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*Citizens' Freedom to Choose Representatives: Ballot Structure, Proportionality and “Fragmented” Parliaments*

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Citizens’ Freedom to Choose Representatives: Ballot Structure, Proportionality and “Fragmented” Parliaments

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Abstract

The analysis of the political consequences of electoral laws has emphasized how individual characteristics of the electoral system (electoral formulas, district magnitude, ballot structure) affect the degree of parliament “fragmentation” and proportionality. This paper argues that the personal attributes of representatives are also an important consequence of electoral laws, and that they are in part determined by citizens’ freedom to choose representatives. We clarify this concept and develop an index of citizens’ freedom to choose members of parliament as a function of the ballot structure, district size and electoral formulae. Using data from twenty nine countries, we find that neither proportionality nor the effective number of parties is significantly affected by voters’ freedom of choice. This result has important normative implications for electoral reform.

Keywords: Ballot structure, Electoral index, Freedom to choose, Personal vote.

JEL: D72
1. Introduction

Electoral systems are perhaps the most powerful set of rules in representative democracies. There is widespread agreement that elements of electoral systems – electoral formulas, district magnitude, and electoral thresholds - influence, although not mechanically, political outcomes such as the number of political parties in parliament, the internal structure of these parties, the political stability, and the proportionality of vote shares and seat shares. In short, electoral laws have political consequences (Rae 1971, Lijphart 1990, Mueller 1996). To analyze these consequences the relevant variables must be measurable. District magnitude and electoral thresholds are measured quantitatively and electoral formulas are measured qualitatively. Both variables impact the political outcomes measured by indexes such as the disproportionality index and the effective number of parties in parliament. Such indexes are very important to understand the likely effects of electoral reforms; namely how changes in certain variables of the electoral systems affect objectives like political stability or the fairness of representation.

The effect of electoral systems, and more specifically the effect of ballot structures, on the type of members of parliament elected did not receive much attention during the twentieth century. However, in the nineteenth century John Stuart Mill (1861), Thomas Hare (1859) and other prominent social reformers were perfectly aware that electoral systems were crucial in determining the personality, intelligence and

1 In this paper we will use the disproportionality index of Loosemore-Hanby (1971) which divides by two the sum of the module of differences between each party’s seat share and vote share. Michael Gallagher (1991) suggested another index, and Bernie Grofman and others suggested that instead of scaling by one half the vote-seat deviation, it should be scaled by the effective number of parties. We agree that for some purposes of empirical analysis it is more accurate to use the effective number of parties. However, if it is necessary to disentangle the effect of an electoral system variable on proportionality and the effective number of parties, it should not be included. This is one of the reasons why we develop in this paper two freedom of choice indices, one that does not depend on the number of parties (FC1) and another that does depend on the number of parties (FC2).

2 The most frequently used index is the inverse of the sum of the squared percentage of seats that each party has in parliament (see Laakso and Taagepera (1979)).
interests of those elected to serve as members of parliament. Mill (1861, p. 256) states that “It has been seen that the dangers incident to a representative democracy are of two kinds: danger of a low grade of intelligence in the representative body, and in the popular opinion which controls it; and danger of class legislation on the part of the numerical majority.” He was conscious that a critical issue in determining “intelligence in the representative body” was the extent of political competition to access parliament, and that the level of political competition is influenced by the ballot structure and the electoral formula. In a certain sense Mill and Hare were calling for attention to the personal consequences of electoral laws.\(^3\)

To date, the research on the importance of ballot structures is somewhat inconclusive and it is target to the political (not personal) consequences of electoral laws. Rae (1971) formulated the hypothesis that “ordinal” ballots, where voters can choose more than one party (candidate), are more favorable to a fragmented parliament (greater effective number of parties in parliament) than a “categorical” vote, where voters have to vote just for one party (or candidate). However, he rejected the hypothesis. Subsequently, Lijphart (1990) replicated Rae’s work with more data and different methodology and reached a similar conclusion; ballot structure is not a very relevant variable in electoral systems. Lijphart only found evidence of the importance of ballot structures in plurality rule systems where the Australian “alternative” vote produces more parties than the UK plurality rule. Few authors have recently addressed the importance of the information given in the ballot (Bowler and Grofman (2000), Carey and Shughart (1995), Farrell and McAllister (2006), Norris (2003)).

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\(^3\) John Stuart Mill was a supporter of Thomas Hare’s single transferable vote electoral formula, based on the expected effects on the representation of minorities and also the attributes of representatives. On this last point he says (Mill 1861 p. 264): “At present, by universal admission, it is becoming more and more difficult for any one who has only talents and character to gain admission into the House of Commons. The only persons who can get elected are those who possess local influence, or make their way by lavish expenditure, or who, on the invitation of three or four tradesmen or attorneys, are sent down by one of the two great parties from their London clubs…”.
disregard of this issue may be associated with the difficulty to capture the diversity of ballot structures within a single measure.

