Policies, families and integration:
a state of the art of immigration research in Europe

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Nº 03/2010
1. Introduction

Migration is currently an area of vast scientific research, public debate and policy intervention in Europe. This is the case when the object under analysis is international migration and, more specifically, immigration, i.e., international movements of people targeting the European societies – the object of the present report. The reasons for the centrality of this theme are numerous. On the one hand, migratory movements, which were always part of the European history, became increasingly visible in most European countries. Taken in the sense of international migration, they were never as large as they are today. On the other hand, they defy some of the entrenched principles in which cultures and identity lie. The settlement of populations with different national backgrounds, cultures, religions and values defy the notion of ethnic homogeneity in which the European identities are (mistakenly) based. The themes of international migration and social change do not come across very often in social research. However, it may be argued that international flows are nowadays one of the biggest sources of social change in Europe.

The literature produced on the theme is countless. In the early stages of immigration in Europe, most of the studies were produced in Western countries, usually adopting a national perspective. With the enlargement of the migration realm, Northern, Southern and Central European countries became involved, each of them also producing an abundant national research. With the time, an increasing volume of cross-country research was produced, much as a consequence of European Union (EU) funding opportunities and academic networking. All in all, a vast amount of research has been produced on these topics, displaying a wide geographic and thematic variety. Although the better known studies come from the largest countries in Europe, being written in the dominant scientific languages (mostly English), many other were produced in the framework of other countries and languages.

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3 This paper was prepared in the framework of the project “Social Platform on Research for Families and Family Policies” (Family Platform), coordinated by Uwe Uhlendorff, Technical University Dortmund, and funded by the European Commission (7th FP, Project SSH-CT-2009-243864). The paper was part of a vaster state of the art in the field of “Social Inequality and Diversity of Families”, coordinated by Karin Wall, ICS/University of Lisbon, whose contribution is gratefully acknowledged.
Taking into account these considerations, the current state of the art must be considered as a general and incomplete overview of research on immigration in Europe. Given the scope and maturity of migration studies, the long period in which relevant flows took place, the many countries and scientific communities involved, and the many interrelated themes, it is virtually impossible to carry out an extensive evaluation of the research carried out in the field. For the purpose of the current report, this exercise was still more unfeasible given the short amount of time and resources allocated to the task – even knowing that only research produced from the 1990s was to be taken into account.

The methodology adopted for producing this report took into account the vast extension of the field and the resources available. Firstly, some major general studies on migration in Europe, including previous states of the art, were reviewed. This was the case of works such as Castles and Miller (2003 and 2009), Penninx, Berger and Kraal (2006), Spencer and Cooper (2007), Penninx, Spencer and Van Hear (2008), Portes and DeWind (2008), Bonifazi et al. (2008) and Okolski (forthcoming). The work of Penninx and colleagues (2006) was particularly relevant for this purpose, as it condensed the collective effort of several European researchers, gathered in IMISCOE (International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion), an European Network of Excellence in migration studies created in the framework of the European Commission (EC) research funding; its objective was presenting a detailed state of the art of European research in several migration domains. Secondly, some relevant databases and websites were consulted. This was the case of the EC research site, where cross-national European research projects are presented; the IMISCOE website, condensing the more recent production in this framework; international organisations websites, such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM); and some relevant journals.

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4 The difficulty of drafting a state of the art on migration issues is widely admitted. For example, Penninx and colleagues (2008: 7) argue that “research related to international migration, integration and social cohesion has grown to such an extent that it is impossible to review the literature according to conventional approaches of a State of the Art Study. The field of migration has grown itself as the diversity of migration, its forms, mechanisms and motivations have changed (...). The field of integration has likewise expanded, coming to include, along with the traditional domains of work, education, housing and health and political, social and cultural/religious dimensions, new topics such as language, policymaking in the field, interethnic relations, discrimination, age, gender and generation. Furthermore, with the inclusion of new analytical perspectives, such as the focus on transnational ties and connections of migrants and the perspective of sending countries, the domain of study has significantly enlarged”.

5 Some of the original full versions of these states of the art were also consulted (see http://www.imiscoe.org). The themes dealt with by this work were: international migration flows and their regulation; migration and development: causes and consequences; migrants’ citizenship: legal status, rights and political participation; migrants’ work, entrepreneurship and economic integration; the social integration of immigrants with special reference to the local and spatial dimension; cultural, religious and linguistic diversity in Europe: an overview of issues and trends; identity, representation, interethnic relations and discrimination; time, generations and gender in migration and settlement; the multilevel governance of migration.

6 http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences.

and publishers websites. Finally, some bibliographic databases were checked, but mainly to fill some gaps resulting from the previous steps.

The objective of the current report is presenting the main research lines, theoretical discussions and controversial issues existing about immigration in the European framework and, particularly, in the EU since the 1990s. As stated previously, it only deals with international migration and, particularly, immigration, dealing with both inflows and integration – two subjects sometimes separated in research. Besides this first introductory section, the second section presents the framework, i.e., a brief history of immigration in Europe and some relevant statistical data. The third section summarizes the research, structured around three main themes: a thorough exam will be made of research on policy issues (admission, control, integration and citizenship); family-related issues (demography, family migration, gender and age related migration); and integration patterns (work, space, identity and second generations). The first of these latter topics has a dual objective, presenting simultaneously the main research available and the related public policies existing towards immigration. In the final section, a brief synthesis is made and some research gaps will be tentatively identified. Compared to other states of the art in the field, this one differs in some respects, among which focusing more attentively on family and social inequality related issues, given the scope and objectives of the project from which it derives.

2. Framework

The history of European immigration is not as recent as sometimes portrayed. In countries such as France, a considerable amount of inflows existed already in the first half of the 20th century. But in all developed Western countries, large inflows occurred mainly after the Second World War, in the framework of a solid economic expansion that lasted for circa 30 years – the so-called “30 glorious years”. As well documented by several sources, most of the immigrants were then supposed to be temporary guests, but many remained. From the 1970s onwards several changes occurred, including the enactment of restrictive policies, the changing geography of flows and new migration patterns. From the 1980s, Southern Europe and Ireland gradually became important targets of immigration, together with some Scandinavian countries. More recently, after the end of the Cold War, also Central and Eastern European countries became object of concern, given the importance of transit and, later, durable forms of immigration (Bonifazi et al., 2008; Okolski, forthcoming). During these decades, also outflows took place from most European countries – although always less researched. Many of these were intra-EU flows. At the same time, a clear policy driven difference started to emerge between intra-EU flows and others involving third countries. The contradiction between (quasi) free circulation – successively updated with the new EU enlargements – and restrictions towards third-country nationals became increasingly evident.

The years of solid economic expansion in Europe, lasting until the mid-1970s, were largely based on manufacturing industries and a relatively stable international environment. During this period, most of the inflows targeted the Northwestern
countries and obtained a durable job. When the national and international context changed, new migration patterns emerged. Globalisation brought with it a new kind of flows, including more irregular immigration, asylum seekers and refugees, and accrued social concerns. This was also the time of the new service and information economy, increasing deregulation of the labour market and global economic competition. The growing politicization of immigration then took place, deriving from a new public attitude towards inflows, was just a prelude to the more recent securitization debate.

The measure of international migration is complex. As described by several sources – including, for example, an extensive work carried out by Poulain and others (2006), resulting from an EC funded project –, the methodology and concepts used in this field largely differ among European countries. Recently, the EC has launched an initiative to carry out a harmonization of migration statistics in the EU, a measure needed since long ago. However, its outcome is not yet complete. Despite the efforts of institutions such as the OECD, in the framework of its annual International Migration Outlook, comparative exercises are always fragile. This means that a comparative analysis may be mostly be carried out using general definitions and a macro vision. When entering the detail of variables and geography, the methodological difficulties for comparisons become evident.

Despite the methodological problems, recent statistical data confirm the importance and widespread character of immigration in Europe. Data on annual net migration rates in OECD countries, from 1955 to 2007, are displayed in Table 1, as well as data on the contribution of net migration to population growth in 2006, displayed in Figure 1. The persistence and widespread character of immigration is clear. The observation of net migration growth in Europe since the 1950s confirms several facts: the durability of inflows to the Northwestern countries until today; the turnaround from emigration to immigration in several countries, such as in Southern Europe; and the gradual advent of new immigration destinations. Furthermore, comparison between net migration and natural increase is telling about the way how immigration is driving demographic growth. In a context of overall demographic decline in Europe, with a generalized pattern of low fertility, it is mainly migration that is allowing for a positive growth and the smoothing of the structural impacts of ageing.

Data about the proportion of foreign-born and foreign population in the OECD countries, between 1995 and 2006, are displayed in Table 2 and Figure 2. These two criteria – country of birth and country of citizenship – are the most common ones to capture the volume of immigration. Although the former is more rigorous, since it measures all individuals (nationals and foreigners) that actually migrated between countries, the second is the most easily available, since it grasps all foreign individuals

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8 Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on Community statistics on migration and international protection. This regulation has produced its first results in 2009, with data referring to 2008, although the first year was admitted to be still experimental.

9 Tables and Figures are presented in the Annex.
(immigrants and non-immigrants, including the so-called second generation) living in a country. Both series of data confirm that the European countries, particularly the EU, present today a human landscape, in migration terms, not fundamentally different from the “traditional immigration countries” of America and Oceania.

Taking, for instance, the foreign-born population, some European countries, such as Luxembourg, Switzerland, Ireland and Austria had in 2006 a larger share of immigrants than the United States, a country in which immigration is part and parcel of national identity. Taking the criteria of foreign population, the same European countries are joined by Spain, Belgium and Germany as having a higher share than the United States. When observing the rate of growth during recent years (1995 to 2006), it is visible that both the share of foreign-born and foreigners are on the rise in most European countries. The speed of growth has been higher in some of the recent European hosts, such as the Southern European and Ireland, countries in which the number of immigrants (or foreigners) sometimes doubled or tripled in just ten years. Spain is the most impressive example, having passed from a proportion of 1.6 per cent of foreigners in the whole population, in 1997, to a huge 10.3 per cent, in 2006.

The legal channels sought for by prospective immigrants are diverse (Figure 3). In 2006, family-related migration, including family reunification and marriage migration (entries of fiancés or recently married spouses of citizens or legal foreign residents) accounted for the majority of inflows, approaching 44 per cent of the total. This was followed by individuals entering in the framework of free movement provisions, particularly in the case of the EU, labour migration and humanitarian grounds (including refugees). The situation was very different from country to country, with family migration dominating in countries such as the US and France (OECD, International Migration Outlook, 2008). However, these numbers do not reflect undocumented immigration and temporary mobility.

Several data about the economic participation of immigrants in OECD countries are displayed in Tables 3 and 4 and Figures 4 to 7. The important contribution of immigrants in national economies, as well as some of the main reasons for related social inequalities, may be observed in those figures. Data confirm the relatively high labour participation rates of foreign-born populations, although usually smaller than the native’s ones (Figure 4); the fact that it is the less skilled that display highest participation rates (Table 3 and Figure 5) – a situation related to their frequent deskilling, i.e., the fact that they often perform tasks below their educational level; their frequent insertion in some of the less privileged economic sectors, such as manufacturing, construction and personal services (Table 4); their higher share in flexible and precarious labour arrangements, such as temporary employment (Figure 6); and their much more higher vulnerability to unemployment (Figure 7).
3. Research

3.1. Policies: admission, control, integration and citizenship

Immigration policies are a crucial area to understand immigration in Europe. On the one hand, they reflect the steps taken by national governments and supra-national institutions, most notably the EU, to deal with inflows and related issues, including immigrants’ integration. On the other hand, a large amount of research has been devoted to study policy developments. In fact, policy developments and policy research go hand in hand, what justifies presenting both in this section. Two main aspects of immigration policy will organise this section: first, admission and control, and second, integration and citizenship. It must be noted that policy builds realities, in the sense that it gives visibility to some issues and omits others. Although it is the function of the researcher not to follow closely the policy lines, research efforts have been in fact strongly tied to policy dilemmas and related public debates. Despite this, the next paragraphs will try to highlight both the research directly tied to policy needs, as well as more autonomous research.

