Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/2626
Título: On Random Matching Markets: Properties and Equilibria
Autor: Pais, Joana
Palavras-chave: Matching Markets
Stability
Random Mechanism
Data: 2006
Editora: ISEG – Departamento de Economia
Citação: Pais, Joana. 2006. "On Random Matching Markets: Properties and Equilibria". Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão - DE Working papers nº 11-2006/DE/UECE
Relatório da Série N.º: DE Working papers;nº 11-2006/DE/UECE
Resumo: We consider centralized matching markets in which, starting from an arbitrary match¬ing, firms are successively chosen in a random fashion and offer their positions to the workers they prefer the most. We propose an algorithm that generalizes some well-known algorithms and explore some of its properties. In particular, different executions of the algorithm may lead to diferent output matchings. We then study incentives in the rev¬elation game induced by the algorithm. We prove that ordinal equilibria always exist. Furthermore, every matching that results from an equilibrium play of the game is stable for a particular preference profile. Namely, if an ordinal equilibrium exists in which firms reveal their true preferences, only matchings that are stable for the true preferences can be obtained.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/2626
ISSN: 0874-4548
Versão do Editor: https://aquila1.iseg.utl.pt/aquila/getFile.do?method=getFile&fileId=26447
Aparece nas colecções:DE - Documentos de trabalho / Working Papers
UECE - Documentos de Trabalho / UECE - Working Papers

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