In this paper we focus on voters’ freedom of choice. Implicitly we assume that the personal attributes of members of parliament are, in a large measure, a function of the degree of competition for a seat in parliament. This competition can arise from two different processes: internal party competition independent of voters’ preferences or party competition driven (in a greater or lesser extent) by voters’ preferences. Voters’ freedom of choice is greater when voters have more candidates and political platforms to choose from, more possibility to express their preferences, and more information about the candidates.

Therefore, one aim of this paper is to make the case that it is worth measuring freedom of choice because of its intrinsic and instrumental values. Freedom of choice is one of the criteria that should be considered in electoral reform. A second aim is to indirectly test Rae and Lijphart’s hypothesis of a quasi nonexistent relationship between ballot structure and either proportionality or party fragmentation. A third aim is to develop a synoptic index that captures different degrees of “freedom of choice” in different democracies and clarify the possible applications of such an index in testing new hypotheses. Therefore, Section 2 clarifies the concept of “freedom of choice” from the perspective of social choice theory. Section 3 builds the index from three dimensions: choices available to voters, effective preferences they can express in the ballot, and information concerning candidates. Section 4 presents the empirical evidence on “freedom of choice” and how it relates to proportionality and the effective number of parties. Finally, section 5 discusses the implications for electoral reform of our analysis and develops several hypotheses that can further be tested with the present index.
2. Freedom and choice: concept and measures.

Liberty and freedom of choice have been extensively discussed by eminent scholars in quite different perspectives (e.g. Isaiah Berlin (1969) and Amartya Sen (1988, 1991)). The most useful approach for our purposes here is the axiomatic approach that has been developed in social choice literature.

In some sense, what distinguishes democracy from authoritarian regimes is freedom of choice. Consider a case where a ruler unilaterally transfers his power to his son, and the alternative case where his son obtains the power through winning a competitive and deliberatively fair struggle to obtain popular support in a democratic election. Although the ultimate ruling person is the same, the democratic process is associated with citizens’ freedom to “choose” (directly or indirectly) the new leader.

This example also highlights an important point that has been emphasized particularly by Amartya Sen (1991), concerning the “instrumental” and “intrinsic” values of freedom of choice. The value of freedom of choice in democracy is not just that there is a higher probability that better leaders are selected (or incompetent leaders dismissed), but also the intrinsic value associated with participation in the political process.

Consider an individual who eats a “pastel de nata” with an espresso everyday, which he selects from a menu (or opportunity set) of many cakes and diverse beverages. If he was forced to eat that meal, he would not stand it. The fact that people value outcomes and procedures (the way those outcomes are reached) show two different dimensions of freedom of choice.

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4 The “pastel de nata” is a typical and well known Portuguese cake.
Most people agree that the “intrinsic” value of freedom of choice increases (even at a diminishing rate) with the augmentation of the opportunity set. If she has more cakes to choose from, her freedom of choice increases, even if she still chooses to eat the same “pastel de nata,” because she prefers this cake to any other that was added to the set. Conversely, if her opportunity set decreases, her freedom to choose decreases.

In this paper we will assume that freedom of choice increases (decreases) when the elements in the opportunity set increase (decrease). One simple measure for ranking opportunity sets according to freedom of choice is the cardinality of the sets. If one has three cakes one has more freedom than if one has only two.

In markets choice is over private goods and it is a real choice. However, in politics, we are in the realm of collective or social choices. The information citizens express through the ballot is aggregated and transformed through the rules of the electoral system into a social choice. Each citizen does not “choose” anything, but instead he has a greater or smaller freedom to express his preferences concerning the opportunity set that is presented to him.

Apart from the cardinality of the opportunity set there are three additional dimensions that could be considered in order to measure freedom of choice. The first dimension is the number of items that can be selected from the “menu.” If just one item can be selected from a given set, the freedom to choose is less than if the choice is between two items of the same set. Alternatively, the same number of available choices (e.g. 2) in menus of different sizes (e.g. 3 and 6 items) is also associated with different

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5 There is, however, an objection to that assertion. From a cognitive perspective some authors have been arguing that, after some point, to have more elements in the opportunity set create cognitive dissonance so that less is better than more.