3.1.1. Admission policies

(a) General policy issues

Some of the immigration issues dealt with by policymakers are related to admission procedures and control mechanisms. The objective is to know who may be legally admitted in a country, and in what conditions, and the ways of preventing unwanted immigration. During the period of economic growth between the mid-1940s and mid-1970s, there were, according to Castles and Miller (2003), three main categories of countries: the “classical” immigration countries, such as the North American and Australia, in which permanent settlement and family reunion were promoted, and in which a legal immigrant was always a prospective citizen; European countries such as the UK, France and Netherlands, where immigrants from former colonies were granted favourable conditions of entry and easy access to citizenship, and where other immigrants were often relatively well accepted; and European countries such as Germany, Austria and Switzerland, tied to the classical “guestworker” model. After the mid-1970s this distinction became blurred. The European countries converged in many respects and, under certain perspectives, are also becoming closer to the classical immigration countries. This seems to be a two-way process. As stated by Miller (1999), currently a Europeneization of American policy and an Americanization of European policy may be witnessed. A similar idea was expressed by authors such as Cornelius et al. (2004), when defining their “convergence hypothesis”: immigration policies tended to converge to a general restrictive approach in major developed countries. But it is usually argued that an important distinction remain: the identity of the European nations is not related to immigration, but much more to some ethnic homogeneity, at the contrary of North American ones, whose founding myths evolve around immigration (Castles and Miller, 2003: 50).
All countries also create important differences among immigrants. As described in several sources, the “categorisation of immigrants” by policymakers, on the basis of nationality, ethnicity or skill level, enacts separate groups facing different admission constraints (Baganha et al., 2006: 31-32). The classical cleavage had to do with the colonial and post-colonial relationship between countries. Very often immigrants coming from ex-colonies were granted privileges, both for entry and acquisition of nationality. This occurred in the Northwestern European countries already referred to, but also in Southern European ones, such as Spain and Portugal. More generally, links based in ancestry and ethnic identity have served to produce privileges: although the German case was the more well known in the second half of the 20th century, all countries possessing diasporas favour this kind of action 10. More recently, in the European context, the sharpest difference occurs between EU and third-country nationals. As it will be seen ahead, these different groups face completely different conditions for admission and, generally, acquisition of rights.

Notwithstanding these selective criteria, since the 1990s the trend among European countries – and, particularly EU ones – was towards restrictive policies and a focus on control. As stated by Baganha et al. (2006: 26), “the control of migration has preoccupied the minds of policymakers ever since the relatively liberal migration regime that prevailed during the classical period of post-war labour immigration came under increasing pressure in the early 1970s, and much more forcefully, in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As a result migration policy in general came to be seen as being essentially about controlling and preventing unwanted flows”. In fact, after the oil shock of the mid 1970s and the profound economic restructuring that took place, several changes occurred: the labour demand for low skilled jobs was not as evident as before, unemployment increased and immigration pressure became stronger. The latter resulted from the end of the Cold War (bringing with it the re-entry of Central and Eastern countries in the European migration system), the conflicts that took place (particularly the one in ex-Yugoslavia, in 1991-1995) and the large economic gaps remaining (and sometimes widening) among developed and less developed countries. The changing context explained the changing attitudes of European authorities and public opinions regarding immigration.

The new policy initiatives, particularly since the early 1990s, have been several. The old and new European immigration countries introduced stricter border controls, new visa requirements, penalties for airlines which failed to control the documentation of their passengers, public and workplace inspections, and improved means for detecting falsified documents. At the same time, the available legal avenues for immigration, such as family reunion and asylum seeking, were made more difficult for potential migrants, and renewed efforts were launched to combat irregular employment, smuggling and trafficking. These initiatives were mainly of a reactive type. As argued by Castles and Miller (2003: 118), “this general climate of restrictiveness led some observers to speak of a «Fortress Europe», building walls to keep out impoverished masses from the South and East”.

10 For an overview of selection processes based on ancestry and postcolonial contexts in Europe, see Joppke, 2005.
In recent years, this restrictive stance coexisted with some mild opening to new immigrants. The acceptance of immigrants is based in principles of human rights (which were always present), economic and demographic needs. The channels of family reunion and asylum seeking always existed, although, as it will be seen ahead (see next sub-sections), were changed to allow a more rigorous scrutiny, what in practice meant more obstacles to applicants. They result from the acceptance of human rights principles and the adhesion to world legal regimes. The economic needs are translated in the enactment of temporary labour programmes for low skilled workers and specific avenues for highly skilled professionals. The demographic need is repeatedly cited as an argument for improved channels of regular inflows. It is meaningful that, in 2000, the (then) EU Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs, António Vitorino, stated that “the zero immigration policies of the past 25 years are not working”, urging for “new legal ways for immigrants to enter the EU” (cit. in Martin, Martin and Weil, 2006: 74-75). However, the growing politicization of the issue, the public debate and social tensions around immigration, and the security concerns, mostly raised after September 11th, justify that pro-active policies are still, at the most, timid and tentative 11.

At the same time, a new consensus started to emerge that immigration regulation could not be made by individual host countries alone, but required enhanced cooperation. This occurred at several levels: the EU framework, in which several steps were taken since the 1990s; bilateral cooperation with sending countries; multilateral cooperation between countries (the better example of which being the High Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development that took place at the United Nations in 2006 - see also GCIIM, 2005); and cooperation between governments and civil society. As written by Baganha et al. (2006: 30-31), “the emergent international policy responses seem to encourage the participation of different levels of government (national, regional and supra-national), the input of non-governmental and private agencies, multilateral rather than bilateral fora and partnership between the countries involved in the migration pattern (sending, receiving and transit countries). The fact that numerous agencies have come to influence the process of policy-shaping or even policy making requires a less state-centric analysis of migration policies and also the study of the evolving modes of cooperation. The concept of multilevel governance seems to be useful for the development of such new approaches” (see also Zincone and Caponio, 2006).

The role of the EU must yet be singularized. Besides the principle of free circulation of labour, which was one the early pillars of the Union, immigration have been the object of several initiatives since the 1990s. This commitment also explained an increasing

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11 A cross-comparative European research project, funded under the EC’s 7th Framework Programme, is currently under way on a related subject. The project, coordinated by Gianni D’Amato, from the University of Neuchatel, is entitled “Support and opposition to migration - A cross national comparison of the politicization of migration” (see http://www.som-project.eu). It compares seven European countries about the conflicts over the social and political participation of immigrants and the way how immigration is becoming politicized in these countries.
research on the theme. In the words of Penninx et al. (2008: 7), “the EU, and specifically the European Commission, has commissioned a significant amount of research and overview studies since international migration was declared a topic of communitarian policymaking (Amsterdam Treaty 1997). The field of integration followed in 2003 after the Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment (2003) was politically accepted. EU-policies in the latter field, however, were not communitarian, but to be based on consensus of sovereign partners”. Whilst some aspects have been the object of agreement and common policy in the EU, such as border control, asylum procedures, family reunification, EU citizenship and rights for long-term third-country residents, others are still the prerogative of nation-states, such as labour admission and, above all, access to nationality (for a synthesis on the latest EU approach to immigration and asylum issues, see Collett, 2010).

(b) Labour admission
The recognition of labour needs, which would be filed up by immigrants, was not made without hesitations by European governments. Contrary to the period until the mid-1970s, economic expansion was no longer made on the basis of a stable environment, long-term contracts and a large need of low skilled labour. Moreover, inflows now faced a situation of structural unemployment (also affecting natives), flexible labour arrangements and overall pressure over social protection mechanisms. For this reason, during many years no significant legal avenues for labour immigration were opened up in the EU. The main route to the labour market was irregular migration, coupled by the possibilities allowed by family reunion and asylum seeking legal channels.

The situation started to change during the 1990s. After the end of the Cold War, a number of temporary foreign worker policies were enacted, mainly involving low skilled workers targeting sectors such as agriculture. The second generation of temporary worker programmes was initially an initiative of countries such as Germany, aiming to support the transition period in the economies of Central and Eastern countries after the fall of the socialism, as well as a means of combating irregular migration in this context (Castles and Miller, 2009). Other countries followed this approach, such as the Netherlands and Sweden. Meaningfully, these timid programmes were viewed as progressive in the new restrictive climate. This is obviously a paradox, since the guestworker programmes prevalent during the 1960s and 1970s, which involved much more immigrants, had been widely criticized for their limited integration prospects and incapacity to prevent settlement. But following the same policy line, some countries of Southern Europe, particularly Italy and Spain, launched further temporary work programmes since the 1990s to fill up labour needs. In this latter context, most of the programmes involved seasonal workers targeting agricultural jobs.

The recognition of skill shortages in highly skilled domains, notably information and communication technologies (ICT), later followed as an immigration channel. This mainly occurred during the second half of the 1990s, when the ICT bubble was more visible, also following initiatives of the United States to admit a higher number of specialists in that domain. This led a number of European countries to design specific
legal avenues for highly skilled workers, particularly ICT experts (see OECD, 2002). The German case is among the best known: the country launched the Green Card in 2000, mainly targeting ICT specialists – although its quantitative target would be far to be met (Kolb et al., 2004). The recent initiative of the EU of launching a Blue Card is of the same kind (Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, coming into force in 2011). This means that the more relevant permanent labour shortage explicitly admitted by EU governments in recent years is of highly skilled people, the one supposed to improve the competitive advantage of Europe in the global arena. Low skilled needs are viewed mostly as temporary.

However, researchers have pointed to the fact that plenty durable opportunities in less skilled occupations remain. In fact, a large amount of literature define the current economic environment in developed economies has providing dual opportunities in the labour market, either at the top or at the bottom of the professional ladder (for example, Sassen, 1991). The way how countries have been fulfilling less skilled labour needs differ. In most cases, recourse is made to irregular immigrants and temporary work programmes, besides less privileged citizens (including long-term immigrants and their offspring). Two other policy approaches have been developed in recent years. One is exemplified by the UK. The recent introduction of a points system in this country, which mainly rewards skilled labour migrants, was accompanied by the admission than less skilled opportunities would be fulfilled in the framework of the EU free circulation of workers. For as long as economic disparities remain in the EU, it is feasible that low income countries (such as Poland) are available to send labour to higher income ones (such as the UK). A second development was sought for by the Southern European countries. In Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece systems of quotas were developed since the 1990s, which tried to tackle the various labour market opportunities (Arango et al., forthcoming). Although research on Southern Europe demonstrated the many failures of such systems, they were nonetheless meaningful as a quest for proactive regulation of labour migration.

(c) Family reunification
One of the long-lasting legal channels for admission in the EU is family-related immigration. Taking into account legal permanent immigrants, it represents nowadays the majority of inflows in many EU countries (see Figure 3). Among the European hosts, the main exception to this rule is the one of Southern European countries. This is explained by the recent character of immigration in the latter context, favouring a larger share of labour movements (single individuals who only later will bring their families in), and by the importance of irregular inflows, even when family members are involved.

The possibility of family reunification, as well as the one of asylum seeking (see next sub-section), was not concealed in the mid-1970s, when restrictive policies were enacted. This is the reason why these two channels were from then on the main legal avenues for admission, joining irregular migration to explain the persistence of inflows towards Europe during the years. The strong entrenchment of family reunification in
human rights principles and international law always made it an undeniable right of immigrants. The EU laid the ground for a unified policy with the EU’s Resolution on the Harmonisation of National Policies on Family Reunification in 1993. Later, in 2003, it launched a directive about family reunification (Directive 2003/86/EC), proving its key character in European immigration policy.

Despite the universal acceptance, the evolution of the principles of family reunification was not straightforward. As stated by the literature, EU family migration policies “typically observe a very narrow understanding of the family” (Kraler and Kofman, 2009: 4). Although the 2003 directive sets some guidelines about the eligible family members, what constitutes the family differs among member-states. Usually, family related admission respects to members of the nuclear family, particularly spouses and dependent children less than 21 years old, and, in some cases, registered partners. In a few other cases, also admission of dependent or elderly parents or other dependent relatives is allowed. The more abundant cases respect to immigration of spouses, more than that of children. One of the reasons for this is that family formation or marriage migration (constituting a new family) is surpassing conventional family reunification (reunion of separated families) as the main form of family reunion (Kraler and Kofman, 2009).

Compared with traditional immigration countries, such as North-America, an important difference of the EU is its limitation of the family unit. The former extend family migration beyond dependent relatives, also including adult children, siblings and non-dependent parents (Kofman and Meetoo, 2008). As argued by Kofman (2004: 244), in contrast with the United States, Canada and Australia, “(...) in European states the criteria based on family ties have not been a priority in immigration policies and a highly restrictive definition of the family, normally limited to spouses and dependent children within the nuclear family, has been used as the basis of entry”.

Several restrictions have also been enacted over family reunion, whose amount is increasing in recent years (Baganha et al., 2006; Bauböck et al., 2006; Kofman and

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12 The right to family reunification is part of two human rights conventions: the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (although the latter is still to be ratified by most developed host countries). For a comprehensive view of family reunification policy in the world, see [http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-migration/developing-migration-policy/migration-family/family-reunification-issues/cache/offonce;jsessionid=77B505FC020F15E0020686F1FE46C5F7.worker01](http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-migration/developing-migration-policy/migration-family/family-reunification-issues/cache/offonce;jsessionid=77B505FC020F15E0020686F1FE46C5F7.worker01).


14 An increasing number of countries is recognizing the changing patterns of familial relationships. Some already recognize social units such as same-sex relationships, cohabitation, single parents and adopted children, such as the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and the UK (Kofman and Meetoo, 2008).
Meetoo, 2008). The possibility for family reunion was always linked to certain conditions. These traditionally included income requirements and living arrangements (including housing), a form of avoiding pressure over the welfare state. More recently, also integration requirements are to be met, such as integration tests and knowledge of the local language (measures such as these were enacted in countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark and Austria in recent years). Since 2009, also the EC is linking family reunion with integration prospects, therefore conditioning that right (Collett, 2010). Besides, immigrant sponsors are required to fulfil a larger period of legal residence before calling their families in. In the case of migration for family formation, including transnational marriages, requirements for a minimum age of spouses or a probationary period of marriage have also been recently enacted. A polemical – and meaningful – requirement has been the attempt made by the French authorities to impose a DNA testing on immigrant’s children.

