeck and Lapabitsas 2013; Perez and Matsaganis 2018).

Gasparotti and Kullas (2019) used a synthetic control method to determine which countries benefited and lost from the creation of the euro, pointing out that the EMU had asymmetric impacts. For the period between 1999 and 2017, they estimate that Germany and the Netherlands were the countries that most benefited (+23,116 euro and +21,003 euro per capita, respectively, compared with the counterfactual situation). In contrast, Portugal, France, and Italy were the countries that experienced the largest costs (of 40,604 euro, 55,996 euro, and 73,605 euro per capita, respectively).

Perotti and Soons (2020) argue similarly that since market prices and trade flows adjust faster
than wages, productivity, and production structures, the euro resulted in persistent implicit and non-visible redistributive effects. Perotti and Soons argue that the euro resulted in the appreciation of the real exchange rate of the Euro Area peripheral member states and in a depreciation of the real exchange rate of the core member states). The authors conclude that since the euro is a system of implicit tax transfers through real exchange rates transmission rates, then it should be compensated by a system of explicit tax-transfers (from the rich and more internationally competitive economies, i.e., the core member states to the poor and less internationally competitive economies, i.e., peripheral member states).

A third strand of literature argues that indicators of price competitiveness or of wage competitiveness (ULC) are lacking in explanatory power, focusing on the importance of non-price competitiveness indicators. For example, there is some evidence (Ban and Adascalitei 2020; Bierut and Kuziemska-Pawlak 2017) of situations where a significant deterioration of this indicator did not hinder the increase in the share of exports in the international markets. That is, as is well known, this price-competitiveness indicator – the real exchange rate –, by not taking into account structural change, namely changes in the weight of a given sector, or improvements in the quality of production, is an imperfect and often biased predictor of economic under- or overperformance.

In fact, it is well established in the literature that, in some cases, the countries that displayed the most relevant declines in their price-competitiveness were those with the largest increases in the export market shares11. This has been referred as the Kaldor Paradox (Kaldor 1978).

Thus, non-price competitiveness is likely also part of the explanation. A fundamental premise of the so-called North-South models is that the country in the South is far from the technological frontier, for example, as a result of differences in the educational level of the labor force, in the quality of the infrastructure, in the level of capitalization of firms and in the composition of the productive structure of a given economy (Verspagen 1991). As a consequence, firms in countries of the South cannot operate at the “state of the art” technological level. This implies that their production of goods is of lower quality and/or with lower technological intensity (Verspagen and Wakelin 1993).

While Euro Area peripheral member states can be considered developed economies, and thus are not fully comparable underdeveloped countries of the South in North-South models, an analogous mechanism of non-price competitiveness may similarly explain the economic underperformance of the Euro Area peripheral member states relative to that of the core member states. Several metrics such as the Economic Complexity Index (Hidalgo and Hausmann 2009)

11 The export market share is the weight of a given country's exports in total world exports. This indicator is a measure of the competitiveness of a country's exports.
suggest that, on average, firms of the peripheral member states exhibit a much lower technological levels than firms of core member states, particularly Germany (Botta 2014). As these countries were specialized in goods of low technological level, there was less room for product differentiation, and therefore the external competitiveness is to a greater degree based on price-competitiveness, hence on (low) wages.

The problem for the Euro Area peripheral member states stems from the lack of competitiveness of their production vis-à-vis Germany, i.e., a situation similar to the "middle income trap" where they are not price competitive compared to developing countries (namely China and India), but are unable to compete on quality (Rodrik 2016; Storm and Naastepad 2015; Felipe and Kumar 2014).

For this reason, reducing wages to regain competitiveness would not be a solution, for various reasons, not addressed here in detail. In particular, even if lower wages would result in higher price competitiveness, *ceteris paribus*, a questionable proposition, it still would require a large decrease in living standards (vis-à-vis China, and Eastern countries) that would not be politically feasible.

A related line argument is that the peripheral member states were proportionally more impacted by external shocks to the Euro Area (and to the European Union). In particular, the enlargement of the European Union to the eastern European countries and the entry of China into the World Trade Organization (WTO), the tendency to relocate industrial units away from the Euro Area peripheral member states (and the fall in new industrial FDI) worsened significantly. The relocation of industrial firms away from the peripheral member states also had negative impacts on the technological level of the production structure of these countries, constituting an adverse economic shock for these economies (Botta and Tippet 2020; Hafele and Gräbner 2020; Mamede 2015). The entry of eastern European countries in the EU and the entry of China into the WTO may be (incorrectly, in our view) interpreted as exogenous shocks. However, these were asymmetric shocks, affecting the peripheral member states disproportionately more, given the productive structure of these economies at time of entry. Similarly, the technological level of exports and imports may explain current account imbalances through the impact of technology intensity on long-term exports growth rates. Missio and Jayme (2012), Soukiazis, Muchová and Leško (2017), and Romero and McCombie (2016) find that Brazilian and European exports of technology intensive sectors have higher income elasticities, i.e., are relatively more sensitive to the global demand and relatively less sensitive to variation of export prices.