6 This measure has been suggested by Pattanaik and Xu (1990). Three axioms univocally determine this measure. First, the indifference between no-choice situations (e.g. indifference between two plebiscites with different candidates); second, strict monotonicity (e.g. freedom increases when the number of candidates increase); and third, independence. Sen (1991) argues that freedom should not include only the opportunities of choice available to the individual, but also take into account his preferences in relation to the elements of the opportunity set.
degrees of freedom. The second dimension is the information associated with each item in the menu. If she does not have any information concerning the characteristics of the items she is choosing from, her freedom is in some sense virtual. She could just select a random number to make her “choice”. Ceteris paribus, the more information associated with each item in the menu, the greater the freedom to choose. Finally, freedom and liberty, in a positive sense, are also a function of an individual’s capability of knowing what is best for him and processing the relevant information in order to choose accordingly.

The index developed in this paper considers the first three dimensions discussed above: the cardinality of the opportunity set, the number of effective revealed preferences, and information concerning the candidates. The former two will be labelled as “options” and “choices.” However, the capabilities dimension is not introduced for simplicity reasons.


The first critical issue we need to address is the options voters face to assess the cardinality of the opportunity set (the “menu” of choices). We assume that, if given the chance, citizens will vote for political parties and for candidates (the “personal vote”

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7 The more complicated issue is how to rank different size menus with different number of choices. The “freedom of choice” index developed in this paper, satisfies both conditions mentioned in the text, and has an implicit trade off between having more items to choose and more possibility to choose.

8 Again, there are simple cases and more complicated cases. From a no information menu, to a menu where I have information on one item, there is an increasing freedom. This is the simplest case. Complicated cases are those where it is possible to have more information on some items and less in others.

9 Information on political candidates can arise from different sources: the candidates themselves, the political parties, interest groups and the media. What this dimension says is that we consider more information and more diversified information as better than less information. Taking into account cognitive limitations, the marginal benefit of increasing information should be decreasing.

10 The measure of freedom can be ordinal or cardinal. The discussion will be in terms of the cardinality of the opportunity set so that it is possible to rank all sets. Any concave and increasing function of that cardinality will enable to have an index with the properties of increasing marginal freedom (with the number of elements in the menu), but at diminishing rates.
on the characteristics of the candidates). Since each political party has a distinct platform, when the \textit{effective} number of parties increases, the citizens’ freedom to express political preferences in different ways also increases. This measure has been used widely in the literature and we also use it in the \textit{effective} freedom of choice index (FC2).

However, there is a problem with using the effective number of parties. Among other things, we want to analyze the possible causal effect of “freedom of choice” on the fragmentation of parliament (given by the effective number of parties). So in a \textit{simple} freedom of choice index (FC1) we assume that opportunities to express political preferences must be independent of the actual effective number of political parties. We consider three parties, a Left Party (L), a Center Party (C) and a Right Party (R), as the opportunities to express political preferences.\footnote{The average effective number of parties in our sample of 29 countries is 3.81. However, we have chosen 3 for reasons of symmetry that can be justified to simultaneously treat ideological diversity and personal characteristics.}

Apart from ideology, we assume citizens care about candidates’ personal characteristics and that these are independent of political platforms.\footnote{If we were to consider a spatial analysis, which is not the case here, we would say that the two dimensions are orthogonal. There is no \textit{a priori} reason to suppose that leftwing politicians have better (or worse) attributes than right wing politicians. Note also that there can be a conflict between ideology and personal attributes. The candidate “closest” to the voter ideology can have a low “score” on personal attributes and vice-versa.} If given the opportunity, citizens would vote for particular candidates as well as for political platforms.

To analyze the cardinality of different electoral systems, it is easiest to start with the simple index (FC1), looking at the following matrix, where each column refers to a different party (L, C, R) and each row is a candidate (1, 2, 3) belonging to the party’s list (when applicable).
Table 1. Citizens’ opportunities to select candidates

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L1</td>
<td>C1</td>
<td>R1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L2</td>
<td>C2</td>
<td>R2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L3</td>
<td>C3</td>
<td>R3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the simple index we establish an upper limit for voters’ “options” given by the product of three parties and three candidates. This can be considered as an unnecessary constraint on voters’ available choices because some ballots allow for more options. However, the concept of freedom, as we want to measure it, is not just the input information that the voter introduces in the ballot, but it is also related to the effectiveness of this information in the final selection of candidates. This suggests a limitation in the available choices in the relevant opportunity set. Moreover, all citizens have cognitive limitations so that, even from the strict point of view of the voter input in the ballot, a limitation on available “choices” should be considered.