The increasing number of restrictions is part of the general restrictive climate existing in the EU, but is also closely tied to particular debates. The perspectives about family reunification are changing in the EU, as research has often highlighted. The argument that family migration may reinforce the pressure over the welfare state and may bring in more (unwanted) low skilled workers has been persistently cited for restricting family reunion. More recently a further argument has been added, namely that family migration may, at the contrary of what was expected, hamper integration prospects. This occurs since it may prolong traditional family norms and gender divisions (for example, patriarchal relationships, traditional customs such as arranged and forced marriages, and domestic violence), contrary to the principles of equity of European societies (Kofman and Meetoo, 2008; Kraler and Kofman, 2009). Furthermore, restrictions were enabled in face of the abuse of this channel, including “bogus marriages” and “sham marriages” (Kofman and Meetoo, 2008).

It must still be added that the possibility of family reunification depends on the legal status of the immigrants and, more generally, on their position in a stratified system. Among the differences, EU citizens face much better prospects for family admission than third country nationals. This means that, as stated earlier, the categorisation of immigrants affects profoundly their integration patterns.

In face of these changes, immigration based in family reunification decreased recently in the EU. Given this fact, some authors have argued that the EU defence of family reunification is far from having fulfilled its explicit aims, since it allowed several restrictions under the common policy. As argued by Kraler and Kofman (2009: 5), “(...) the European Commission failed to reach its objective for greater harmonisation through the family reunification directive. Instead of that, it has initiated a race to the bottom. (...) As a result, there is a growing gap between the right to family reunion for

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15 A recent comparative European research project delved on this issue: the project, entitled “Civic Stratification, Gender, and Family Migration Policies”, funded by the Austrian Ministry of Sciences, was coordinated by Veronika Bilger and Albert Kraler, from the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), Austria, and lasted between 2006 and 2008. For further information, see Kraler and Kofman, 2009 and http://research.icmpd.org/1291.html.
family members of third-country nationals and those of EU nationals. Citizens with family members from non-EU countries have fewer rights than citizens who have made use of mobility rights or other EU migrants and their family members. This ironic situation has given rise to what has been termed «reverse discrimination».

(d) Asylum seekers and refugees

Such as in family reunification matters, immigration policies are limited to enact strict national prerogatives in asylum and refugee issues. According to Baganha et al. (2006: 31), “the categorisation of migrants is not only within the mandate of the nation-state. Some migrants can claim the right to move and resettle on the basis of interests beyond the scope of national policy making, notably the UN's Refugee Convention or the European Convention on the Human Rights”. However, the pursuit of universalistic obligations was not made without considering realist objectives, linked to national dilemmas. Following the same authors, “the outcome of this balancing act has been that European governments are willing to accept a limited number of asylum seekers, of whom they will recognise an even smaller number of refugees” (id., ibid.).

The importance of the asylum seeker and refugee statuses has fast increased in Europe until the early 1990s. As referred to above, this legal channel was one of the few that remained available for immigration when the restrictive policies became predominant after the mid-1970s. As referred to above, it is also based in human rights principles and international law 16. No matter whether the movement was or not duly grounded on the Refugee Convention, the number of asylum seekers strongly augmented in the EU during the 1980s and reached a peak in the early 1990s. The reasons for this were several, including the political and military upheavals of the epoch, particularly related to the end of the Cold War, and the overall trend for an increase in worldwide migration.

The fact is that, after the early 1990s, several European states reacted and imposed restrictions on the admission of asylum seekers. The first steps were taken by Germany and Sweden, but a number of other European states followed, increasingly in the framework of the EU. The restrictive measures then enacted included: legislative changes to restrict access to the refugee status; the setting of temporary protection regimes instead of permanent refugee status; measures to prevent individuals without adequate documentation from migrating (including requirements for visas and carrier sanctions); designation of “safe third countries” bordering the EU (such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic), thereby leading to the return of asylum seekers to transit countries; restrictive interpretations of the UN's Refugee Convention; and EU cooperation on asylum policy, particularly the Dublin Convention, indicating that the first country entered by an asylum seeker might decide on the claim, thereby generalising the “safe third country” principle among EU countries (Castles and Miller, 2003 and 2009; Baganha et al., 2006).

16 The most important instrument is the UN's Refugee Convention of 1951.
These measures, coupled with other factors, such as the decrease of conflicts and the lesser number of individuals showing up to the authorities, explained why the number of asylum seekers decreased in Europe – and other developed host countries – since the mid-1990s. As stated by Castles and Miller (2003: 107), “the refugee regime of the rich countries of the North has been fundamentally transformed over the last 20 years. It has shifted from a system designed to welcome Cold War refugees from the East and to resettle them as permanent exiles in new homes, to a «non-entrée regime», designed to exclude and control asylum seekers from the South”. The result of such a policy, resulting from the pressure of controlling inflows, may have had the perverse effect of questioning their own legitimacy, since it may erode the guarantee of providing international protection (Baganha et al., 2006).

3.1.2. Irregular migration

Irregular migration and related issues, particularly the organized networks fuelling it, i.e., smuggling and trafficking networks, have been an important area of concern, both for policymakers and researchers, since the 1990s. The volume of irregular migration was in direct relationship with the degree of restrictiveness. Since European immigration policy became restrictive, after the mid-1970s, and mainly during the era of “Fortress Europe”, after the early 1990s, irregular migration became endemic in European societies – although in some countries in higher numbers than in others. Reasons for this were the continued supply and demand for immigrants, the importance of the informal economy (Schneider and Klinglmair, 2004), and the informal and organized networks bringing in immigrants. In other terms, new (irregular) channels were opened for flows and new actors emerged. A lot of research has been devoted to these issues, addressing the policy responses and smuggling and trafficking networks. Less research has dealt with the measure of irregular migration and the lives and strategies of irregular migrants, what is partly explainable by the hidden character of this event.

(a) Control and regularizations

As described above, the measures enacted to improve border control – such as new visa requirements, carrier sanctions and techniques for detecting falsified documents – , used to deter unwanted immigrants, were mainly visible after the 1990s. Despite their volume, they were not enough to eradicate irregular inflows, what explained further forms of control. These included control within the national territory, namely public and workplace inspections, including in the latter sanctions to employers that recruited irregular immigrants.

Sanctions to employers existed since the 1970s, both in Europe and North America. The rationale behind them was the fact that labour demand in the informal economy

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17 An EC funded research project (6th Framework Programme) was recently carried out on this theme: the project, titled “CLANDESTINO - Irregular Migration: Counting the Uncountable. Data and Trends Across Europe”, was coordinated by Anna Triandafyllidou, from the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), and lasted from 2007-2009 (see http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/projects/197_en.html and http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/).
was a crucial variable for explaining inflows. It was thus needed a combat to irregular labour, at the demand side, to effectively deter it. These sanctions were often accompanied by regularisation programmes, a form of “cleaning the field” before harsher measures were put in place. This kind of approach, which was started in countries such as France and Germany in the 1970s, continued throughout the years, although with a drive to the South. In the mid-2000s some Southern European countries, such as Spain and Portugal, followed a similar policy (see, for example, Arango and Jachimowicz, 2005). However, it must be added that employer sanctions have seldom been effective. Reasons for this were insufficient personnel, weak coordination between official agencies, inadequate judicial follow up and defensive strategies by employers and immigrants (Castles and Miller, 2003). Some lack of political will may also have been relevant, given the awareness of the importance of cutbacks in labour costs in some sectors.

Regularization programmes were often launched in European countries since the 1970s. Advantages and disadvantages of such programmes have been diagnosed. The first include the need to terminate employment irregularities, to provide immigrants’ integration and to better know the facts. The latter include the complaint that regularizations are a form of rewarding irregular behaviour and that such operations may have a pull effect over new immigrants (Levinson, 2005). Regularization programmes were common in several European countries during the 1970s and 1980s, but became lesser and more concentrated in space after the 1990s. Initially, they were generalized in Western countries and North America. Countries such as France and the United States carried such operations still in the 1990s, as well as Switzerland in 2000. Until today, advocacy for regularization is frequent in most of the developed host countries. But since the 1990s regularization programmes were mostly enacted in Southern European countries, namely Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece (id., ibid.). The recent increase of immigration in this context, the importance of the informal economy, the search for new – and not purely restrictive – ways of managing immigration, and a favourable political climate, may explain this Southern peculiarity (VV.AA., 2009). It has been object of debate whether the so-called Southern soft underbelly is a reality, suggesting a lesser control at the European Southern borders, or, at the contrary, control failures are of the same type in Southern and Northwestern Europe (Pastore et al., 2006; Finotelli, 2009).

(b) Smuggling and trafficking

The concept of “migration as a business” (Salt and Stein, 1997) and, more generally, the related “migration industry” are today widely used in migration literature. They mostly refer to the fact that a set of organized activities support the movement of people and that this tends to increase when the restrictiveness is higher. The irregular facet of this industry is the one of smuggling and trafficking networks. Since they are closely tied to irregular migration – although legal migrants maybe also involved in trafficking –, their importance has grown throughout the years, attaining a peak after the 1990s.
During this period, a vast amount of the research was devoted to the topic. In this case, it may be easily admitted that research closely followed policy needs. Many of the studies were funded by inter-governmental organisations, such as the IOM, and governmental agencies. For the IOM, combat to human trafficking was one of the highest priorities in the 1990s, and for the EU countries the theme was always high in the agenda. A recent European directive about smuggling and trafficking (Directive 2004/81/EC on the residence permits issued to third-country nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject of an action to facilitate illegal immigration, who cooperate with the competent authorities) confirms the priority of the theme in the EU. It must still be noted that research and policymakers clearly distinguish – at the theoretical and legal levels – two different aspects of this reality: smuggling is defined as the support to irregular migrants, mainly constituting a crime against states; whilst trafficking involves fraud and exploitation, mainly constituting a crime against people.\footnote{The United Nations (UN) produced definitions on both issues in two recent protocols – the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and the UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, both adopted in 2000.}

Research on these themes was abundant after the 1990s. Although the hidden character of smuggling and trafficking made the work challenging and incomplete, the many recourses devoted to it allowed the production of abundant evidence. Research either focussed in destination and transit countries or, in some cases, looked at departure areas, all in different geographical locations. Many Northwestern and Southern European host countries were researched, and Central and Eastern Europe was the object of frequent scrutiny. Furthermore, also departure areas in other continents were observed. Some of the evidence provided lead to some recurrent conclusions. These include the fact that loose networks often combine with highly organized ones, both displaying a very dynamic behaviour in face of policy interventions (for example, Pastore et al., 2006); physical risks associated with both smuggling and trafficking are high (for example, Carling, 2007); supply and demand variables often combine in explaining inflows (for example, Anderson and Davidson, 2003); and regular and irregular statuses often superpose, as is the case of family members and asylum seekers using the services of smugglers, and individuals being trafficked as legal immigrants to the sex industry (using visas to work on the entertainment industry).

3.1.3. Integration policies and citizenship

(a) General policy issues
Until recently, integration was not an issue in European immigration policy. The reason was that immigrants were conceived as temporary workers and their permanent settlement was not officially tackled. However, with the time, it became evident that many guest remained and that support policies should be enacted. Until the 1990s, it was mostly ad hoc measures that were put in place and a large part of the responsibility was delegated to the civil society, particularly NGOs, trade unions and churches. The most notable exceptions were Sweden and the Netherlands, which since
the late 1970s put in practice comprehensive policies. Since the 1990s the situation changed dramatically and most countries developed integration concerns. At the same time it became clear that integration policy should be more than about episodic support, and had to be linked to a self-image of the state. As argued by Penninx et al. (2006: 12), “(...) integration policies inevitably go far beyond the simple idea of providing facilities for newcomers to adapt and function in the new society. The premise of any integration policy ultimately leads to questions of how the society in which newcomers «integrate» essentially defines itself and whether it is able and willing to change. (...) This has led, using the newcomers as a trigger or a threat, to much more fundamental questions and discussions on the identity of our societies: who are we?” (Penninx et al., 2006: 11-12). This meant that the focus of integration policies has also been directed to issues of social cohesion, plunging deeply on the political debate.

In this larger sense, integration policies are closely related with different models of the nation-state or, in other words, with different concepts of citizenship. Historically, following Castles and Miller (2003: 243), three main cases may be found: “some countries of immigration make it very difficult for immigrants to become citizens, others grant citizenship but only at the price of cultural assimilation, while a third group makes it possible for immigrants to become citizens while maintaining distinct cultural identities”. These categories are closely related with laws dealing with the access to nationality, which will be examined in a next sub-section, and more generally with the granting of civil, political and social rights.

It also must be stressed that citizenship is a dynamic field, in the sense that attitudes and policies evolve. This was the case in the EU – and in a multitude of levels. At the national level, several countries have been changing their integration models, including access to nationality. The overall pattern of these changes was neither clear nor straightforward. In some recent cases, this has meant a drive towards a “neo-assimilationist” model, meaning by this a higher claim for identification of would-be immigrants with national norms and language – as reflected in recent policy changes in countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands, whilst in other cases the option for a multicultural model seems to have prevailed – as was the case of some Southern European hosts, such as Portugal.