12 To the extent that core member states influence EU and Euro Area policy making to a greater extent, these outcomes could alternatively be interpreted as quasi-endogenous.
In this way, the European peripheral member states, as their economic structure are less technologically sophisticated, may have been more affected economically with the appreciation of the Euro that occurred in the mid-2000s, given the fact their foreign competitiveness is more sensitive to variation of export prices.

A fourth strand of literature argues that the explanation for economic divergence lies in different stages of initial development in the context of economies of scale and scope and economies of networks. For Aglietta (2012), the increasing integration of economies with a different level of development, tends to aggravate these differences, instead of leading to convergence among economies. The mechanism through this occurs is Verdoorn's Law, i.e., the existence of a positive relationship between output growth and labor productivity growth due to increasing returns (especially in manufacturing) (Verdoorn 1949). By this way, the countries with a higher initial technological and with a higher initial economic growth level will be able to maintain a self-sustaining growth dynamic, aggravating disparities among economies.

Thus, according to this literature, the economic divergence in the Euro Area is the consequence of the integration in an incomplete monetary union without significant fiscal transfers of countries with significantly different levels of economic and technological development (de Grauwe 2013b; Gräbner et al. 2020).

A fifth strand of literature focuses on the effects of misguided Euro Area or national economic policies. In particular, the differentiated effect of Euro Area budgetary policy on the peripheral member states economic development. The fiscal austerity that occurred in these economies, first with Stability and Growth Pact and particularly following the onset of the euro crisis, may have contributed to the widening of the technology gap (Botta, Tippet and Onaran 2018). Firstly, by contributing to an increase in unemployment (especially long-term unemployment), it had detrimental impacts on human capital, with the expected loss of labor skills. On the other hand, the spillovers from technologies that tend to occur in periods of intense capital accumulation cease to occur in periods of declining private investment. Finally, the adjustment programs were associated with the privatization of natural public monopolies at distressed prices, with negative externalities to the overall efficiency of these economies (Hudson 2021).

4. DUTCH DISEASE: CAUSALITY CHANNELS

In addition to the different possible explanations discussed in Section 3, this paper argues that there may have been an additional transmission mechanism – a Dutch type financial disease – that was a key contributor to the economic divergence of the peripheral member states, following the adoption of the euro. The Dutch disease hypothesis was theorized through the so-called core model (Corden and Neary 1982; Corden 1984). This economic model was developed to provide
an explanation for the sudden process of deindustrialization that occurred in the Netherlands in
the 1960s after the discovery of a natural gas field and subsequent export of this commodity.

The model consists of a small open economy where there are three sectors: the booming tradable
goods sector, the lagging tradable goods sector, and the non-tradable sector – which typically
represents more than 60 percent of GDP in developed economies. Prices in the first two sectors
are assumed to be determined in (perfectly) competitive international markets. The model further
assumes perfect mobility of factors of production (capital and labor) between sectors in this
economy, with wages being initially equal across sectors.

The Dutch disease core model suggested that the gas export revenues (the exports of the
booming tradable goods sector) resulted in (i) increase in the price of non-tradable goods,
causing an appreciation of the real exchange rate of those economies ("spending effect"), and
(ii) a reallocation of production factors from the lagging tradable goods sector to the non-tradable
sectors ("resource movement effect").

Thus, the Dutch disease hypothesis posits that significant capital inflows from a booming
tradable goods sector alter an economy's productive structure towards a greater weight of non-
tradable sectors.

Although the Dutch disease model outcomes are a consequence of a boom in the commodity
sector, there may be other situations where this Dutch-disease-like transmission mechanism may
be relevant. For example, Palma (2019) argues that Dutch disease can also be caused by other
types of capital inflows, e.g., FDI, emigrant remittances, tourism revenues, speculative capital
inflows, or relevant changes in the price of export commodities.

Of particular interest for this analysis of possible explanations for the economic
underperformance of the Euro Area peripheral member states is Batavia and Nandakumar's
(2016) thesis that the adoption of the euro led to a structural change of these economies, through
a Dutch-disease-like transmission mechanism, as the euro, exacerbated foreign capital inflows
and contributed to growing financialization\textsuperscript{13} of the peripheral member states (Rodrigues, Santos
and Teles 2016).

The Dutch disease transmission mechanism was likely to have been particularly strong as
nominal exchange rates traded in a band between 1995 and 1998 and as they were irrevocably
fixed from 1999 onwards.

In this context, any capital inflows, per the balance of payments accounting identity, must result
in current account (and capital account outflows) that lead to matching net borrowing
requirements of the member states on the receiving end of capital inflows.