The “menus” (opportunity sets) of the main ballot structures and electoral systems in the simple index (FC1) are the following:

- PR, Plurality Rule with nominal vote in one candidate (e.g. UK) or AV, the “alternative” vote with ordinal vote (e.g. Australia):
  
  $\#X_{plr}=\#X_{pr\_av}=\#\{L, C, R\}=3$

- AM – Absolute Majority rule in runoff elections (e.g. France)
  
  $\#X_{am}=\#\{L, C, R\}=3$

- CLPR - Closed List Proportional Representation (e.g. Portugal)
  
  $\#X_{clp}=\#\{L, C, R\}=3$
- OLPR - Open List Proportional Representation (Preferential Voting) (e.g. Czech Republic)
  \[\#X_{olp} = \#\{L_1, L_2, L_3, C_1, C_2, C_3, R_1, R_2, R_3\} = 9\]
- STV - Single Transferable Vote (e.g. Ireland)
  \[\#X_{stv} = \#\{L_1, L_2, L_3, C_1, C_2, C_3, R_1, R_2, R_3\} = 9\]
- MS Mixed systems using dual Ballot (e.g. Germany)
  \[\#X_{db} = \#\{L, C, R, Li, Ci, Ri\} = 6\]

Turning now to the revealed preferences of the voters it is important to define an upper boundary for the relevant number of revealed preferences, i.e. those which have an impact on candidate selection. Now we are addressing the issue of determining the number of items available for a voter to “select” to have an effective impact on candidates’ choice. We establish this number as three, since for the reasons stated below, the practical importance of citizens’ fourth preference is rather low and should be disregarded.

A main distinction between the different ballot systems is whether voters can reveal their first preference alone, or more. In plurality rule with a candidate ballot or in closed list proportional representation with a party ballot, voters can vote for one candidate or one party respectively, so that only the first preference counts. This has been labelled a “categorical” ballot in the literature. In all other systems voters can reveal more than one preference (ordinal or not) in what has been labelled “ordinal” balloting following Rae (1971).

In the French electoral system (party ballot with runoff), if a party has an absolute majority the candidate of that party is elected. If not, there is a second round. So the second preference of the voter only is necessary in some districts. Therefore, we consider 1.5 to be the effective number of revealed preferences.
In dual ballots, where voters have the single member district to vote for candidates and regional or national district to vote for parties, voters have two “choices”\(^\text{13}\).

Some literature considers the rank ballot has giving the greatest amount of “choice” to the voter. In fact, the voter is able to fully or partially rank order the candidates across political parties. This is an input oriented interpretation of the ballot. However, what is relevant is not the maximum information the voter can express through the ballot, but the individual “choices” that are relevant for the collective choice of candidates. Taking into account that the fourth preference onwards has a minor impact on candidate selection, we assign the maximum value of three “choices” to STV, but also to the candidate-preference ballot of Australia, although here the choice set (number of candidates) is much smaller.

Given its diversity, the preferential system poses more difficulty in determining the available ballot “choices.” In preferential systems voters select the party in which to vote and then can order (or mark) the candidates within that party list. In “strong” preferential systems there is no minimum percentage below which the candidate does not get elected. In “weak” systems, there is a minimum percentage which functions as a party “screen” on voters’ preferences. If he can not reach it, and if proportional representation suggests that a candidate of that party must be elected, it is the first candidate of the party list who takes office. It also happens that the number of votes for the candidates from the party list can be restricted.\(^\text{14}\) This of course has an impact on

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\(^\text{13}\) Lijphart (1990) correctly points out that the mixed systems should not be included in the “categorical” category as Rae (1971) did. We always use the term ordinal ballot within brackets because we can not say that voters rank a party with a candidate in mixed systems. However, we can say that they express preferences for a party and a candidate.

\(^\text{14}\) It is the case of the Czech electoral system that there is a minimum percentage for the candidate to over run the party list (7\%) and also a maximum number of “approved candidates” in the ballot (recently reduced from four to two candidates) (see 2006 revision of Act 247/195). There are mainly two types of ballots used in preferential systems. Either the ballot allows selection of one or more candidates (approval) or the voter can actually rank the candidates. Note, however, that in the former case, “approval votes on
citizens’ effective freedom to choose. Clearly, the “choices” available in open list proportional representation systems are smaller than in the STV, particularly in the “weak” systems.

![Table 2](image)

Table 2. Electoral systems, ballot structures, and voters’ options and “choices”.

candidates” are used with electoral formulae (e.g. method d’Hondt) different from “approval voting” (see Brams and Fishburn 1983) which is not an electoral formula for multi-member districts.
Therefore, we consider two choices to be relevant in this type of electoral system.\textsuperscript{15} Table 2 summarizes the conclusions concerning available “options” and “choices”.