Regardless of the different integration models, in many cases long-term immigrants have acquired, in the EU societies, a status of quasi-citizenship – designated by Hammar (1990) as denizenship 19 -, whereby a multitude of rights was acquired, except the political ones resulting from nationality. In all cases different types of immigrants acquired different citizenship rights. In this respect, at the EU level several changes occurred, including the granting of the EU citizenship in 1992 and the concession of rights to third country nationals. The latter has included the definition of a status of residential or civic citizenship for long-term residents, object of a recent directive

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19 According to the Swedish sociologist, “denizenship” is one of the three legal statuses associated to immigrants (the other two are alienship and citizenship). It refers to two different immigrant categories: i) labour migrants with permanent residence status and their descendants and ii) recognized refugees.
(Directive 2003/109/EC, concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long term residents), also known as “LTR Directive” (Bauböck et al., 2006) 20.

Finally, it must be noted that the fields of admission and control, on the one hand, and integration policy, on the other, are typically separated domains of intervention and reflection. At the most, the two domains are linked by the frequent political assertion that a restrictive admission is a pre-condition for a successful integration. In recent years, the linkage became stronger and the situation was in some cases reversed. As said, some EU countries, including Denmark and the Netherlands, require that the would-be immigrants attend integration courses or pass a language test. This means that, for the first time, admission is conditional on integration (Penninx et al., 2006; Baganha et al., 2006).

(b) Integration measures
Besides the general principles in which integration policies lie, these may be observed in detail by considering the different domains of policy intervention. At the national, regional and local level, numerous evaluation exercises have been made, either commanded by the authorities or resulting from independent research. At a European comparative level, similar exercises would be of utmost difficulty, given the different institutional contexts of the EU countries and the multiple empirical issues under observation. However, many of the obstacles to a comparative analysis have been removed with the launching of the Migrant Policy Index (MIPEX) (Niessen et al., 2007) 21. This project, carried with the support of the Migration Policy Group and the British Council, and co-financed by the European Community (INTI Programme: Preparatory Actions for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals), involved a large network of European researchers and policymakers. Its objective was comparing the immigrants’ integration policies of the EU states, plus Switzerland, Norway and Canada, aiming to rank them in diverse policy areas and, broadly, on the whole integration policy – disregarding the above notion of integration models. The ranking was achieved by defining a number of policy areas, several policy indicators of each area, and a benchmark for each indicator (based on Council of Europe Conventions, EU Directives and European-wide policy recommendations). Meaningfully, since it reflects the outcome of the categorization process already referred to, the index only refers to third country nationals legally residing in each EU country, not counting EU citizens, refugees and asylum seekers, and irregular migrants.

Aside from the concrete results of such ranking, what is relevant for the current purpose are the policy dimensions considered in MIPEX, since they represent the main specific actions that may be taken by the states in the integration realm. The six policy areas considered in that project were labour market access (including eligibility, labour market integration measures, security of employment and rights associated), family reunion (including eligibility, acquisition conditions, security of status and rights


21 See also http://www.integrationindex.eu.
associated), long-term residence (including eligibility, acquisition conditions, security of status and rights associated), political participation (including electoral rights, political liberties, consultative bodies and implementation policies), access to nationality (including eligibility, acquisition conditions, security of status and dual nationality) and anti-discrimination (including fields of application, enforcement and equality policies). Issues related with family reunion have been observed in a previous sub-section. The issues of political rights and access to nationality, crucial to a full citizenship, will be examined in the next sub-section.

(c) Political rights and access to nationality
Citizenship is a multidimensional concept, which includes a set of civil, social and political rights. The latter is considered of vital importance, since they represent the capacity of voicing and acting over collective issues, i.e., taking part in the management of collective affairs in a political community. The main obstacle to the access to these rights is that they are contingent on nationality. As written by Bauböck et al. (2006: 87), “(...) in contrast with civil liberties and many social welfare entitlements, political participation rights are still significantly attached to the legal status of nationality”.

Several changes occurred in this field, in the EU, during recent decades. When the guestworker era prevailed, the theme was out of the agenda of policymakers and, often, researchers. In the 1990s the situation changed. Political mobilization, participation and representation of immigrant groups were often accepted, especially at the local level. As a result, important novelties showed up, which gradually decoupled political rights from nationality. The EU citizenship and the concession of local voting rights to immigrants, disregarding nationality, was a remarkable step in giving voice to non-national communities. As said above, the European Commission has also introduced the concept of civic citizenship in 2000, meaning by this the granting of several rights and duties to long-term immigrants, including political rights at the local level, as a necessary step for successful integration. In other cases, consultative bodies (local, regional and national) were enacted to represent immigrants. Finally, the discussion has also started, among researchers and policymakers, whether the access to full political rights (including vote in national elections) should depend on nationality or should constitute simply an extension of voting rights (Bauböck et al., 2006) 22.

Nowadays, access to nationality is still the key variable to obtain full voting rights – a matter that is linked, at the same time, to collective identity issues. For this reason its position in the integration debate is of utmost importance. The concession of

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22 An EC funded research project was recently carried out on the theme of immigrants’ political integration at the local level: the project, titled “LOCALMULTIDEM - Multicultural Democracy and Immigrants’ Social Capital in Europe: Participation, Organisational Networks, and Public Policies at the Local Level”, was coordinated by Laura Morales, from Universidad de Murcia, and lasted between 2006-2009 (see http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/projects/256_en.html and http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/eurpolcom/research_projects_localmultidem.cfm).
nationality to a foreigner means not only his/her access to collective power, but also his/her acceptance in the polity as “one of us”.

A large amount of research has been carried out on the evolution of nationality rules throughout Europe. The most comprehensive of such studies was coordinated by Rainer Bauböck, in the framework of a project funded by 6th EU Framework programme. The project, known as NATAC (The Acquisition and Loss of Nationality in EU Member States), compared nationality laws and their implementation in the 15 old member states, being followed by an extension to the 10 new member states and some other European countries. The project intended to know the evolution of contemporary conceptions of statehood, nation-building and citizenship in the EU, as well as testing an eventual convergence hypothesis. Data collected in its framework showed that “(...) there is still a remarkable diversity between European nationality laws concerning conditions for acquisition of citizenship by birth as well as by naturalisation. (...) This is, on the one hand, due to a lack of EU competency for harmonisation or setting of minimum standards. On the other hand, policy imitation across countries seems to be also less developed than in other areas of integration policy” (Bauböck et al., 2006: 74-75). However, some elements suggest that a majority of countries tended to more liberal policies in the 1990s and more restrictive in the new century.

Although nationality laws remain a strict prerogative of individual member-states, it is meaningful that the European Commission has introduced some common principles in this area. In 2003, a communication from the European Commission on immigration, integration and employment (COM (2003) 336 final) suggested some standards for members-states’ nationality laws, indicating that “naturalization should be rapid, secure and non-discretionary” and that for second and third generation immigrants “nationality laws should provide automatic or semi-automatic access” to citizenship” (Bauböck et al., 2006: 84). Until the moment, however, many differences remain, both at the level of the underlying principles of nationality acquisition – particularly the weighting of ius soli and ius sanguinis, together with the ius domicilii – and at the level of practical operationalization of the law.

Meanwhile, at the same time as the debate around the change in citizenship models and nationality laws occurred, a decisive modification took place. With the spread of migration, the easiness of travel and communication and the growing number of mixed marriages, there has been a trend towards the acceptance of dual citizenship. Given the gradual recognition that an individual may have more than one loyalty, an increasing number of EU nation-states has been accepting this principle. In practice, this means that the traditional basis of national political communities is being eroded, in favour of a growing transnationalism (Faist et al., 2008).

For more information on the project, see [http://www.imiscoe.org/natac/](http://www.imiscoe.org/natac/). The results of the NATAC project have been published in 2006, in two volumes (Bauböck, Ersbøll, Groenendijk and Waldrauch, 2006). A third volume about the ten new member states and Turkey has been published in 2007 (Bauböck, Perchinig and Sievers, 2007). Finally, an updated edition was published in 2009 (Bauböck, Perchinig and Sievers, 2009).
3.2. Families: demography, family migration, gender and age

A large body of research has addressed immigration from a family-related perspective. Under this heading, several areas may be referred to. In this section, some of the main recent studies about the demographic impact of immigration, family migration, gender issues and age related migration will be reviewed.

3.2.1. Demographic impact

The demographic impact of immigration in Europe has been the object of an increasing amount of research. The reason for this is plain: in face of the potential decline and structural ageing of the European population, the direct and indirect impacts of immigration have been much welcome. The advent of the second demographic transition, with the persistence of low (and lowest-low) fertility levels and increased life expectancy, has led all European societies to a more or less advanced stage of low natural increase and ageing. The inputs resulting from (usually) young adult immigrants and their offspring allowed total population increase, slowed down the pace of ageing and smoothed some of its consequences.

Studies such as the one of Haug et al. (2002), carried out in the framework of the Council of Europe, have been among the first to delve comparatively on those issues. Despite the frailty of information sources, its conclusions pointed to the fact that immigration have contributed significantly to the positive demographic growth and the lesser pace of ageing in a number of European countries, mainly since the 1960s. This had to do with both its sheer numbers (direct impact) and its delayed demographic effect, given the volume of immigrants’ offspring (indirect impact). Fertility rates among immigrants, although varied, tended frequently to reach the host country levels. However, their concentration on adult fertile ages led in every case to a high proportion of births issued from immigration – the actual basis of the second generation. Alternatively, their mortality rates were low, again given the effect of the young age structure.

After the UN’s (2000) seminal contribution, the impossibility of replacement migration, in the sense of offsetting the consequences of European low fertility, has been repeatedly stated. Several studies, such as Lutz and Scherbov (2006) and Bijak et al. (2007), confirmed that immigration may be, at the most, a small part of the solution to an unavoidable problem, i.e., low demographic growth and ageing. However, simulations of net migration rates over the next decades suggested that a significant immigration would be beneficial to sustain the current quantitative level of the workforce and the current potential support ratios in most EU countries.

Further research delved on the impacts of immigration on fertility, family patterns (see next sub-section), morbidity and mortality. With regard to fertility, some recent studies suggest that immigrants’ fertility, although varied and even when declining towards the host country levels, have added significantly to national demographic conditions.
patterns. On the one hand, children born from immigration account for a growing share of total live births in many EU countries. On the other hand, they have had an impact on the stabilisation or even increase of fertility in some countries, as in some lowest-fertility cases, such as Spain and Italy (Billari, 2008). With regard to morbidity and mortality, and despite the relatively weak incidence of these events in immigrant populations, given its relatively recent character and young age structure, several studies observed the links between migration and health, taking into account health-related problems of immigrant communities and impacts on public health (McKay et al., 2003).

The importance of immigration – including national, intra-EU and third-country national immigrants – for the present and future of European populations is universally accepted. Indeed, it must be reminded that inflows and outflows are part of demography, at the same title as births and deaths. It is only the political and cultural challenges associated with foreign inflows that have given so much visibility to this issue, particularly when non-EU citizens are concerned. The most extreme evaluation of immigration’s impacts is of a British demographer, who is known for his critique stance towards inflows: although Coleman’s (2006) proposal of a “third demographic transition” seems exaggerated, it is useful as a signal of its current importance.

3.2.2. Family migration

(a) Family migration as a field of study

Family migration is an area of recent research. During the traditional period of guestworker migration, neither immigration was supposed to conduce to settlement, nor immigrant families were a challenging issue. Family reunification that took place at the time usually followed the male breadwinner model, thus pointing to a monotone type of immigrant family. In fact, family migration was neglected until recently, both by academics and policymakers. As argued by Kofman and Meetoo (2008: 151-152), this may have resulted from their “conceptualization as a feminized and dependent form of movement with little relevance for labour force participation”. This neglect is, of course, partly linked to the relatively minor role attributed to women’s agency, a situation that only changed recently. In fact, family migration presents an important linkage with studies on gender and migration (see next sub-section).

During the recent decades, and particularly from the 1990s, the increasing diversity of families and migration patterns led to a growing interest on the theme. On the one hand, family patterns changed substantially in Europe, sometimes leading to migration events. On the other hand, migration itself changed, bringing with it implications on family. As synthesized by King et al. (2004: 5-6), “the meaning and nature of the concepts of family and household are challenged both by broad social changes in Europe, and by the increasing diversity of types of migration and mobility, as earlier labour migrations are overlain by migrants who are refugees and asylum-seekers,

24 For example, in Portugal, the number of live-births from a foreign mother or father amounted to circa 12 per cent of the total in 2008, a value that almost tripled the total percentage of foreigners.
clandestine entrants, skilled professionals, students, retirement migrants and many others”.