One of the leading macroeconomic adjustment variables is the goods trade balance. If the capital

\textsuperscript{13} Following Epstein (2005), financialization is hereinafter understood as "the rising importance of financial
markets, financial motives, financial institutions, and financial elites in the functioning of the economy and
its governing institutions, both nationally and internationally."
inflows shock is sufficiently large, it is likely to transmit through rising goods imports and falling goods exports, which impact negatively the tradable goods sector of member states experiencing large capital inflows, as predicted by the Dutch disease model (Corden and Neary 1982; Corden 1984).

In fact, between 1995 and 2012, the relative share of financial services to gross value added, which Krippner (2005) considers the key metric of financialization, increased significantly in the peripheral member states in comparison to the evolution of weight of financial services in core member states (see Figure 9).

In the 1990s, there was an intensified integration of the financial markets of the founding members of the Euro Area, the Maastricht Treaty determined that restrictions on capital movements and cross-border payments were prohibited after January 2004, as well as the harmonization of prudential regulatory rules in the banking sector, often, to the least common denominator, which in practice translated into a liberalization of the financial system.

In addition, as a result of the elimination of exchange rate risk, foreign capital flowed from the core to the peripheral member states of the Euro Area to take advantage of interest rate spreads. This inflow of foreign capital contributed to a large reduction in interest rate spreads within the EU (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2002). The foreign capital inflows could have been beneficial if allocated to the tradable sectors. However, since in contrast to the tradable sector, the non-tradable sectors did not face international competition, foreign capital inflows were directed to non-tradable sectors to the detriment of investment in tradable sectors, as financial sector credit to non-tradable sectors was deemed less risky (Felipe and Kumar 2014; Piton 2017a). The literature identifies various possible explanations as to why capital inflows were channeled towards non-tradable sectors. First, since the credit market was underdeveloped in the European periphery, banks were not available to lend funds to tradable sectors because there were already collateral constraints (Reis 2013). Since guarantees at the collateral level are greater in the non-tradable sectors, credit tended to flow to these sectors.

Additionally, the credit expansion arising from external capital inflows contributed to asset price inflation, particularly financial and real estate (Aliber and Kindleberger 2015). As a result, the balance-sheets of firms in non-tradable sectors were "artificially" inflated, which facilitated further financing and a further shift of capital and labor towards these sectors (Botta, Yajima, and Porcile 2022). In this way, financial flows contributed to the increase in the expected return on investments in non-tradable sectors. These two previous situations were examples of the effect of resource movement.

According to Gopinath et al. (2017), as capital inflows were channeled to firms with higher net worth (and not necessarily to the most productive firms), it led to a misallocation of productive resources, with negative impacts on productivity of these countries.

Benigno and Fornaro (2014) also consider that foreign capital inflows, by generating excess
funds, contributed to a decrease in interest rates, with positive effects on the demand for credit and the level of aggregate demand in the economy.

However, the lower-interest-rate effect is not transmitted equally to the tradable and non-tradable sectors. While an increase in demand for tradable goods can be satisfied by importing goods, in the case of non-tradable goods this is not possible. The only way to meet the increase in demand is through the shift of productive resources to this sector. On the other hand, Dornbusch (1983) argued that foreign capital inflows will also influence the relative prices of the two sectors, as the real interest rate declines, the aggregate demand increases, which in turn will positively affect the price of non-tradable goods. Gaulier and Vicard (2012) similarly point out that aggregate demand shocks have a positive impact not only on the volume of transactions of non-tradable goods and services (e.g., construction boom) but also on their prices (e.g., real estate bubble), as supply is sticky.

In contrast, an aggregate demand shock in a small open economy has negligible impacts on the prices of tradable goods, whose prices are determined exogenously at the international level. As mentioned above, external capital inflows contributed to the convergence of interest rates in the Euro Area. The more significant fall of real interest rates in the peripheral member states, in parallel with the increase in real incomes, and with greater confidence of economic agents (resultant from the period of strong economic growth), was an important stimulus to private investment and private consumption, fostered by significant expansion in the availability of and in the demand for credit. This fact may have contributed to a more significant growth of the prices of non-tradable goods and services in these economies (Piton 2017b).

In addition, the reduction of real interest rates in the peripheral member states resulted in a significant reduction on public expenditure on interest. Thus, the governments of the Euro Area peripheral member states benefited from a significant increase in their fiscal space (Lane 2006), which they used to promote increases in primary discretionary public expenditure. Froot and Rogoff (1991) argued that most of the increase public non-interest spending tends to raise the relative price of non-tradable goods, due to the fact that this spending is concentrated in the non-tradable sectors.

The earlier literature considered that the contribution of non-tradable sectors played a minor role in explaining the volatility of the real exchange rate in the Euro Area (Engel 1999; Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan 2002).