Finally, the last issue to address is the information available to the voter about the candidates. We assume that information on each candidate is a decreasing function of average district magnitude \((M = S/D)\), with \(S\) the size of the assembly and \(D\) total number of districts (upper and lower tier).\textsuperscript{16} In single member districts, opportunities for interaction between candidates and voters are greater. This is important mainly for the knowledge of the personal attributes of particular candidates. Information on each candidate decreases as the size of the district increases. This can arise from two different factors: the average number of mandates per district (in multi-member districts) increases or the electorate per mandate (in single member districts) increases. It is important to understand how \(M\) takes into account this second factor in mixed systems.

Let \(S_1\) refer to seats allocated in the lower tier and \(S_h\) seats allocated at upper tiers. Therefore,

\[
M = \frac{S}{D} = \frac{S_h}{D} + \frac{S_l}{D}
\] (1)

In plurality rule with candidate ballot, \(M = 1\). In dual ballot systems the average district size (electors per mandate) is higher if, for a given number of electors, the number of single member districts decreases. This effect is captured by \(M\) as the following example illustrates. Korea has 253 single member districts (and respectively the same number of MPs) out of a total of 299 (85%). On the other hand, Germany has only 50%

\textsuperscript{15} It is clearly the case that in a set of \(k\) candidates, a partial ordering of \(n<k\) candidates is associated with more “freedom” than purely giving “approval” to the same subset of \(n\) candidates. In the former case there are \textit{factorial} \(n\) \((n!)\) different ways to express preferences, while in the latter just one (e.g. with \(n=3\), \(3! = 6\) as opposed to 1). Our index is a function of approved candidates in the ballot because this is the essential information that is transformed through the electoral formula.

\textsuperscript{16} Chin and Taylor-Robinson (p.465 2005) found that “voters in closed list proportional representation access less of the available candidate information compared with subjects in the SMD electoral system”. Our specification of the “information function” is consistent with their findings.
of MPs elected through single member districts. This means that, disregarding the absolute assembly size, Korea \( M_k = 1.18 \) is much closer to the UK average district magnitude \( M_{UK} = 1 \), than Germany \( M_G = 1.99 \). Thus, taking the overall average district size, enables to distinguish between mixed systems with different proportion of MPs elected in single member districts.\(^{17}\)

Amongst different possibilities we adopt this function for a proxy of the information that citizens have on the personal characteristics of candidates:\(^{18}\)

\[
I = \frac{1}{1 + \log M}
\]

where \( \log M \) stands for the decimal logarithm of \( M \).

Therefore, the simple index of freedom of choice is a combination of these three characteristics. It is an increasing function of voters’ available “options” (the cardinality of the opportunity sets), voters’ “choices” (the number of relevant revealed preferences), and the information about the chosen candidate. To combine the first two aspects we use the geometric mean\(^{19}\) and we multiply this value by the information value, assumed as a function of \( M \). Consequently the index is based on \( \sqrt{c \cdot p} / (1 + \log M) \), where \( c \) stands for the “options” available to the voters, \( p \) for the “choices”. Finally we

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\(^{17}\) There are different approaches to district magnitude. Rae (1971) considers average district size. Taagepera and Shugart (1989) and Taagepera (2002) use an “effective district magnitude” which is an implicit function of the assembly size and the number of seat winning parties. There is always a loss of information when using an average instead of the distribution of district magnitude, namely we loose the variation of the distribution (see Monroe and Rose (2002)). We agree with Taagepera’s criticisms to the average district magnitude, namely that it does not take into account neither effective thresholds nor the effects of nationwide compensation in a national district (when it applies). However, the effective district magnitude is an output based measure and since we want to built an input based index we follow Rae’s approach. Moreover, the aim of our analysis here is to measure how much information is provided by candidates to voters. As explained in the text, even when district magnitude is an average of several single member districts and one national district, district magnitude changes with the proportion of seats allocated in single-member districts. The implicit assumption is that for a given assembly size and electorate, as the number of single member districts decreases, the size of each district increases and therefore the “information distance” between candidates and voters increase, i.e. there is an information loss.

\(^{18}\) Since it is a convex and decreasing function of \( M \), we implicitly assume that information about candidates decreases at a diminishing rate (negative sign of second derivative). It means that when the district size increases from one to two, the information loss is greater than when it increases from 20 to 21.

\(^{19}\) The geometric mean is computed by multiplying \( c \) and \( p \), then taking the square root of the product.
standardize the formula in such a way that the index value for the candidate-ballot (UK, USA) is 1, i.e. for the country \( i \) the index is given by:

\[
FC1_1 = \frac{\sqrt{c_i P_i}}{(1 + \log M_i) \sqrt{3}}
\]

This index has an advantage of not being a function of the effective number of parties and will be used to analyze the relationship between the two variables.\(^{20}\)

The effective freedom of choice index (FC2) is similar but we substitute \( c^* \) for \( c \), indicating that available political “choices” take into account now the effective number of parties in parliament. Therefore the index is based on the expression \( \sqrt{c^* P} \over (1 + \log M) \).