Interest on family networks and strategies, both at sending and host countries’ level, was part of the widening research. The increasing diversity of gender roles, migration strategies and integration outcomes, including independent female migration, led to many studies on the theme. Another topic meriting particular attention was the one of transnational families, defined as those “(...) that live some or most of the time separated from each other, yet hold together and create something that can be seen as a feeling of collective welfare and unity, namely «familyhood», even across national borders” (Kofman and Meetoo, 2008: 154). However, much is still to be done. According to Kofman and Meetoo (2008: 151-152), “it is necessary (...) to move beyond the narrow economic approaches adopted in previous work on family migration (...) and to examine the changing forms and (re)composition of the family, the diverse strategies deployed in the course of migration, the gendered composition of family migration, the position of specific members of the family, such as children and the elderly, and the implications of policy measures for men and women (...). Furthermore, as women migrating as heads of household now make up almost half of global flows, they are themselves becoming major initiators of family reunification”.

(b) Types of family migration

Family migration is a heterogeneous field of study. This was not always understood as such. As pointed out by King et al. (2006: 252), “European case-studies of international family migration have tended to assume traditional paradigms of family organisation – the nuclear family above all – and have not fully explored or even acknowledged the variety of family and household types which derive from diverse home-country settings, or are evolving amongst European populations, or are developing within specific transnational migration contexts. Several different family-migration trajectories can be identified”. In this respect, researchers and policymakers coincided for many years on the orientation towards the nuclear family, given the narrow concept of family also prevailing at the policy level.

Since the 1990s, it is widely admitted that there are different forms of family migration – and, relatedly, immigrant families. However, the elaboration of a typology is not an easy task, given the “fluid and interacting categories” in the field (Kofman, 2004: 246). The changing migration patterns contribute to this difficulty, as well as the shortcomings of statistical databases. Despite these problems, some general classifications may be used. One was suggested by Kofman (2004), for whom there are three basic types of family migration: i) family reunification; ii) family formation or marriage migration; and iii) whole family migration. The other was indicated by King et al. (2006), who adds to the former typology a separation between family formation and marriage migration, as well as a new category, split-family formation. In the next paragraphs Kofman’s classification will be used.

The first type of family migration is family reunification, the conventional form of this movement. It occurs when an immigrant, living in an host country for a certain period
of time and with an already existing family back home, brings in his/her family members. Given the legal restrictions in the EU, the usual modality of family reunification is the admission of spouses and children, and sometimes also registered partners and dependent parents. Although the typical form of reunification encompasses a male immigrant and his family, there are more and more cases of processes led by immigrant women.

The second type of family migration is family formation or marriage migration. This includes two main sub-groups. In the words of Kofman and Meetoo (2008: 155-156), “the first consists of second and subsequent generations of children of migrant origin (both citizens and non-citizens) who bring in a fiancé(e)/spouse from their parents’ homeland or diasporic space. This group has increased due to the growth of second and subsequent generations who continue to marry external partners, a particular characteristic of Turkish and North African immigrant populations (...). The second variant of marriage migration involves permanent residents or citizens bringing in a partner they have met while abroad for work, study or holiday. In this case, the marriage is a secondary effect of the reason for going abroad”. Other designations for these sub-groups are endogenous marriage, or transnational marriage, in the first case, since it respects to unions of members of the same ethnic group in different countries; and mixed marriage, or binational marriage, in the second case, since it involves members of different ethnic groups (Kraler and Kofman, 2009).

Taking both categories, studies have shown that the volume of family formation surpassed family reunification in recent years. This was particularly true in countries with large settled immigrant communities (Kraler and Kofman, 2009). Particularly, the number of mixed marriages, or binational marriages, has been rising widely. In fact, a broad notion of mixed marriages includes events as varied as spouses brought in from a foreign country, belonging to a different ethnic group from the sponsor; unions of residents in the host country, belonging to different ethnic groups; and (in what may be seen as constituting a statistical bias) unions between citizens (such as naturalized immigrants) and foreigners, although both from the same ethnic group. In any case, mixed marriages account today for a significant share of all marriages taking place in the EU countries, what justifies being an increasing subject of research in Europe (Barbara, 1993).

A particular case meriting attention is the one of arranged marriages, which, in the expression of Kofman and Meetoo (2008: 161), “(...) stands out as one of the forms of marriage migration that needs to be scrutinized, contained and managed”. Although traditional arranged marriages respect to established families, being the marriage usually arranged by parents, other fast-growing modalities are modern matchmaking services and mail-order brides. In the latter cases, a more or less organized intermediation takes place between the partners. The most usual pattern in these relationships involves males from developed countries and women from less developed countries. There is typically a short period for courtship and, in a growing number of cases, internet is replacing direct contact as the means of personal introduction.
Despite the predominance of male partners in the start of family formation processes, recent research has highlighted the growing role of women’s agency (Kofman, 2004). There is an increasing number of female immigrants bringing in male spouses and fiancés from the origin countries, what is related to a more equal gender balance in the second generation and normative changes in sending countries. This is the case, for example, with immigrants from Turkey and North African countries. At the same time, more and more marriages resulting from international contacts result from women’s travelling, studying and working abroad.

The third type of family migration is whole family migration. In this case, the entire family – usually a nuclear family – moves at the same time. Given the legal restrictions, this case is not common in Europe. The major exception respects to some highly skilled immigrants, including intra-EU ones, and refugees. In the first case, some EU countries accept that the family of students, work-permit holders and trainers moves along with the immigrant 25.

(c) Immigrant families
One of the areas where research is still scarce is immigrant families. As pointed out by Wall (2007: 2252), “the sociology of immigrant families represents a significant lacuna in the research on international migration”. According to the same author, the available research on the theme has addressed four main topics: the migration decision (insofar as migration is often an ongoing family project, negotiated at the family level and structured around the needs and resources of the households 26); the forms of family migration (including migration led by male or female partners and whole family migration); the demographic trends (mainly focussing on immigrants’ fertility); and the assimilation of immigration families (studying the different modes of integration of family members, including the second generation) (id., ibid.: 2253-4).

Other perspectives are recently emerging on the topic, mainly respecting to family dynamics. One is the study of reconciliation of work and family in the framework of immigrant families. This was the case of a project funded by the EU entitled “SOCCARE – Families, Work and Social Care in Europe” 27. The project, which compared five EU countries (Finland, France, Italy, Portugal and the UK) has looked into the way how immigrant women with small children balanced work and family care. Among its conclusions, it was shown that the nearly absence of family networks increased the difficulties faced by women, often also subject to a heavy workload and disposing of low incomes, what excluded them to the access to childcare services. The strategies

25 A recent research project funded by the European Commission delved on this topic: the project, coordinated by Norbert Schneider, from the Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz, Federal Institute for Population Research, Germany, was entitled “Job Mobilities and Family Lives in Europe”; its object was the spatial mobility of highly skilled workers inside the EU and its consequences in their family lives (see http://www.jobmob-and-famlives.eu).

26 This approach is used by one of the most relevant theories on migration, the new economics of migration.

27 The project, that lasted from 2000-2003, was coordinated by Sipilae Jorma, from the University of Tampere, Finland (see http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/projects/102_en.html).
enacted by immigrant families to overcome these problems are described in Wall and São José (2004).

Other areas meriting increased attention are mixed marriages and transnational families. In the first case, differences in culture, religion and attitude towards family and gender roles poses specific challenges to family life (see, among others, Barbara, 1993). In the second case, attention is given to the possibility of carrying family life (including care arrangements and economic support) at the transnational space (see, among others, Zontini, 2004). Some of the reasons explaining the growth of the latter are the difficulties facing family reunification, the irregular character of immigration and work, the live-in arrangements facing domestic workers (particularly in the Southern European context), the rotational character of many flows and, of course, the easiness of transport and communication. However, it may be argued that studies on transnational families mostly consider a nuclear dimension of the family. When taking an enlarged notion of the family, the notion is almost as old as international migration itself (although the contacts were indeed less frequent and intense).

3.2.3. Gender

(a) Gender and migration as a field of study

Although some research remains “gender-blind”, there is a consensus nowadays about the relevance of gender as a key analytical category on migration studies. The relevance of gender in migration research can be perceived in two different ways. On the one hand, it is important to a full understanding of the immigrants’ experiences and strategies; on the other, it is crucial to a better knowledge of the outcomes of immigration and integration patterns. Those who reject this idea are neglecting the fact, stated by Anthias, that “gender is a relational social category implicated in a range of social relations linked to the process of migration” (cit. in King et al., 2004: 33).

It is known that gender studies are not only about women. However, the fact is that it has been through them that gender emerged as a key analytical category on the migration field. Mostly inspired by the feminist movement, what may be termed as the “first wave” of research on immigrant women and gendered migration emerged in the early 1980s (e.g. Phizacklea, 1983; Morokvasic, 1984; Simon and Brettell, 1986). These studies have challenged migration research with their innovative perspectives about the role of immigrant women. Following King et al. (2004), their major findings were that i) women migrated in larger numbers than previous male-centred studies suggested; ii) women were not merely “followers” of men, being also primary labour migrants; iii) even when migrating as dependents, women often entered the labour market (with different employment opportunities compared to men); iv) women’s migration patterns and integration outcomes varied according to their national and ethnic background; and, finally, v) migrant women and their families were treated very differently compared to native populations. Furthermore, some of these studies addressed related topics, such as the relationship between production and reproduction in women’s lives, and whether women’s migration and labour experience enhanced their power and status within the households.
Since the late 1990s, a “second wave” of literature on immigrant women and gendered migration emerged. Still following King et al. (2004), four main perspectives stand out: i) migrant women agency, ii) feminisation of international migration, iii) globalisation and iv) transnationalism. In the first case, the role of women is now seen as both affected by structures (as was stressed before) and enabled by them (in the sense of framing their agency), allowing a more flexible analysis of immigration and gender relations. In the second case, women are seen as having a more important role in migration processes, both quantitatively and as social actors, meaning by this the spread of independent strategies. As pointed out by the authors (id., ibid.: 36), “the real point about the feminisation thesis is not to do with quantifying female versus male migration, but recognising the increased agency and independence of women in migration flows and systems”. In the third case, globalisation is seen as both constraining women’s migration paths (for example, originating the feminisation of poverty, leading to the growth of the international market for domestic workers and the sex industry) and providing opportunities for them. In the fourth case, the increased presence and active role of immigrant women in transnational networks (such as family and care networks, including transnational mothering) is stressed, although her position in the hierarchies of power must be still object of discussion.

(b) Migration, patriarchy and women

One of the most relevant points raised by the literature had to do with the impact of international migration over women’s roles and power, i.e., gender relations. Two contrasting views are usually expressed. As expressed by King et al. (2004: 39), “some lay emphasis on migration as a potentially liberating and transformatory experience, through which women are able to regain a measure of control over their lives and destinies – often, however, whilst remaining entrenched in the «service» of their families who may depend on them for their livelihood. Other analyses are more negative: gender is seen as another layer of the multiple oppression of migrant women – structurally discriminated against as migrants, as women (both by the host society and within their own ethnic group), as members of the labouring underclass, as racially stigmatised, and, finally, as accepting these oppressive structures”.

The increased agency and crucial role assured by women in the contemporary world is cited. For example, authors such as Sassen talk about the “feminization of survival”: “because it is mainly women who make a living, create profit and secure government revenue (...) in using the notion of feminization of survival I am not only referring to the fact that households and whole communities are increasingly dependent on women for their survival (...) governments are also dependent on women’s earnings” (cit. in Wall, Nunes and Matias, 2008: 604). In other cases, it is her oppression and victimisation in current migration that is admitted. It may be argued that, in the migration context and, particularly, when observing the European experience, generalized assertions about changes in gender relations are not adequate. Recent findings suggest that patterns of patriarchal and social control may be changing for some immigrants, but not for all.
Hence, some studies suggest that immigration has beneficial effects on women and gender relations. In several occasions, immigration and wage earning in Europe may lead to increasing independence of women, more flexible division of labour at home, less segregation in public spaces and increasing centrality in transnational families and networks. This helps to explain why, in some cases, women are more reluctant than men about return migration.

Contrasting studies describe that many women still suffer of some specific circumstances of their immigrant community’s experience (for example, social exclusion and enclavement), which tend to collide with values of the destination country – usually more favourable to women’s increased autonomy and freedom. At this level, many findings indicate that there is a connection between violence and migration, namely male violent behaviour against women (spouses, sisters and daughters). Some of these studies explore the links between violent male behaviour and social conditions, such as racism experience or unemployment and social relegation, while others explore the connection between violence and different forms of social control within the migrant community (for example, violence against young girls from the second generation). Since some immigrant women create their own activist groups, this means that there is sometimes an awareness of women’s rights within the community.

Furthermore, domestic violence is a problem that goes beyond households and immigrant communities. The channels of “sex, marriage and maids”, as expressed by Phizacklea (1998), define some of the main avenues of female migration to Europe. They are also a clear example of the violence perpetrated against them. The sex industry is largely demand driven, providing occasion for trafficking networks and prostitution, bringing in young women from less developed countries. Marriage, particularly arranged marriages and matchmaking, often links men from European host countries and women from less developed ones – as in the case of mail-order brides. Domestic work and caring, both in live-in and external work arrangements, provide numerous job opportunities for immigrant women, particularly in Southern European countries, where gender relations are more asymmetric (household tasks are less balanced between men and women) and caring is attributed to families. Many of these domestic and caring jobs are viewed as awkward and exploitative (King et al., 2004).