However, subsequent research, both for OECD and Euro Area countries, concluded that changes in relative prices of non-tradable sectors have a large impact on the real exchange rate, and can explain up to 50% of the variation in this indicator (Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 2006; 14

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14 Between 1995 and 2007, the average reductions in real interest rates were about 7.7 and 2.9 percentage points for the peripheral and the core member states, respectively (Piton 2017a).
Comunale and Hessel 2014). There are several macroeconomic models that show that changes in relative prices between tradable and non-tradable goods can also influence exchange rates, with relevant macroeconomic impacts (Obstfeld and Rogoff 2000, 2007; Ruscher and Wolff 2009).

Thus, the increase in the relative price of non-tradable goods will cause the overvaluation of the exchange rate, exerting additional pressure on exporting sectors, especially those more dependent on price competitiveness (it encourages specialization in non-tradable sectors, such as construction or real estate).

Benigno and Fornaro (2014) consider that foreign capital inflows tend to lead to a deterioration of the current account balance, accompanied by a steady rise of employment and output in non-tradable sectors (mainly in the construction sector), which translates into stagnant productivity growth. The authors referred this effect as "financial resource curse".

Other literature emphasizes the thesis that there is greater potential for productivity growth in tradable sectors, particularly in manufacturing (e.g., Szirmai 2012; Tregenna 2009; Rocha 2018; Rodrik 2016).

Botta, Yajima, and Porcile (2022) empirically analyzed the impact of capital inflows (foremost, portfolio investment and external lending) and argued that the recipient economies could suffer from financial Dutch disease-like transmission mechanism. The capital inflows from abroad would cause the decline in the technological level of the production of goods and the shift of resources towards non-tradable goods, particularly with the deterioration in the production of technological-intensive tradable goods. This effect will be particularly strong for economies with lower level of development. Even if financial booms are limited in time, they promote technological regressions, causing slowdowns in the rate of productivity growth and in the relative size of the tradable goods sector. Ultimately, external inflows, by jeopardizing the level of sophistication of productive structures, can increase the vulnerability of economies to external shocks.

When considering the existence of Dutch disease due to foreign capital inflows, we could initially focus on portfolio investments due to their short-term profile and the rapid reversal of flows. However, Larney (2011) finds that in the case of more financially open economies, an increase in Foreign Direct Investment flows, even if its new investment in tradable goods sector also contribute to exacerbate Dutch Disease, by contributing to a greater degree of real exchange rate appreciation.

5. CONCLUSIONS

This paper aims to understand the economic underperformance of the Euro Area peripheral member states since the mid-1990s.
It argues that the traditional explanations of the deterioration in external price competitiveness and the short- and long-term adverse macroeconomic impacts of the exchange rate overvaluation have limitations, as they do not take into account structural changes, namely changes in the weight of sectors, or improvements in the quality of production.

Second, firms in the peripheral member states, due to their lower quality or technological intensity, are not able to operate at the "state of the art" technological level. For this reason, these economies could be in a situation similar to the "middle income trap", where they would not be price-competitive vis-à-vis developing countries but would also be unable to compete on quality.

A third explanation for the underperformance of these economies is that they experienced asymmetric shocks, and since the Economic and Monetary Union lacked instruments to deal with (temporary) asymmetric shocks, deficit countries had to impose internal devaluation policies to correct these external imbalances, with adverse impacts on economic growth and employment. Finally, it is argued that the adoption of the euro led to a Dutch Disease effect arising from foreign capital inflows, which caused a much larger reduction of real interest rates in peripheral member states. This resulted in a permanent change of the productive structure of peripheral economies.

This paper identifies the channels through which capital inflows led to an increase in the price of non-tradable goods ("spending effect"), while also facilitating economic incentives for the reallocation of production factors to non-tradable sectors ("resource movement effect").

The Dutch financial disease thesis advanced in this paper argues that following the adoption of the euro, foreign capital inflows, even if in the form of FDI in new tradable goods sector – which was a fraction of overall FDI levels, which was mostly directed towards the acquisition of established non-tradable sector firms with market power or even natural monopolies – explain economic underperformance through the expansion of the non-tradable goods sector and contraction of the tradable goods sector.

This Dutch disease effect is likely to have been very significant, as the irrevocable definition of the euro nominal exchange rate to the former currency at an appreciated conversion rate meant that, given the balance of payments accounting identity, any exogenous and asymmetric foreign capital inflow shock necessarily resulted in a current account and/or a capital account outflow, whose main transmission channel is likely to have been the tradable goods balance and tradable goods manufacturing sector. Thus, excessive levels of capital inflows following the adoption of the euro would result in an accelerated contraction of the peripheral member states tradable goods manufacturing sectors, reducing these countries’ productivity growth potential. This effect could thus be a leading explanatory factor of the peripheral member states economic underperformance since the adoption of the euro.
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