To standardize the index we use as normalizing constant \( 1/\sqrt{c^*_{us}} \), where \( c^*_{us} \) is the effective number of parties in the USA (\( c^*_{us} = 1.99 \)), so that the index assumes the unitary value in this country. For country \( j \) the index is given by:

\[
FC2_j = \frac{\sqrt{c^*_{us}} P}{(1 + \log M_j) \sqrt{c^*_{us}}}
\]

4. **Empirical results: freedom of choice indices**

Table A1 (in the Appendix) shows the characteristics of electoral systems in the 29 democracies we are analyzing. The mean district magnitudes, the effective number of parties and the Loosemore-Hanby proportionality index enables some comparison between the electoral systems.

\(^{20}\) Note that although it may seem that the index is asymmetric with respect to \( c \) and \( p \), since the range of \( c \) is between 1 and 3 and the range of \( p \) between 3 and 9, this is not the case. In fact, it can easily be demonstrated that we could multiply \( c \) by any positive scalar, so that the standardized index would not change.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ballot Structure</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Effective number of parties</th>
<th>Mean district magnitude</th>
<th>LH-index</th>
<th>FC2-Index</th>
<th>FC1-Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party Ballot</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>150.00</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Ballot</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>120.00</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Ballot</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>10.45</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Ballot</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>8.68</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Ballot</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>8.17</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Ballot</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>6.73</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate-Ballot</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate-Ballot</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate-Ballot</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference-ballot</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>4.15</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference-ballot</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>12.03</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference-ballot</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>11.25</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference-ballot</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>4.92</td>
<td>10.53</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>1.21</td>
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**Table 3: Countries ranked by increasing voters’ freedom to choose MPs (FC1)**

An application of the “freedom of choice” indices to several types of ballot structures and electoral systems is shown in Table 3. The two indices give a similar ranking of countries.
The simple one (FC1) should be used to test hypotheses concerning the political consequences of electoral laws and to discuss electoral reforms, since it only depends on variables from the electoral system. The second one (FC2) gives more importance to freedom to express political preferences but is calculated taking into account electoral results.

The interpretation of the FC1 index is straightforward as seen in section 3. Values can be directly compared with the reference value given by the candidate ballot system. Consequently, in The Netherlands or Israel, the freedom of choice is approximately one third of the level existing in the UK or the U.S., while in Ireland the level is almost twice the reference value. This is due mainly to the dimension of (reduced) information on candidates in the former countries given that they just have one electoral district. On the other hand, Ireland has relatively small districts (for a proportional representation system) and benefits from a greater menu of voter choices.

Several conclusions can be drawn from the index of freedom to choose (FC1). First, we can derive a rough ranking of the different ballot structures: Party ballot, Candidate ballot, Preference ballot, Dual ballot, Candidate preference ballot and Rank order ballot, in ascending order. However, some countries have higher (smaller) values in the index than was previously supposed by the type of ballot they use.\textsuperscript{21}

It is not surprising that the party ballot index is below the reference value given by the candidate ballot system. The options available to the voters and the possible “choices” are the same in both systems, yet in the party ballot, the voter has much less information concerning the personal characteristics of candidates.

The dual ballot systems are associated with quite different positions in the ranking given the fact that mean district magnitude is significantly different from

\textsuperscript{21} This shows an important methodological difference between our approach and the traditional studies of ballot structure that just create a typology of different ballots and ranked them. We rank electoral systems, not ballot types.
country to country (e.g. Germany (1.54) has a lower degree of freedom of choice than Korea (1.87)).

It is interesting to note how the proportionality index, such as the Loosemore-Hanby, and the freedom to choose index give different types of information on electoral systems. Australia and Slovenia have the same degree of proportionality (0.84), but voters’ freedom to choose in Australia is much higher. Norway (party ballot) and Taiwan (dual ballot) also share the same high degree of proportionality (0.95) but voters in Taiwan have more possibilities to express their preferences.

A similar situation occurs when we compare the effective number of political parties using the FC1 index. The USA and Malta have a similar effective number of political parties, but the FC1 index is much higher for Malta than for the USA.