In sum, assertions about female migration strategies, independence and power in migration processes and at the households, and overall change in gender relations as an outcome of migration, must be viewed as more the subject of empirical research than that of generalized assumptions. Supporting this approach, a large array of research have addressed the theme of female migration in Europe in recent years, including various comparative projects funded by the EU 28.

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28 This was the case of projects such as Female Migration Vision, coordinated by Rossana Trifiletti, University of Florence, Italy, 2005-2006 (see http://www.fondazionebrodolini.it/Kernel/Common/DocumentPage.aspx?docId=6401); GRINE – Migrant Women Face Increased Prejudice, coordinated by Luisa Passerini, European University Institute, Florence, Italy, 2001-2004 (see http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/projects/055_en.html);
3.2.4. Age related migration

Migration is closely related with age and the life course. This is known since some of the pioneering works in the field. Studies about human capital and migration, for example, pointed to the fact that most economic migration occurs at young adult ages, given the larger period of return (as migration is an economic investment in human capital, it would not be rational to migrate in mature adult years). Studies about residential mobility suggested that changes in the life cycle – or, more generally, in the life course – are related to geographical movements. This time-based perspective has been reminded by King et al. (2004 and 2006). When applied to family migration events, it is suggested that “taking a time-based perspective, families can be created, split and then reunified through different stages of the migration cycle. The life-history approach sees a complex interweaving of family stages with migration events: family formation or dissolution may set the scene for or trigger migration; and migration in turn may provide opportunities for, or in other cases constrain, particular family formations. Personal and intra-family relationships and dynamics can also play a significant role – such as separation, divorce, or a woman migrating to flee an abusive husband” (King et al., 2004: 43-44). When applied to other movements over the life course, this time-based perspective may also help to explain movements such as migration of children, student migration and retirement migration (King et al., 2006).

Studies on migrant children may be divided according to the framing of the movement, addressing the cases of refugees and asylum seekers, victims of trafficking (particularly trafficking for sexual exploitation), migrant children with EU citizenship, migrant children of third country nationals and inter-country adoptees. Studies on student migration are very recent and fast-growing. They stress the recent growth of these flows, reinforced by the incentives to mobility (such as the Erasmus and Socrates programs at the EU level), their framing on the globalisation of higher education and their linkages to youth culture. Studies on retirement migration are also spreading. They address its multiple facets, which include, among others, retirement migration of wealthy Northwestern Europeans to Southern Europe and retirement migration of former economic migrants to their countries of origin (often intra-EU migration). Still in the case of retirement migration, recent research highlighted the changing patterns of 

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FEMAGE - Needs for Female Immigrants and their Integration in Ageing Societies, coordinated by Charlotte Hoehn, Bundesinstitut fuer Bevolkerungsforschung, Wiesbaden, Germany, 2006-2008 (see http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/projects/195_en.html); FEMIPOL - Integration of Female Immigrants in Labour Market and Society. Policy Assessment and Policy Recommendations, coordinated by Maria Kontos, Institute of Social Research at J.W. Goethe University, Germany, 2006-2008 (see http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/projects/196_en.html); GEMIC – Gender, Migration and Intercultural Interactions in the Mediterranean and South East Europe: an Interdisciplinary Perspective, coordinated by Maria Stratigaki, Panteion University of Political and Social Sciences, Athens, Greece, started in 2008 (see http://www.gemic.eu); and GEMMA – Enhancing Evidence Based Policy-making in Gender and Migration, coordinated by Diassina Di Maggio, Agenzia per la Promozione della Ricerca Europea, Rome, Italy, started in 2008 (see http://www.gemmaproject.eu). The latter site also provides information about other research projects related with gender and migration, including some of those quoted above (see http://www.gemmaproject.eu/projects_static.aspx).
residence and mobility: in the international space, as before in the national one, dual residence and seasonal mobility are increasingly common, therefore rendering complex the study of migration. Given the legal framework, this is much more relevant in the EU than in other international contexts.

All these processes are related to age and, of course, socially constructed, in the sense that they are dependent on broader definitions of the individuals’ positions over the life course. But they are also related to other social variables. Some of them are gendered. For example, retirement migration may be seen – such as domestic work and caring – as a gendered process. As reminded by Kofman (2004: 253), “a small-scale study of Portuguese in France and of those who had returned to Portugal 29 highlighted the enormous disparity between men who entertained return projects, which in many cases forced their wives to return as well, and women who preferred to remain with their family in France”. Other processes are dependent on social status. Both student migration and retirement migration are clearly connected to the individuals’ social position and his/her ability to afford such strategies. Finally, many depend on immigration policies: the free circulation of EU citizens enables them to much easier mobility than occurs with third-country nationals.

3.3. Integration: work, space, identity and second generations

The notion of immigrants’ integration may be explored in two different ways. The first is linked with policies and national models of citizenship, as was seen in a former section. The second results from the integration patterns in several domains, such as labour market, spatial distribution and social relations. These patterns are often structural in character, in the sense that they impose significant constraints over immigrants’ access to resources and life chances, even when accounting for policy initiatives and immigrants’ agency. In other words, they help to explain how immigrants are positioned towards social inequality factors. In general, it is known that some of the variables conditioning individuals’ lives are closely linked with their objective position in the labour market, as occurs with social class, whilst others have to do with subjective factors and cultural differences, such as ethnic belonging. In the field of immigration, several factors impact on immigrants’ life chances, including work and ethnic patterns, but also some others. This section will briefly present some of the available research regarding immigrants’ integration patterns in the EU, taking in mind the role that they display in affecting social inequality.

3.3.1. Labour market

The study of immigrants’ position in the labour market has been often carried out. After the seminal studies of Michael Piore (1979) and Alejandro Portes (1981, among others), the patterns of immigrants’ incorporation in the labour market of developed host countries are well known. A large part of the explanation is presented by the segmented, or dual, labour market theory: the largest proportion of immigrants is

driven by the job opportunities offered in the secondary labour market, i.e., the worse paid and less interesting jobs, dismissed by native workers on economic and social grounds. This means that immigrants are over-exposed to the so-called 3-D jobs (dirty, demanding and dangerous). If this was true during the period of large economic expansion that lasted until the 1970s, it resumed in a different context in the late 20th century, when deregulation and globalisation became dominant. The spread of flexible and precarious forms of employment – including temporary jobs, non-voluntary part-time, atypical time-schedules (such as night shifts), etc. –, as well as labour arrangements in the informal economy, have largely affected the immigrant workforce.

Despite significant national variations, it is understandable that immigrants are displayed in labour statistics with recurrent features: compared to the native workforce, they are usually concentrated in some economic sectors (manufacturing, construction and personal services, including cleaning and caring); are over-represented in temporary jobs; are over-exposed to unemployment; are usually under-paid; and suffer from frequent deskilling (they often work in jobs under their qualifications). National variations regard variables such as employment rates, levels of social protection and engagement in the informal economy. In this respect, several differences distinguish North-western from Southern EU host countries (see, for example, OECD, 2007 and 2008; Arango et al., forthcoming).

Despite their predominance in the secondary labour market, many studies have also delved into other modes of incorporation. The insertion of immigrants in the primary labour market, including the brain drain and highly skilled mobility, has been the object of frequent research. Many of this respect to intra-EU movements (see, for example, OECD, 2002 and Salt, 2004). A more recent line of research has explored immigrants’ entrepreneurship and the related ethnic economy (see, for example, Oliveira and Rath, 2008 and Zhou, 2008). It has addressed several forms of immigrants’ initiatives, often in the framework of urban economies, benefiting from their ethnic social networks and transnational ties. Comparatively less research has addressed the theme of professional and social mobility among immigrants.

### 3.3.2. Spatial segregation

The majority of recent immigration to the EU is directed to large cities. This results from the role performed by these cities in the global economy (Sassen, 1991), the available job opportunities and the role of social networks. The urban context constitutes a magnet over international flows and is also modified by it. As expressed by Fonseca (2008: 6), “(...) the increase in international migration is, simultaneously, part and parcel of the process of globalization and major cities reinforce their position as structural points of the world economic system. At the same time, with regard to the social structure of cities, the most noticeable changes are related with increased income inequality between the social groups at the top and those at the bottom, as well as with the emergence of new types of poverty and social exclusion associated with unemployment, ageing and ethnic origin. These transformations lead to conflicts
that have to be managed at the urban level and within the metropolitan territory. Therefore, urban politics are changing quickly, trying to find new responses to maintain the difficult balance between economic competitiveness and social cohesion”.

At the urban level, the spatial distribution of immigrants is both an outcome and a cause of their broader social differentiation. Residential segregation occurs when there is deviation from a uniform spatial distribution. The degree of segregation of immigrants is higher insofar as an increase in this deviation occurs. As recalled by Asselin et al. (2006: 143), based on the work of Boal, four types of “migrant spatialised communities” exist: areas of assimilation-pluralism (where the natives are a large part of the local population, but not the majority); mixed minorities areas (where two or more ethnic groups coexist); polarised areas (where one ethnic group forms a majority); and ghettos (where there is a high degree of concentration of one ethnic group). The most extreme form of segregation is the one of ghettos – but here also the element of coercion must be added. According to the same authors, “the urban ghetto constitutes an extreme form of spatial segregation. (...) [However], [not] every area inhabited by an ethnically, racially or religiously defined group is a ghetto. The involuntary aspect is a very important dimension. Without the aspect of coercion, the area is more appropriately described as an ethnic enclave” (id., ibid.). In other terms, “all ghettos are segregated, but not all segregated areas are ghettos. Thus, residential segregation is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for ghettoisation” (id., ibid.).

The degree of spatial segregation of immigrants is variable across the EU. There are multiple causes for this variation, including immigrants’ income levels, discrimination in the housing market, public housing policies and degree of ethnic closure. The debate is whether agency or structural variables are to blame: “while some interpret segregation as an outcome of choice (albeit within income constraints), others take a structural approach, viewing segregation as a feature of inequalities in power, resources and discrimination” (Spencer and Cooper, 2007: 36). All in all, it seems clear that national and local specificities are a key variable in this respect. National and local history, urban context and institutional arrangements are decisive in explaining immigrants’ residential patterns in different cities (Asselin et al., 2006). Several case studies carried out on the EU confirm this wide heterogeneity – such as, for example, when Northern are compared with Southern cities (Malheiros, 2002). There is also no evidence whether segregation is generally increasing or not across the EU space.

Since long ago, segregation is equated with a deficit of integration (Asselin et al., 2006). However, a challenging theme of recent research concerns its positive aspects. First of all, the existence of social problems, such as unemployment and social exclusion, is often wrongly associated with segregation. As reminded by Asselin et al. (2006: 144-145), “(...) segregation of elite migrants is never classified as a problem (...). There is evidence from a lot of European cities that some elite migrant populations manifest high levels of segregation”. But more than this, even segregation of low income immigrants may not be problematic, enhancing further capabilities of these groups to integrate. According to Spencer and Cooper (2007: 38-39), “there is no
agreement in the literature on whether segregation is negative for migrants or ethnic minorities (...). Some argue that it is the continuing correlation between ethnic segregation and deprivation which is the problem (...). Although extreme levels of segregation may hinder integration, evidence suggests this may not be the case with moderate levels of segregation. Evidence from Amsterdam shows that minorities in similar levels of segregation vary in their performance on other indexes of integration such as education, employment, social and cultural values and political integration (...). Furthermore, ethnic clustering, by facilitating the development of community infrastructures and social support networks, can enable migrants to feel a sense of belonging”. In short, residential segregation could be a positive aspect of immigrants’ lives, if it does not lead to isolation and exclusion from other opportunities and networks.

3.3.3. Culture and identity

Culture is a complex and dynamic aspect of immigrants’ lives, reflecting modifications over time but also causing further changes. According to Spencer and Cooper (2007: 7), “cultures among migrants, as among host populations, are diverse - by ethnicity and faith but also region, class, gender, age and legal status. Cultural integration involves changes in the attitudes and behaviour of migrants and in those of the host society (in its impact on the arts and cuisine for instance). The literature focuses almost exclusively on changes among migrants”. Oliver Asselin et al. (2006: 137) also share from this opinion, stating that policy initiatives assume a more or less linear path of “integration”, disregarding the fact that assimilation is not a “one-sided concept” and that immigrants have led to changes in European societies.

In general terms, much of the debate around culture evolves around the concepts of assimilation and multiculturalism. The notion of assimilation derives from the traditional North-American experience. It supposes that the immigrants adapt gradually to the host society, by accepting a homogeneous culture practised by the majority. Alternatively, the notion of multiculturalism, mostly developed in the European context (and also Canada), implies that cultural differences between ethnic groups are assumed as long-lasting. Both concepts may be understood at the level of actual practices and at the level of policies. In the latter case, they are linked to the different models of citizenship and nationhood outlined in a previous section. Although sometimes an analysis based on policy objectives may conceal actual cultural outcomes, a large body of research was in fact inspired by the policy discussion (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2004; Asselin et al., 2006).

When viewed in detail, both assimilationist and multiculturalist approaches have displayed many shortcomings during the years. According to Vertovec and Wessendorf (2004), when multiculturalism was developed in Europe, after the 1980s, it represented a turn away from classical assimilationist approaches. Both researchers and policy makers then agreed that the latter were impracticable at the European context, what required the acceptance of cultural diversity. However, after a period where multiculturalism prevailed, a return to assimilationism was verified in the new
century. Referring to the European experience, Asselin et al. (2006: 134-137) state that “(... the comeback of the term «assimilation» is associated with a growing fear that, without staunch policy measures, immigrants and their descendants will not integrate and will pose a serious danger to the cohesion of European societies. (...) (There is) a growing awareness that minority formation among migrants is leading to and reinforcing ethnic stratification, which lends support to positions and policies that are critical of cultural pluralism and multiculturalist principles (...)”. Countries such as the Netherlands, the UK and Germany are therefore viewed as substituting multiculturalism for assimilation, although under the new designation of “integration programmes”.

Some research lines prefer changing from a broad discussion about cultural diversity to a more specific one, about some of its concrete manifestations, such as religious and linguistic diversity (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2004). The latter are crucial areas to observe cultural belonging, since they do not only respect to public but also to private lives of immigrants, including families and households. Although religious issues are far more polemical, EU states have shown a higher degree of acceptance of religious than linguistic diversity. As admitted by Kymlicka (1995), this results from the need of modern states to build a common language, whilst the separation of state and church often occurs in liberal nation-states.

Studies on religious diversity have focused on the growth of religious fundamentalism, the confrontation of religious norms with the principles of the liberal nation-state, and the importance of secularism in increasingly plural societies. Public manifestations of religion have been one area under study. It has been highlighted that they may act as a factor strengthening collective belonging and identity, also contributing to the management of social problems (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2004). Other studies addressed the institutional recognition of religion. In this respect, the recognition of religious minorities and the involvement of religious organisations in policymaking, particularly at the local level, have had positive impacts on integration.

The growth of Muslim immigrants has been one of the major topics under study. With reference to the UK, Spencer and Cooper (2007: 23) state that “(...) Muslims are found to be disproportionately young, concentrated in deprived urban areas, more likely to live in public housing and to have fewer qualifications. They experience discrimination and negative stereotypes on the basis of their faith. The negativity of the Muslim experience has led to religion becoming a more important marker of identity for young Muslims, who seek recognition in the public sphere based on their faith rather than ethnicity”. However, the debate has also evolved around the heterogeneity of Muslim communities (they are diverse in terms of cultural background, language and plurality of views) and the dynamic character of identities. Therefore, the practice of religion is plural and the acceptance of multiple identities (such as European and Muslim) is possible (id., ibid.).

Language is another important marker of identity. At least in the first generations of immigrants, the maintenance of the original language is seen as vital, whilst for
subsequent generations this role is mainly attributed to other cultural artifacts. As said, linguistic diversity does not fit so neatly into the principles of EU states than religious ones. As explained by Vertovec and Wessendorf (2004: 30), “(...) it is justifiable to require an immigrant to learn another language, whereas it is rather problematic to ask an immigrant to change his/her religion. Hence, language assimilation is generally interpreted to be more compatible with liberal values than religious assimilation, because the acquisition of language does not prevent people from freely expressing their moral convictions”. This helps to explain why the issue of mandatory language courses as a pre-condition to integration has been accepted in recent years. In the case of immigrants’ children, the incidence of bilingualism has been also object of scrutiny. In spite of the evidence about higher school failure among these youngsters, some efforts are still laid down in the building of mechanisms to bridge cultural and linguistic difference, favouring the acceptance of multilingual contexts in everyday lives (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2004).

The issue of cultural diversity has witnessed recently an important leap with the introduction of the notion of “super-diversity” (Vertovec, 2006). Referring to the UK context and, particularly, the experience of London, the author argues that diversity of national origins and ethnic belonging, among immigrant groups, is no longer enough to explain the current dynamics. According to him, “over the past ten years, the nature of immigration to Britain has brought with it a transformative «diversification of diversity» not just in terms of ethnicities and countries of origin, but also with respect to a variety of significant variables that affect where, how and with whom people live. These additional variables, which importantly must be seen as mutually conditioning, include a differentiation in immigration statuses and their concomitant entitlements and restrictions of rights, labour market experiences, gender and age profiles, spatial factors, and local area responses by service providers and residents. Rarely are these factors described side by side, and often issues of ethnic diversity and the stratification of immigrants’ rights are explored separately” (id., ibid.: 1). In sum, “a simple ethnicity-focused approach to understanding and engaging minority groups in Britain, as taken in many models and policies within conventional multiculturalism, is inadequate and often inappropriate for dealing with immigrants’ needs or understanding their dynamics of inclusion or exclusion” (id., ibid.: 17).

This means that the positioning of immigrants towards the access to resources and life chances is an increasingly complex matter. Traditional sociological categories, such as labour market incorporation (and social class) and ethnic belonging, were already powerful predictors of difference. However, in the case of contemporary immigration, other factors now add to the discussion, including – as suggested by Vertovec – legal status, gender and age profiles, spatial patterns and policy responses. In an already plural EU, this represents an entire program of research for many years to come.
3.3.4. Second generation

Studies about the second generation are crucial to understand immigrants’ integration. This mostly results from the time perspective so important in migration studies. As known since the classical theories in the field, only a long-term perspective may conclude by the success or failure of migration projects. Time is needed to pay off the costs of migration, to acquire new human and social capital, and to overcome obstacles to integration. Studies on intra-generational and, particularly, inter-generational mobility are thus crucial in integration processes. Moreover, second generations often may acquire the citizenship of the host country – which is, in many respects, the main obstacle to integration and participation. Hence their success or failure is telling about the way a society is dealing with its new members. Under the term “second generation” are usually subsumed the native-born children of immigrants (foreign-born parents) and, in some cases, also the children that arrived before primary school. Sometimes the term “1.5 generation” is also used to designate children arrived very early in their lives or immediately after starting their school careers.

Second generations in Europe are still recent. Taking into account the major inflows that took place after the 1950s, most of the immigrants’ offspring is still in an early stage of its life. The majority of the immigrants’ descendants attended primary school in the 1980s and secondary school in the 1990s, and are now entering the labour market. This explains why most of the studies until now observed the educational attainment and the transition from school to work, but not yet the occupational trajectory. This poses some differences compared to the study of second generation in traditional immigration countries, such as the United States – although the study of the “new second generation” in this last context provides an interesting parallelism (King et al., 2006; Thamson and Crul, 2007). As said in a previous section, the early stage of these studies in Europe will not conceal its long-lasting future. Immigrants’ offspring is an increasing part of the European demography, what means that larger generations of children with an immigrant background are entering, year by year, in families, schools, work and public life.

The number of studies about the second generation in Europe is increasing. In general, they have showed that, in educational terms, immigrants’ children perform worse than children with no immigrant background, although better than foreign-born children. When observing their early performance at the labour market, they confirmed their lowest employment rates, vulnerability to unemployment and lowest access to skilled jobs, when compared with native youngsters, although again showing better indicators than foreign-born youngsters. These gaps are justified by the low socio-economic background from which they come (third country immigrants in the EU are usually characterized by low education and/or low socio-economic condition), worse access to social networks in the labour market and discrimination (Castles and Miller, 2009: 227-229). Since many of these descendants acquired national citizenship, the fact that
discrimination is not only based on nationality, but also in ethnic origin, explains part of the problem.  

When viewed in detail, the situation of second generations in Europe is however more complex (Crul and Vermeulen, 2003; King et al., 2004 and 2006). Many of the recent research have highlighted many differences among EU countries and among immigrant groups. On the one hand, national contexts explain a large part of the variability in integration patterns. This often respects less to immigrant oriented policies than to educational and labour market national arrangements, such as type of schooling (vocational or non vocational) and access to higher education. On the other hand, immigrant communities display heterogeneity and polarization (even when coming from the same sending country), between and within EU countries. This means that it is possible to observe a fraction of second generation youngsters, for example Turks, performing well in some EU countries, and risking to become an underclass in others.

Factors affecting second generation outcomes are thus complex. As expressed by King et al. (2004: 50), two sets of determinants “(...) shape the integration processes of the second generation: external factors, such as levels of discrimination and the degree of social and residential segregation; and factors intrinsic to ethnic groups, including the ability to access social support networks, level of education and skills, and the amount of financial resources available. Intrinsic cultural values, though they risk attributing behavioural differences to «culture» alone (...), do offer insights into why certain ethnic groups attain higher levels of social mobility than others despite similar socio-economic backgrounds. An apt example is the value that immigrant parents attach to their children’s education”. Comparisons between the EU and other receiving contexts are also problematic given the higher European variety. According to the same authors (id., ibid.: 52), the theory of “segmented assimilation”, developed at the United States to understand recent integration patterns of the second generation, is inadequate at the EU since it disregards “(...) differences between European countries in terms of education policy, citizenship laws, discourse on immigration and race, and inequalities in society as a whole”, as well as internal differences within ethnic groups.

In face of these challenges, several EU cross-national projects have been developed during the last years.  

30 For example, according to Spencer and Cooper (2007: 23), “a recent edited volume on France finds consensus (...) that the French aspiration to equality has not protected ethnic minorities from discrimination, for instance in working class jobs, university admissions or central government policy making. As a consequence, it finds disadvantaged minorities are increasingly expressing their ethnic identity (...)”.

31 Among these, two main projects must be taken in account. The first is EFFNATIS –“Effectiveness of National Integration Strategies Towards Second Generation Migrant Youth in a Comparative European Perspective” –, which lasted from 1998-2000. The project, coordinated by Friedrich Heckmann, from the European Forum for Migration Studies, University of Bamberg, Germany, and funded by the EU Commission under the TSER framework programme, aimed to compare different national integration policies and their effect on second-generation integration in six European countries. Taking into account that EFFNATIS did not compare the same ethnic groups in different countries, another European project emerged in 2003 – TIES, “The Integration of the European Second-Generation”, coordinated by M. Crul and J. Schneider, from the Institute of Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES), University of Amsterdam,
the second generations; the wide variety according to national contexts; some contradictory situations within the same groups; differing degrees of ethnic closure; and even unexpected variations in time. For example, “the position of second-generation Turks, Moroccans and other migrant groups varies widely between the different countries in Europe, and it is not easy to make an overall assessment of trends. The picture is further complicated by the polarizations within ethnic groups that exist in some countries. Moreover, if we view the development of different groups over time, we do not see a linear process. The Moroccan community, for instance, once seemed headed for downward assimilation, but now seems to be rising. This underscores the hazards of premature classification” (Crul and Vermeulen, 2003: 982-983).

An interesting study was recently carried out about the French case (Attias-Donfut and Wolff, 2009). It concluded that, in many respects, the integration of immigrants’ descendants was being a success. According to the authors, this was an outcome of a major change occurring within these families: the “unchaining of generations”. By this concept they mean the cultural shock between first generation immigrants and their children, since several discontinuities emerge between them: language, culture, family values, identity, memory, life experiences and social trajectories. The result is a relatively favourable setting for the second generation’s integration, although several factors still hinder an easy generalisation. The latter include the socio-economic status (which constrains mobility more than cultural and ethnic traits), gender (immigrants’ daughters perform better, particularly at school, than sons) and parents behaviour (stronger adhesion on the part of immigrants to host society norms and values makes easier their children’s integration).

4. Concluding remarks

Research on immigration in Europe is large and plural. The nature of its object of study explains many of its characteristics. Viewed from today, immigration is already a long-lasting feature of European societies. Immigrants entered mostly after the end of the Second World War and, from then on, never ceased their flow. The national origins, educational background, occupational profile, immigration strategy, culture and identity largely varied, as much as their specific destination. One after another, all

and funded by several European institutions (see http://www.tiesproject.eu/component?option=com_frontpage/itemid,1/lang,en). This latter limited its comparative dimension to the study of three distinct immigrant communities – the Turkish, Moroccan and ex-Yugoslavian second-generation (for some results see, for example, Crul, 2008). More recently, another two projects took place in the European context: TRESEGY and EU MARGINS, both funded by the EU. The first, TRESEGY – “Toward a Social Construction of an European Younthess: Experience of inclusion and exclusion in the public sphere among second generation migrated teenagers”, was coordinated by Luca Queirolo Palmas (University of Genoa, Italy), and lasted from 2006-2009. The second, EU MARGINS – “On the Margins of the European Community - Adult Immigrants in Seven European Countries (Spain, UK, Italy, France, Estonia, Sweden and Norway)”, funded by the EC 7th Framework Programme and coordinated by Max J. Demuth (Oslo University, Norway) and will last from 2008 to 2011 (this project is devoted to the study of the inclusion or exclusion of young adult immigrants).
North, Western and Southern European countries became countries of destination – even when also sending ones –, and Central and Eastern European countries are now also involved. Europe is now a mosaic of immigrants, whose numbers do not lag much behind traditional immigration countries, whose patterns are not easily categorised, and whose structural role in future European societies is undeniable.