If we consider a more aggregated analysis of the averages of “categorical” ballots (Party and Candidate ballots) and the averages of “ordinal” ballots (all the others) it is possible to test Rae’s hypothesis. Table 4 shows that, for each type of ballot, the averages of the effective number of parties and the degree of proportionality are similar. This gives support to the rejection of the hypothesis that the ballot structure has an effect either on the fragmentation of parliaments or on proportionality. On the other hand, as expected, ordinal ballots are associated with significant larger voters’ freedom of choice.\(^{22}\)

\(^{22}\) We test the hypothesis that there are no differences between means amongst the two groups for each characteristic (number of parties, average district magnitude, etc.), using a normal framework and the Welsh approximation, (i.e. we do not impose the equality of the variances in the two groups). At a 5% level, we do not reject the same means for the effective number of parties, the proportionality index, and the average district magnitude. However, we strongly reject the means equality for both the FC indeces. The use of more robust testing techniques leads to the same conclusions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate and Party Ballot (&quot;Categorical&quot;)</th>
<th>Effective Number Parties</th>
<th>Average District Magnitude</th>
<th>Proport. LH</th>
<th>Freed. Choice (FC2)</th>
<th>Freed. Choice (FC1)</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>34.11</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.64</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Ballots (&quot;Ordinal&quot;)</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>5.48</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>2.06</td>
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</table>

**Table 4—“Categorical” and “Ordinal” ballots**

It is also worth mentioning that the average district magnitude of ordinal ballots is relatively small, while it is very large in categorical ballots given the weight of party ballots.\(^{23}\)

Finally, to analyze how the freedom to choose index can be related to other characteristics of an electoral system, such as proportionality or the effective number of political parties, we estimate a linear regression where the dependent variable is the effective number of parties and the covariates are the freedom of choice index (FC1) and the decimal logarithm of average district size. The estimated values are (standard errors below the estimated coefficients)

\[
N_{\text{Parties}} = 1.8105 + 1.6651 \log(M) + 0.7456 \text{FC1}
\]

\[
(0.6072) \quad (0.7232)
\]

\[
R^2 = 0.252, \quad n = 29, \quad F-\text{Statistic} = 4.380, \quad p-value = 0.023
\]

where \(N_{\text{Parties}}\) stands for the effective number of parties.

We confirm that district magnitude is relevant for the effective number of parties but “freedom of choice” has no significant effect.\(^{24}\)

\(^{23}\) The no rejection of the equality of the means is due to a very large variance in each group, namely in the categorical one.

\(^{24}\)
An important consequence of this result is that changes in electoral systems that increase voters’ “freedom of choice” do not have a significant negative impact, as could be expected, on a more fragmented parliament and therefore they do not stimulate increased instability in parliamentary regimes.

We also estimate the possible effect of “freedom of choice” on proportionality and reach a similar conclusion. The FC1 index is not statistically significant but the district magnitude is, now, marginally significant.

\[
LH_{\text{index}} = 0.8448 + 0.0476 \log(M) + 0.0213 \text{FC1}
\]

\[
R^2 = 0.162, \ n = 29, \ \text{F - Statistic} = 2.524, \ p - \text{value} = 0.100
\]

where \(LH_{\text{index}}\) is the Loosemore-Hanby index of proportionality.

The finding that “freedom of choice” does not affect these variables does not lead to the conclusion that it should be considered a “weak” variable. The arguments presented in section 2 that “freedom of choice” has an intrinsic value apart from an instrumental value implies that increasing freedom is valued positively on its own. In the next section, we will discuss some empirical evidence that suggests it can also have

\[24\] Since FC1 is also a function of M, there is some correlation between the independent variables. Although this introduces some multicollinearity into the model, the conclusions about the dependency between the effective number of parties and each variable are not affected. We can verify that “freedom of choice” has no impact on the effective number of parties estimating the regression

\[
\hat{N}_{\text{Parties}} = 4.549 - 0.5938 \text{FC1}
\]

\[
R^2 = 0.0357, \ n = 29, \ \text{F - Statistic} = 0.9982, \ p - \text{value} = 0.3266.
\]

We can also observe the dependency between the effective number of parties and \(\log M\)

\[
\hat{N}_{\text{Parties}} = 3.010 + 1.242 \log(M)
\]

\[
R^2 = 0.221, \ n = 29, \ \text{F - Statistic} = 7.680, \ p - \text{value} = 0.0099.
\]
an instrumental value concerning variables other then fragmentation of parliament and proportionality.

5. Discussion

The freedom citizens have to express their political preferences and their preferences concerning relevant characteristics of representatives to parliament (congress) depend on the structure of polity. More decentralized structures of government (in unitary or federal countries) are, ceteris paribus, associated with overall greater freedom of choice. This means that the results of this paper should be interpreted with some caution, since we only apply the index to national legislatures (lower house).\textsuperscript{25} It is necessary to bear in mind that the role of the lower house is different in parliamentary and presidential regimes and also in unicameral and bicameral regimes.\textsuperscript{26} Moreover, we have not considered an obvious important factor, the internal competition within parties in organizing lists (when applicable).

Having these provisos in mind, this paper developed an index of freedom of choice of members of parliament that takes into account three distinct dimensions: voters’ “options” (the cardinality of the choice domain), “choices” (the number of revealed preferences on candidates/parties), and “information” (on candidates characteristics). Empirical evidence shows that the index can not be univocally associated either with electoral systems, proportionality indices, effective number of parties or other measures of electoral systems. In fact, one of the aims of developing

\textsuperscript{25} The index can also be applied to parliaments of States, Provinces or Lander in Federations. In those federations where there are significant linguistic, religious, ethnic, or other divisions and citizens are segregated in part according to these divisions, it is natural that if the electoral system is the same at national and regional levels, the effective number of parties is slightly higher at national level. Therefore, the average regional FC2 index should be smaller than the national FC2 index.

\textsuperscript{26} Spindler and Tommasi (2007) argue that in the case of Argentina, the lower house has no significant effective power. If this is the case, it follows naturally that greater citizens’ freedom of choice in the same would not be very relevant to legislative behavior.
such an index is to be able to discriminate between electoral systems having similar degrees of proportionality or similarly “fragmented” parliaments, as measured by the effective number of parties.

The debate around the reform of electoral systems - namely the possible shifts from majoritarian to mixed systems, or changes within proportional representation regimes – arises from the fact that there are several relevant normative criteria (political stability, fair representation, freedom of choice) and there are frequently tradeoffs between them. For example, there is a possible tradeoff between political stability and fair representation in parliamentary regimes: increased fairness of representation may lead to a more “fragmented” parliament and more unstable coalition governments.

The empirical analysis developed in this paper shows that there seems to be no tradeoff between greater voter participation in the political process and either political stability or fair representation. The conclusion that greater “freedom of choice” does not have implications for proportionality or the effective number of parties has an important normative implication for electoral reform. It shows that it is possible to design systems with a greater role for voters’ participation in the political process without negative side effects. Though, it does not follow that greater citizens’ freedom-of-choice is always beneficial. Political parties’ role in screening candidates when selection follows a competitive procedure may be important. Also, citizens have limited cognitive abilities so that expanding freedom-of-choice after some point may have no significant advantage.

28 It is worth distinguishing between formal political stability and informal political stability. Formal political stability is the capacity of governments to fulfill their normal legislative term (usually four years). It makes an emphasis on the parliament-executive relationship. The informal political stability is related to a low level of political conflict outside parliament. The tradeoff referred to is between formal political stability and fair representation.
We have also shown that some ballot structures give more power to the voters and less to the party elites in selecting representatives. Other ballot structures give exclusive selection privileges to political parties, and still others aim for a more balanced weight of voters and parties in the selection process. The importance of measuring voters’ “freedom to choose” is precisely to weight the relative importance of voters and political parties in selecting candidates.

The hypothesis, implicitly formulated by Stuart Mill, that the quality of representatives, as measured by voters’ standards, will depend on voters’ freedom of choice, can be tested controlling for the fact that it will also be a function of party selection procedures. Intuition suggests that the worst situation is low competition within parties, low freedom of choice and a presidential regime.

There is some evidence that the degree of voter satisfaction is higher in countries where “freedom of choice is higher.” Other hypotheses that have been tested and that deserve further research are the relationship between electoral systems and corruption, or the effects of freedom of choice on voter turnout, on the participation of women in politics or the intertemporal consistency of electoral promises by elected representatives.

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29 See Farrell and MacAllister (2006). An experiment in British Columbia (Canada) also reveals that one highly valued criterion for electoral reform is freedom-of-choice.
30 Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman (2005) present evidence that the combination of closed list proportional representation (CLPR) and presidentialism is the institutional environment that most favors corruption. The fact that CLPR is associated with higher levels of corruption seems consistent with the evidence presented in this paper that they have the least degree of citizens’ freedom to choose representatives. The index developed in this paper enables the development of research considering a continuous composite variable of electoral systems and not a tripartite division (CLPR, OLPR and Plurality) or a binary division (“ordinal” and “categorical” ballots).
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<th>Number of MMD</th>
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<td>0.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual Ballot</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>0.95</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Ballot</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120.00</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual Ballot</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>0.96</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference-ballot</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>9.05</td>
<td>0.96</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference-ballot</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>12.03</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>0.97</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank-order</td>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.98</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference-ballot</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>179</td>
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<td>179</td>
<td>10.53</td>
<td>4.92</td>
<td>0.98</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

Source: data for Portugal, Ireland and Malta collected and computed by the authors. Other data from Pippa Norris (2003).