The different facets of immigration in the EU have been the object of numerous studies. In this review, three major areas were identified: policy issues, family related issues and integration patterns. In each, a brief synthesis of the main research trends and findings was tentatively made. The main sub-themes addressed were: in the policy area, admission and control policies, integration measures and citizenship models; in the family area, demographic impacts, family migration, gender and age related migration; and, in the integration field, labour market incorporation, spatial distribution, identity issues and second generations. The picture that stands out is a complex one, resisting to a simple summary. Policy initiatives were multiple and ever-changing, as the immigration context and policy framework varied. Family patterns were heterogeneous, adding to the pre-existing richness of family diversity in Europe. Integration patterns were complex, balancing between (formal) equality and stratification, and between assimilation and continuous difference. All this is more intricate when the different national contexts of reception are taken in mind, as well as the different characteristics of immigrants received in each European nation.

The changing patterns of international migration at the turn of the century add further challenges to its study. Currently, new forms of mobility are becoming common, surpassing the traditional settlement migration known until recently. Temporary and seasonal migration became common, as well as a frequent circulation and the holding of multiple interests in multiple countries. The notion of transnationalism received vast attention in the last few years (Vertovec, 2008). Different aspects of transnationalism have been highlighted in this report, including political (dual citizenship), familial (transnational families), economic (remittances, entrepreneurship) and identity-related issue. This means that individuals’ lives no longer remain attached to one single location (and country), as was admitted by classical migration theory and social research.

Despite the abundant literature on migration issues developed over the last decades in Europe, the gaps existing in current research are still many. A comprehensive overview of some themes deserving further attention has been already made by some other states of the art in this field (see, for example, Penninx et al., 2006 and 2008; Spencer and Cooper, 2007). In the following paragraphs, only a brief summary of some research gaps will be made below, mainly referring to family and integration issues.

The first and foremost need is of more complete and comparative data. As seen above, data on immigration in the EU is currently limited. Concepts and sources vary, and several areas are badly captured. Beyond the description of some major variables, an in-depth comparative study of immigrants’ characteristics, families and the second generation is hardly allowed under the current datasets. Longitudinal studies, that
allow an understanding of the mobility experience, are also generally not available. As reminded by Spencer and Cooper (2007), the lack of statistics on many areas, the use of different criteria to identify migrants, and even the use of different concepts to mean overlapping issues (for example, integration, cohesion and inclusion), make it difficult to compare immigration and integration across the EU 32.

At the policy level, some of the areas deserving better scrutiny are the impact of family reunification on immigrants’ strategies (settlement, integration and participation); the impact of specific legislation on the family life (spouse’s access to employment, right to social housing, right to public education and health services); the consequences of recent policy restrictions for family reunification and formation; and the use of irregular channels by family members for immigration and integration. In other words, the role of the family reunification and family formation channels, of family support measures and of the family itself as a mechanism for integration is still understudied (Spencer and Cooper 2007). The mechanisms providing full citizenship, as well as their outcomes, could also be more thoroughly studied. A deeper analysis is still to be done on the reasons why naturalization and dual citizenship are used (or not) by immigrants and their offspring; their outcomes on individuals’ lives and prospects, both at the destination and the sending countries; and the effects of (limited) political participation on immigrants’ integration.

At the family level, much more research is needed on immigrants’ families and changes resulting from migration. Some of themes meriting further attention are related with family strategies: these include the role of families in migration decisions; the constraints exerted by the economic and policy framework on collective strategies; and the role of the family in promoting the overall integration of its members (including descendants). Other themes deserving study are related with family structures: this is mainly the case of transnational families, marriage migration and mixed marriages. The latter could be observed under the perspective of its national and cultural combinations; its impact on relationships, children and host country attitudes; and the difference between contacts started in the host country and in a foreign context (for example, EU citizens travelling, studying and working abroad). Finally, also changes within the family resulting from immigration (for example, conflicts about women roles) could be further analysed. In general, it may be argued that family migration was much less studied than other related issues, such as gender 33.

32 Besides the full implementation of the EC Regulation on migration statistics produced in 2007 (see above), a study funded under the 6TH Framework Programme may overcome some of these problems. The objective of this study – PROMINSTAT – is “to promote comparative quantitative research in the field of migration and integration”, providing an online database for 27 European countries (25 EU, plus Norway and Switzerland). The project, started in 2007, is coordinated by Albert Kraler, from the International Centre for Migration Policy Development Research and Policy (RaP), Vienna (see http://www.prominstat.eu/drupal/?q=node/64).

33 On the gaps on family related research, see also King et al., 2004; Kofman, 2004; and Spencer and Cooper, 2007.
With regard to gender, the most needed work seems to be on immigrant men. As written by King et al. (2004: 41), “we recommend attention be paid to the connections between migration processes and the construction of masculinity: this reflects the view that constructions of masculinity have not been given due regard within anthropology and the social sciences”. Eventual changes in masculinity may both affect immigrants and the non-migrant population staying in the host country. Also deserving attention are the impacts of transnational family arrangements on women (and men)’s lives. The enactment of transnational support may be gendered, affecting differentially family members. With regard to age related migration, more study is needed on student migration and retirement migration, including, in the latter, the existence of multiple residences.

At the integration level, a vast area of research remains to be done. With regard to the labour market, more studies are needed about immigrants’ professional mobility; linkages between work and integration (in the sense of inclusion or structural exclusion); employers’ recruitment strategies; role of social networks in providing employment and mobility; entrepreneurship; and (mostly in the current recession) strategies to overcome unemployment. With regard to cities and residential segregation, themes to be explored are the subjective experiences of immigrants (and second generations) at the local level; strategies of landlords to take profit of immigrants housing needs and policy regulations; immigrants’ strategies in the housing domain, including residential mobility; relationship between residential segregation and integration; spatial accessibility to education resources and health care systems; and spatial mobility of the second generation. With regard to culture and identity, themes calling for further exploration include the impact of immigrants on the host society’ culture; the evolution of cultural difference and multiculturalism; the possible combination of cultural (including religious and linguistic) differences and overall integration (differences may not conceal integration in an already highly complex and differentiated host society); the role of religions other than Islam in influencing the integration process; the conflict between religion and secularism; the reasons and outcomes of the immigrants (and second generation)’s attachment to their original language; the role of immigrants (and second generation)’s cultural productions as forms of political expression; and the ongoing discrimination on cultural and ethnic grounds. Finally, with regard to the second generation, research is needed on its performance at the education system; mobility within the labour market; and the impact of irregular immigrants’ conditions over their children life chances.

In sum, migration research is an area of rich past and promising future in the EU. Since immigration became part and parcel of European societies, immigrants and their offspring are becoming a structural aspect of European populations. Moreover, much of the recent social change has resulted from migration – and the future study of immigration and its outcomes will be rightly equated with the study of Europe itself. The variety in policy issues, family life and integration patterns will be partly a heritage of a former Europe, in which international migration was not an issue, and partly the result of years of unprecedented inflows.
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## Table 1
### Net migration rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Net migration rate</th>
<th>Per 1000 inhabitants</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2025</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD Factbook 2009: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics
Table 2
Foreign-born and foreign populations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Foreign-born population</th>
<th>Foreign population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Australia      | 23.0 23.2 23.1 23.0 23.1 23.2 23.4 23.6 23.8 24.1 | ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
| Austria        | ... 11.2 10.9 10.5 11.1 10.8 11.4 13.0 13.5 14.1 | 8.5 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9 9.2 9.4 9.5 9.7 9.9 ...
| Belgium        | 9.7 10.0 10.2 10.3 10.8 11.1 11.4 11.7 12.1 12.5 | 9.0 9.0 8.9 8.7 8.8 8.4 8.2 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.6 8.8 ...
| Canada         | 17.2 17.8 18.0 18.1 18.4 18.7 19.0 19.2 19.5 19.8 | ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
| Czech Republic | ... 4.3 4.4 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.7 4.9 5.1 5.5 | 1.5 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.7 3.1 ...
| Denmark        | 4.8 5.4 5.6 5.8 6.0 6.2 6.3 6.3 6.5 6.8 | 4.2 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.8 5.0 4.9 5.0 4.9 5.0 5.1 ...
| Finland        | 2.0 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.2 3.4 3.6 | 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 ...
| France         | ... 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.7 7.8 8.0 8.1 8.3 | ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
| Germany        | 11.5 12.2 12.4 12.5 12.6 12.8 12.9 ... ... ... | 8.8 8.9 9.0 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 ...
| Greece         | ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
| Hungary        | 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.4 | 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 ...
| Ireland        | ... 7.8 8.2 8.7 9.3 10.0 10.8 11.6 12.7 14.4 | 2.7 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.1 3.3 4.0 4.8 5.6 5.5 6.3 ...
| Italy          | ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
| Japan          | ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
| Korea          | ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
| Luxembourg     | 30.9 32.2 32.8 33.2 32.8 32.9 33.0 33.2 33.8 34.8 | 33.4 34.1 34.9 35.6 36.0 37.3 37.5 38.1 38.6 39.3 40.4 41.6 ...
| Mexico         | 0.4 ... ... 0.5 ... ... 0.4 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
| Netherlands    | 9.1 9.6 9.8 10.1 10.4 10.6 10.7 10.6 10.6 10.6 | 4.7 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.2 ...
| New Zealand    | ... 16.5 16.8 17.2 18.0 18.7 19.2 19.6 20.5 21.2 | ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
| Norway         | 5.5 6.1 6.5 6.8 6.9 7.3 7.6 7.8 8.2 8.7 | 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.7 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.3 4.6 4.8 5.1 ...
| Poland         | ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
| Portugal       | 5.4 5.1 5.1 5.1 6.3 6.7 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.9 6.3 6.1 | 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.1 3.5 4.1 4.3 4.5 4.1 4.1 ...
| Slovak Republic| ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
| Spain          | ... 3.2 3.7 4.9 6.4 8.0 8.8 10.3 11.1 11.9 | ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
| Sweden         | 10.5 11.0 11.8 11.3 11.5 11.8 12.0 12.2 12.4 12.9 | 6.0 6.0 5.9 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.4 ...
| Switzerland    | 21.4 21.4 21.6 21.9 22.3 22.8 23.1 23.5 23.8 24.1 | 18.9 18.9 19.0 19.0 19.2 19.3 19.7 19.9 20.0 20.2 20.3 20.3 ...
| Turkey         | ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
| United Kingdom | 6.9 7.4 7.6 7.9 8.2 8.6 8.9 9.3 9.7 10.1 | 3.4 3.4 3.6 3.8 3.8 4.0 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.9 5.2 5.8 ...
| United States  | 9.3 10.8 10.6 11.0 11.3 12.3 12.8 12.8 12.9 13.0 | 6.0 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
| Chile          | ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
| Estonia        | ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
| Slovenia       | 10.4 10.8 10.8 10.9 10.9 11.0 10.9 11.1 11.3 | 2.4 2.2 2.1 1.7 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 ...

Source: OECD Factbook 2009: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics
### Table 3

Employment rates of native-born and foreign-born population by educational attainment, 2006

As a percentage of total population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Low education</th>
<th>Intermediate</th>
<th>High education</th>
<th>Low education</th>
<th>Intermediate</th>
<th>High education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>74.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>72.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>77.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>79.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>78.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>72.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>68.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>71.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>73.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>77.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
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<td>73.7</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>80.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>70.2</td>
<td>73.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>85.6</td>
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<td>83.4</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>..</td>
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</tr>
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<td>81.9</td>
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<td>73.6</td>
<td>75.3</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>88.3</td>
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<td>66.5</td>
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<td>92.7</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>81.9</td>
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<td>72.7</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>73.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>78.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD average</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>76.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>88.3</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>78.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD Factbook 2009: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics
### Table 4
Employment of foreign-born by sector, 2003-2004 (average)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Percentage of total foreign-born employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and fishing</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining, Manufacturing and Energy</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and retail trade</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels and restaurants</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and other community services</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin. and ETO</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada (2003)</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (2002)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The numbers in bold indicate the sectors where foreign-born are over-represented (i.e., the share of foreign-born employment in the sector is larger than the share of foreign-born employment in total employment). The sign "-" indicates that the estimate is not reliable enough for publication.

Source: OECD, International Migration Outlook, 2006
Figure 1

Chart I.2. Contribution of net migration and natural increase to population growth, 2006

Note: Data for Canada, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and Turkey are for 2005.
Figure 2
Foreign-born population, 2006 or latest available year
As a percentage of total population

Source: OECD Factbook 2009: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics
Figure 3
Permanent-type immigration by category of inflow, 2006
Percentage of total inflows

Source: OECD, International Migration Outlook, 2008
Figure 4

Participation rate by birth status in OECD countries, 2003-2004

Source: OECD, International Migration Outlook, 2006
Figure 5
Gap in employment rate between native-born and foreign-born population by educational attainment, 2006
Percentage points

Source: OECD Factbook 2009: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics
Figure 6

Share of temporary employment in total employment by birth status, 2004

Source: OECD, International Migration Outlook, 2006
Figure 7
Foreign-born unemployment rate relative to native-born unemployment rate, 2006

Source: OECD Factbook 2009: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics